

Chasma Right Bank Irrigation Project (CRBIP)– A Survey Report

**By
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Foreword

CRBIP (Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project) started in 1978 and is to be completed in 2002. Since 1978, a lot has changed regarding compensations, resettlement and response to the people's grievances, thanks to the involvement of NGOs in reviewing the development projects. This project was not reviewed by any independent body or NGO—examination reports and reviews by the donor's consultants notwithstanding. Sungi Development Foundation took the initiative to organize a short survey of the project (for the brief TOR, see Appendix 1). The two member team (Muhammad Ahsan Khan of Sungi and Khadim Hussain) mainly met the project officials and various communities in the Stage III area, to understand and to critically look at the various aspects of the project. As, the technical review of the project was out of the scope of this study, it focussed mainly on the social consequences, environmental impact and compensatory aspects of the project. Meetings with the communities were confined to the Stage III. Strength of this survey is that it brings out communities and public view of the project, including their perceptions, concerns, fears and hopes. Appendix 2 tells how the survey was designed, while Appendix 3 sketches out the schedule of meetings and visits. The report is organized into five chapters—

- 1. Brief description of the project**
- 2. Land Acquisition Process**
- 3. Impact on Environment**
- 4. Social Impact**
- 5. Relocation and resettlement**

Special thanks to:

- Damaan--a local NGO, which coordinated the whole program of visits and meetings-- and its members Ahsan Wagha, Shafi Qaisrani, Allah Wasaya and Ghulam Mohammed
- Chief Engineer of the project Mr. Khalid Waheed, Director Technical, Mr. Sher Zaman Khan and the Collector Gul Aslam Khan.
- Naib Tehsildar Abdul Aziz and Patwari Shahnawaz in *Taunsa*
- John Anania of Sheladia Associates Inc.

- Tahir Shahnawaz- a farmer and an activist
- All the communities we visited, who were welcoming and hospitable.

Khadim Hussain
On behalf of Sungi

Date: November 21, 2000

Brief Description of the CRBIP

Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project, primarily, involves the construction of 274 kilometer long canal taking off from the existing Chashma Barrage, which runs roughly parallel to and on the right side of the Indus River. It also includes the construction of 72 distributaries, 68 X-drainage structures and 91 bridges. As this is meant to irrigate a command area of 606000 acres—the area bound by the canal and the River--building watercourses and water management would be the conclusive part of it. Main features of the main canal and of Stage III are represented by the following tables.

Table-1 Lengths, Command Area and Water Allocation (Main Canal)

Stages	Length Miles/Kms	Command Area (Acres)	Discharge (Cusecs)
I—Total	52/84	150000	1226
NWFP	52/84	146000	1192
Punjab	--	4000	34
II—Total	24/39	94000	800
NWFP	24/39	94000	800
Punjab	--	--	--
III—Total	94/151	362000	2853
NWFP	30/48	126000	1053
Punjab	63/103	236000	1800
Total—	170/274	606000	4879
NWFP	106/171	366000	3045
Punjab	64/103	240000	1834

Table 2—Distributaries, Flood Carrier Channels (FCC) and other structures of Stage III

Name of Structure	NWFP	Punjab	Total
<u>Distributeries</u>			
Nos.	13	31	44
Length- miles/km	138/222	276/444	414/666
<u>FCC</u>			
Nos.	8	21	29
Length- miles/kms	72/116	142/229	214/345
<u>Others</u>			
Bridges	8	27	35
X-Drainage	8	21	29
Head Regulators	13	31	44
Escapes	1	4	5
Cross Regulators	4	13	17

Although the project was conceived a long time ago, it was decided in mid seventies and the work started in 1978. The main donor for the project is Asian Development Bank

(ADB). Stage 1 was completed in 1986, the work on the stage II was commenced in 1988 and completed in 1994. The construction of Stage III started in 1995 and will be completed in August 2002. After completion, the project will be handed over to two provinces, NWFP and Punjab, in accordance with their relevant portions. Precisely due to this, stage 1 and stage II were not handed over to the concerned province and still are being run by WAPDA (the executing body).

Stage III comprises four components; the first two components—Main canal & structures and Distributaries—are being managed by WAPDA while the last two—On Farm Water Management and Agriculture & Livestock are the responsibility of the provinces.

Remarks:

When asked about the impact of the project the chief engineer remarked:

We have sprinkled pieces of gold all around, these were barren lands and now you can see what happened to these.

On the other hand a farmer of the stage III area commented:

So far we have seen only destruction, all my land is cut up into pieces, the rest is being excavated for this distributary, I don't know when we will reap the benefits

An elderly farmer commented:

I don't think we will get the water in our area, most of it will be consumed in NWFP, the rest will be controlled by the powerful, surely, water will not reach the tail ends.

- We observed the dismantling of the Indus Super Highway for constructing the bridges for the nullahs—millions of Rupees are being spent. Coupled with the expenditures on the super-passages, these funds could have been spent to control the hill torrents at their outlets, which could also accrue more benefits to the area west of canal, we just wondered.
- As the photographs show the embankments of the main canal were severely eroded by the rainwater as no grass or trees have been planted yet.
- We don't think the system to block the silt from rain's erosion of the canal banks would ever work—see the photograph—it will certainly choke.
- Defective linings were spotted, this could be extremely dangerous--photo

Land Acquisition Process

Official Position:

Land acquisition officials hold that the process is precisely according to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The Collector for the NWFP's portion of the project, where almost all of the compensations have been paid, provided the following figures.

Table 3:

Stage	Land notified to be acquired- Acres	Land acquired so far- Acres	Remaining- Acres	Compensation made so far— Million Rs.
Stage I	5482	5383	99	79
Stage II	5906	4841	1065	248
Stage III	5980	390	5590	14

This evidently shows that the process is still underway in Stage III.

When asked about the number of the affected people, he said that he didn't have the figures but it certainly ran into lakhs (100 thousands).

The official in *Taunsa* town provided more details about the process. According to him the rates for the trees, crops and lands were taken from the relevant departments (such as Revenue, Agriculture and Forest departments). For example, Sheesham tree of 6-9 inch diameter was priced at Rs.84 while that of 30-33 inch stood at Rs. 2880/-. The Dates trees for the ages of one, nine, 15 and 30 years were respectively priced at Rs. 45, 435, 261 and 63. These prices are very low, even one is needy and willing to sell his/her trees.

Similarly, the official position is that the notification was made on March 3, 1999 and hence the payments for the crops, trees and other assets are due after one year. So the payments are being made to whoever comes and satisfies the official about his/her identity. Similarly the compensations for the land are under process, meanwhile the negotiations with the affected villages for resettlement are under way.

Peoples' View:

Almost all the people we met complained about the lack of information—rather, they had no authentic information at all and were totally lost in rumors and speculations. Nobody received any notice, no official informed them what was happening to their lands and assets; the people only come to know when the contractors' men show up to dig or destroy the trees/crops. These construction workers hold varying versions about the compensations and cool down the landowners with promises. If somebody resists, first they threaten with the consequences and if the persons or parties stick to their guns, they leave that very place and start the work on some other location. This is another way of frightening the communities that the water to their lands will be delayed for an unspecified time (see the photo of the abandoned tube-well). Only one person, out of so many we met, told us that he did receive the compensation. It was due to his continued meetings with the Collector—the money he received was very less than what he was supposed to get (according to the rates told by the LA official).

The Law:

Land Acquisition Act (LAA) is a very powerful law and makes acquiring of private property easy for the government. All it says that the notification may be made public “at a convenient place” and doesn’t bind the state to send notices to the affected persons. It is not necessary to have consultation or negotiation with the affected people for fixing the rates of assets or lands. In particular, when the people, such as the ones living in the Stage III area, have no tradition of resisting the authorities and seriously lack the resources and knowledge to protect their interests, the land acquisition official can get away with almost any thing they like. A poor villager will think twice before even entering a government office, what to think of resisting or raising a voice. An example of how the authorities choose to deal with the complaints is the case of Babhani village, which went to the court for their grievances. Instead of finding alternatives or negotiating with the community the government officials quickly jumped to Section 17 of LAA and in any moment the relevant notification will be thrown at the faces of the affected people. The authorities like this section 17 as this makes the land available “free from all encumbrances”. All this is not what ADB’s guidelines, Draft of the National Resettlement policy or any other modern-day law suggests. Looking at the ADB’s “Summary of the Handbook on Resettlement: A guide to good practice” it becomes evident that violating these principles have been rather the norm of the authorities in relation to this Project. In particular, almost every section of this guide calls for consultation with the affected as well as NGOs & CBOs, which has been grossly ignored during the planning as well as during the implementation.

Similarly Draft National Resettlement Policy strongly criticizes the provisions and the operationalization of Land Acquisition Act and in the section “Synthesis” calls for the review of 8 sections. In addition it suggests a new legislation, which can amend the LAA significantly. (p 23 and 24). Just to highlight the flaws in the policies and implementation of the development projects and the resultant losses and atrocities perpetrated on the affected people, the “Lessons Learnt” (p. 41) in this policy draft is worth noting. (These remarks are reproduced in the following pages in the chapter “Resettlement”).

The irony is that some government technocrats think that the laws are too lenient and the bank policies are too cumbersome (the remark was made during our visit). One such official thinks that the land should be acquired first, without the notification, as it would save time and make the land immediately available. He said he would have resigned if he were deputed at the GBHP, instead of wasting huge funds on the compensations.

According to him, these irrationally huge payments burden the borrowers and not the bank.

Compensation Issues:

There are five main issues in relation to the compensation.

1. In the case of main canal it was agreed that the contractor would pay Rs.120 per canal in return for excavating the adjacent land six feet deep for the needed earth-work. But no one knows about the excavation along the sides of distributaries for the embankments. As the distributaries are going to pass through potentially prime lands these are costly (this land is already under cultivation) and about 200 feet land--all along and on both sides of the distributaries--is being destroyed. People are genuinely afraid that they would not be compensated for this loss.

2. People are not too sure whether the measurement for the lost land has been correctly made. They are also apprehensive about the recording of their losses in relation to assets like trees, crops, tube-wells and buildings. In addition, they are afraid that the rates for the compensation will be too less. Similarly, they are afraid, and rightly so, that the disturbances caused to their livelihood by the various structures, would never be compensated. There are quite a number of people whose lands are badly divided by the distributaries or the drains and rendered useless until the consolidation of these pieces takes place (it might take years). Who would compensate the loss of their livelihood? During this survey 11 villages were asked to give the estimates of their loss in terms of land and amount—this information is compiled in Table 3 on the next page. It is evident from this table that rate of land in most of the cases is about 60000. Rupees per acre while the government would probably compensate them with less than the half of that amount. Similarly other figures like total land lost and total number of affected people are more than double of government's estimates.
3. There is no information center for the affected people so that they could get the relevant information and the necessary guidance. This could also save them from the pressure to bribe the officials so as to get their compensation without making rounds to the offices.
4. There should have been a special court or some institution for arbitration—within the access of the public--so that people could take their complaints to this and get their claims settled.
5. Government, in no case, should resort to the section 17 as there is no emergency as such and find ways to settle with the complainants and claimants.

Impact on the Environment

Peoples' view

During this survey, following possible impacts and threats were perceived by the people.

- The whole construction activity itself is not less than an environmental hazard. Excavation and cutting up of the land along a distance of about a thousand mile (main canal, distributaries, and drains), while destroying trees, crops and other assets has ruined at least 20,000 acres of land. Moreover this has disturbed the livelihood all along and all around.
- Punjab portion of the main canal is 64 miles long and there run 52 distributaries & FCCs, therefore slicing the whole area into 53 pieces, each division occurring at an interval of 1.2 miles. These structures would have high embankments causing soil erosion and hence abundant dust.
- The canal would block the water of the Nullahs on the west of the main canal in spite of the X-Drainage, as at most of these points the existing beds of the nullahs are much lower than the level of the super-passages' beds.
- Previously, the nullahs were causing some erosion at the river bank at the time of falling into the river. Now, when the water in the drains will be more and faster, it will cause more erosion at the edges of the river and it will deposit more silt too. This process will degrade large tracts of land and affect the habitat of the riverine area.
- After some years —when the ground water table will rise--there would be built seepage drains to avoid water logging and salinity and these, in turn, will pollute the river water and hence will be fatal for the biological entities.
- Cash crops, increase in fertilizers and pesticides would change the present healthy ecology to a usual dangerous environment we have in other parts of the country.

What Project's documents say:

A. Para # 19 of PC-1, page 41 –Agricultural Benefits of the Project says:

“Further improvement shall accrue with surface water disposal channel network designed, which shall prevent rise in subsurface water table by providing drainage relief through implementation of subsurface drainage system when the water table rises.”

It does point towards the rise in water table and the need of the seepage drains.

B. Para 21.1 and 21.2, Page 42—Environmental Aspect says”

“With the implementation of CRBC the floods flows are channelised to pass through X-drainage structures across the canal. Spoils banks provide additional safety to the canal but results in ponding of flood flows in the area on the right side of the canal. As a consequence, a number of villages are affected by ponding of the flood flows .It has its own environmental impacts on social and economic life of the inhabitants in the area.”

Because of this phenomenon 9 villages will have to relocate according to the official view; what would be the reality at the time of floods, nobody knows.

C. The points in the IEE—

Initial Environment Examination, which was necessary to meet the requirements of the bank—as this project was given the status of Category B and so full EIA could be avoided—identifies most of the potential environmental hazards, then it mentions the measures to be taken to arrest these. In the end it declares that

“The beneficial impacts of the Project will be significant, particularly if enhancement measures are implemented. The adverse impact of the project will be insignificant, particularly if an environmental management program is implemented”. With two “ifs” this conclusive statement doesn’t sound too assuring.

In any case the report considers “the tremendous increase in fertilizers and pesticides”, “moving in the area of the outsiders such as Pushtoons” and “growth of market and commercialism” as positive developments.

Some of the potential hazards (it later proves that these would be controlled) are indicated in the report and are reproduced in the following.

- The project will alter the hydrology of natural waterways (nullahs) flowing from the Suleiman Range to the Indus River. Para 21, Page 128
- Because the settlement will increase both the population density and the value of the infrastructure at risk, ***floods exceeding the design capacity of structures may be associated with increased flood damage.*** (italics added) The cross drainage structures on the main canal have been designed to pass flood flows of a 1 in 40 year return period. ***When a flood event exceeds this design flow, significant adverse environmental effects may result*** (italics added). Likely effects will be canal breaching, destruction of irrigation works in the vicinity, destruction of crops and possible destruction of villages and consequent loss of life. Similarly, if a 1 in 40 year flood even occurs in the initial years before the flood passages have had a chance of degrade naturally, then the flood passage bund will be overtopped and damage will occur. ---- In addition a flood operation plan will be prepared---to encourage canal breaches if necessary. Para 22, page 128, 129
- Distributaries and minors have been designed to neither aggrade or degrade; hence silt entering the distribution system will leave via the on farm system. Para 27, page 129. (too optimistic a statement, it may not)
- Erosion of the nullah watershed will not have a significant impact on the Project area, as flood passages have been designed to degrade rather than let silt deposit, ***so all silt will pass through the system to the Indus River in the long term*** (italics added). Para 28, page 129---(what it would do?)
- A significant environmental effect of the Project is the long-term potential of water logging and salinity with perennial irrigation practices. Para 34, page 130.
- Mechanization, changes in land tenancy status, land transfer, a growing interest in the land consolidation of land holdings and a Pakhtun tribal migration of possibly historic proportions are trends at least partly attributable to the coming of the canal. Para 43, page 132. – (Who likes the Pakhtuns in this area? ADB’s guidelines strongly call for the rights of the indigenous population and suggests to avoid the influx of outsiders)

Impact on the Rowd Kowhee system:

It is obvious that the present CCA of the project will no more be part of the erstwhile Rowd Kowhee system. Rather the system will become an undesirable feature for this area. The project planners seem to be certain that there would neither be any adverse impact on the Rowd Kowhee system on west of the main canal, nor this system would cause any damage to the project and its command area. They were mainly concerned about the passage of these nullahs at canal and then their drainage through the CCA to the River Indus. However, most of the thinking people raise doubts about the designs and the courses of these FCC.

First, the assumptions about the intensity of floods may prove wrong and the flood management plan with all the proposed actions—in particular effecting the breaches in the canal—may not be followed (there are ample examples of such negligence in Pakistan). In that case the whole system will be destroyed beyond repair.

Second, people have pointed out that some of the newly constructed FCCs are located at those courses, which have not been flooded for the last 40/50 years. True, that the engineering interventions could guide the water into these FCCs but not without considerable erosions and degradation of land. This all may fail. Due to this and the ponding of the nullahs' water on the west of the canal may cause unusual depositing of silt. This, in turn, may spread the water sheet to a huge area and eventually may become dangerous for the main canal. Third, due to the changes in the catchment areas, amount of water at the mountain passes or people's efforts to utilise the Rowd Kowhees' water may change the course of these nullahs and this will again cause considerable damage. Only positive impact may be that due to the presence of technocrats in the area, a project to manage the water of these Rowd Kowhees may be planned and implemented. This could save the canal irrigation system for good.

Social Impact:

To look at the possible social impact one has to understand the agriculture system or systems, which have been existing in the area up to date. First and foremost is the centuries old “Rowd Kowhee” system (RKS).

Rowd Kowhee System:

RKS depends on the monsoon rains on the Suleman Range, which is the catchment area for all these Rowd Kowhees (Hill Torrents). These Hill Torrents in general have specific courses to follow, bring huge quantities of speedy and muddy water and command a certain area. Whether this abundant water is utilized or goes waste (by rushing towards the River Indus) depends on the ability of the people to manage it by blocking it intermittently and temporarily while successively filling their fields, which are bound by a 2/3 feet high earthen bund. These fields get saturated with this water and a layer of silt and once sown in, can produce a good crop without any further irrigation. Traditions for collective work at the starting points of these torrents were respected and guarded as these served the collective interest. Later, these were formalized by the governments and the local rulers, but gradually became impracticable. At certain places, especially close to the outlets of these torrents, the system remains intact, at others it depends on chance.

With the introduction of diesel engines in this area about thirty years ago, big landlords tried to cultivate their lands with the help of these engines and eventually they had to bear heavy losses due to high diesel consumption and uneconomical cost of the engines. Then, about a decade ago a smaller and cheaper Chinese diesel engine suddenly heightened the farming activities all around. In local language this is called “Peter”

Peter System:

Total expenditure on installing this tube-well (e. i. Peter), including the boring, pumping set, etc. is about Rs 50000/-. It has a discharge of about 1 Cusec, consumes 2.5 to 3 liters of diesel per hour and watering one acre of land requires 12 hours of its running. Wheat needs irrigating the fields five times while cotton would need 12 times. That's why water rent is very high (80-100 Rupees per hour). Fertilizer per acre for wheat cultivation costs about Rs.1000. As the yield is low—ranges between 1000 kg to 1600 kg per acre—total earnings per acre are not more than Rs. 2000/- per crop. It is to be noted that the groundwater is brackish, thus continuous cropping is not possible. Precisely due to this scenario the land rent is about Rs. 1500/- per year.

During the initial days when the diesel was not that costly and the soil was rich Peter economy was booming, now it is just subsistence agriculture. As a result a significant part of the youth population has to migrate out for labor or employment in the urban centers.

Impacts:

- >From the standpoint of social and cultural relations among the communities the remnants of the basic Rowd Kowhee system still exist. That is, the social/cultural links—their qualitative content being dictated by the centuries old system—among the people of this area in general and along the courses of these torrents in particular have been alive and strong. For years people have made efforts to consolidate their lands along the water routes (that's why people own lands on the both sides of the main canal, because it cuts across the hill torrents). These social and production relations are breaking and weakening with the incoming of new agriculture systems. With the canal irrigation system there would be tendencies to consolidate the lands along the distributaries and the watercourses and will certainly cause social movements and disruptions. During such movements, how gradual these may be, poor and vulnerable groups stand to lose.
- This project has seriously disturbed the mobility of the population. First, as the commercial and emerging urban centers are close to the Indus Super Highway on the eastern side of the canal, people normally travel from the west. Main canal, having only a few bridges—at certain places there is no bridge in a stretch of 8 kilometers—will cause problems to people's mobility; for example access to Tibbi Qaisrani will be seriously affected. Nullahs' drains have no bridges because these are for the flooding seasons, but the banks are too high for women, olds and the children to climb and cross. Similarly, bridges over the distributaries are not in adequate numbers. There are ample examples where these structures divide the people and their schools, graveyards and relatives.
- Water management issues will cause rifts in the existing harmonious society. Although the existing norms and customs may support the process of consensus building the manifestation of power and the resultant exploitation of the poor and small farmers will be the order of the day. At present the lands stand divided by the new waterways, this acutely affects the small landholders and they don't know how to manage their pieces. As majority of the people has small landholding at least half the population will face tensions and stress for a considerable period of time.
- Most of the people are subsistence farmers or laborers owning small pieces of lands; they would need capital so as to jump on to cultivating their lands. Though ADBP bank and other credit schemes may be present in the area, they may not feel confident enough to benefit from these institutions and get into the trap of moneylenders, fertilizer companies and will eventually stand to lose.
- Labor situation may undergo various pushes and pulls. At present the wages' situation is not good. Though the wages for a day's labor are Rs. 120/- but the work generally is not continuous, that's why people prefer monthly wages of Rs.1800/- instead. Other arrangements of share cropping are not too rewarding either; with the canal irrigation the income from share cropping may increase, but this may encourage the landlords to mechanize or prefer hiring the labor instead. At the same time those small landholders who are either themselves working in the urban centers or have sent their youth there, will choose to return and this may cause labor surplus. It is too early to determine the extent of the changes, however this will not bring any revolution in favor of the laboring people.
- Pukhtuns' in-migration is going to a holocaust for the society of this area. One, Pukhtuns have been descending on these plains all the times in history. Two, with the

Afghan war, they being equipped with money (from arms trade, drugs and smuggling) have moved in and bought lands. Their influence in the stage I and stage II can be felt by just walking on the streets of D. I. Khan. Third, the area and society is extremely peaceful and free from violence and thus attracts the land hungry migrants. Pukhtuns on the northwestern border of stage III area have already started raiding the towns for theft, car lifting and abductions.

- Most probably, the usual pattern of cash crops, mechanization, shortage of skilled labor and surplus of unskilled one, out migration, urbanisation, shanty towns, crimes and violence will eventually lead to degradation of values and quality of life. On the other route, fertilizers, pesticides, newly emerging middle classes, consumerism and political realignments will lead to the reduction in social services and hence will lower environmental and health standards.

Involuntary Relocation and Resettlement

Listed in the official documents, there are nine villages which are going to be affected by the possible flooding on the west bank of the main canal. Of these two lie in the Stage III area—Mapal and Thibay Aali. Naib Tehsildar Abdul Aziz told us that the government is considering various options to respond to this situation. We visited village Mapal and talked to the people and the findings are:

- Village will be affected by the flooding of Rowd Kowhee *Kaura* as the level of the super-passage is higher than the bed of this nullah. The village is located at a distance of 3 km from the main canal.
- The village has about 100 households, a population of approximately 1000—people belong to five different clans (Mapal, Lashari, Dogar, Sau and Jhar), Mapals and the Lasharis are predominant. These two may differ in their choices for the various options.
- Village has a primary school in which 45 students are enrolled.
- So far the village has not made any attempt to demand any resettlement plan from the government, nevertheless it has chosen its representative body of five persons to deal with the issue.
- According to Abdul Aziz, there could be three options. One, that the people agree to individual compensations and leave the village. Two, Government builds a bund around the village to protect it from the floods. Three, the authorities find a suitable place to relocate the whole village and provide land as compensation to the land lost.
- People are very apprehensive about the second options as the flooding would cut their routes to the east and if water stays longer it would almost trap them. Some individuals, who also have lands at some other places or have second house in the nearby towns, may try to strike a deal with the authorities to accept the compensations on individual basis. This would hurt the poor, as they will certainly lose the livelihood, which is the main asset for them.

If the government follows ADB's guidelines, an adequate resettlement arrangement for this and other villages can be made. However, in the absence of any village organization or without the involvement of an experienced NGO, this will not be possible. The experience shows that there are always flaws in the resettlement plans in Pakistan; in this regards "Lessons Learnt" sketched out in the draft National Resettlement Policy are worth noting.

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- Livelihood restoration is the most difficult area in resettlement process. GBHP Resettlement Action Plan could be considered a model for future plans.
 - Inadequate planning causes most problems relating in land acquisition and payment of compensation.
 - Pakistani laws cover some ADB policy objectives. Displacement is avoided.
 - The formula for calculating compensation appears to be acceptable.
 - Revenue records do not indicate the prevailing market prices of lands, most transactions are either undervalued or overvalued.
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- Assistance in the true spirit is generally not provided to the affectees in the resettlement process.
 - Compensation options are limited to either cash payment or “land for land” value
 - No resettlement plan has addressed the integration of resettled population with the host community.
 - Loss of livelihood is not compensated.
 - Involuntary resettlement is executed as a component of the overall project. Non-availability of funds for payment of compensation seems to be a persistent problem often resulting in implementation delays.
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Appendix 1

Terms of Reference

- To look at the CRBIP in general so as to inform Sungi about its salient features.
- Concentrate on the Punjab portion of the stage 3 in terms of the views of the affectees / beneficiaries of the project.
- Particularly to look into the following issues while focussing on the above mentioned portion of the canal:
 1. Land acquisition process and affectees' concerns--for instance, rates of compensation, information to people and procedures for payment.
 2. Project's impact on the erstwhile "Road Kowhee" (Hill torrents) system, in particular the effect of the drains built on the east of the canal to take these nullahs' water to River Indus.
 3. Project's impact on the environment of the area, now (during excavations), possible flooding & its effects and later to the bio-diversity.
 4. Possible social impacts such as the mobility, relations of production, economy, capital flow and labour flow in the area, especially in the CCA (command control Area).
 5. To record peoples' apprehensions, fears and critical views about the project, in addition to the issues of resettlement of certain affected villages.

Appendix 2

Survey Design—issues focused on and questions asked

Though the meeting with the communities, individuals and the project officials were very informal and there were no structured interviews or filling out questionnaires, still there were specific issues on which the conversations and discussions were led to concentrate upon.

Issues and questions:

(Besides the general conversation about the canal, its perceived benefits, losses to private properties, compensations, attitude of government officials and the contractor/construction staff, following issues were taken up as agenda of the meetings)

Mobility—

Do you have to go on the other side of the canal/distributary (doctor, relatives, sale/purchase, graveyard, water fetching points, school).

Is the bridge available for this movement?

No or yes, has this canal affected the mobility or activities in any manner?

Land ownership patterns—any change—

What is the magnitude of land holdings in this village—largest, smallest and average?

Is the land going to be further divided due to the canal's phenomenon or it is going to be consolidated?

Has the canal triggered any change regarding the sale or purchase of land?

Social Organisation—

What is, if any, the existing social organization in the area, for water distribution and other collective activities?

Movement of capital

How and where the money will come from?

Will the ADBP loans fulfill the demand?

Labour Movement—

Will the demand for labor increase?
Will there be any change in the wages?
How the demand for labor be met?

Cropping Pattern—

What kinds of crops are cultivated here?
What is the system of sharecropping prevalent here?
Will the canal boost up the cash crops, what will be its effect here?

Key informants for these questions were elderly people, community leaders, government officials (such as Patwari--revenue staff), traders, bank officials, transporters etc.

Appendix 3

Chart of meetings and visits

(Though, during the whole visit fact finding and information gathering activities were continuously carried out, some of the specific visits and meetings are given in the following).

November 7, 2000—

1. Visited the Project Office of CRBIP in D.I. Khan, met Chief Engineer and the Director Technical, got briefings, possible information and relevant available material.
2. Visited the office of Sheladia Associates Inc (An American Company now camped in D.I. Khan), which is the Donor's consultant to carry out PIME (Project Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation), met the team leader Mr. John Anania to introduce and discuss our survey.

November 8, 2000

1. Visited the Project Office again, met the Collector, Land Acquisition and the staff of OFWM (On Farm Water Management) for the NWFP 's portion of the project which has mostly been operative.
2. Met Tahir Shahnawaz Khan, a landlord, farmer, member of the "Chamber of Agriculture and Farmers' Association", who has an engineering degree. We thoroughly discussed the issues with Mr. Khan
3. Visited an NGO (IKK--Idara Khidmat-e- Khalq) to know its views about the project.
4. Left for Pareetay Aali village in D.G. Khan district (Field Office of an NGO "Damaan" which was the host and the coordinator for this survey)—about 100 kilometers from D. I. Khan. On our way, looked at the bridges being built on the Indus Super Highway to underpass the Nullahs. Reached the destination at about 1800 hrs and based ourselves here for the next four days.

November 9, 2000

1. Visited the Village *Dauaali* and met the community leaders. Spent about three hours to thrash out the issues.
2. Observed the excavated land along the banks of a distributary # 33 and the course of *Litra Para* Nullah.
3. Traveled to the west of the main canal, through the town of *Vahowa*, to the village *Lakhani* , which is close to the Suleman Range, so as to understand the "Rowd Kowhee" system.

November 10, 2000

1. Visited the nearest portion of main canal, observed two X-Drainage structures for *Vahowa* and *Rabait* nullahs, embankments of the canal and the land degradation brought by the construction activity.

2. Visited village *Diwaalain* to meet the community to get answers to our usual questions.
3. Visited village *Kotla Shah* in the afternoon to record the views of the community.

November 11, 2000

1. Went to Taunsa town to see the collector (Land Acquisition) and OFWM staff, met Naib Tehseeldar Aziz Ahmed to find about the land acquisition process and then met the OFWM staff to understand the process of *Chakbandi, Murbbabandi and Qillabandi*.
2. Returned to *Retra Adda* to attend the main meeting of the affectees' network and talked to the organizers and the various community representatives.
3. Visited village *Babhanain* to meet the community—this village had gone to the Punjab High Court (Multan Bench) against the proposed X-drainage of *Para North* nullah.

November 12, 2000

1. Visited village *Mapal* while driving back to D. I. Khan; this village is listed in the “affected villages” and would be probably relocated. Discussed the options with the village's representatives and their views about the resettlement issue.
2. Drove back to Islamabad.