

Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project - III  
**Workshop on Social Impacts**

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**DRAFT DISCUSSION PAPER**

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Prepared by  
**The Consensus Building Institute**  
Cambridge, Mass., USA

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This report was prepared by  
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# Executive Summary

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The Asian Development Bank asked the Consensus Building Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA to undertake an independent and neutral process of social assessment for the Chashma Right bank Irrigation Project (CRBIP), Stage III with the goal of initiating a multi-stakeholder dialogue on the subject.

A two-person team of Social Assessment Specialists was asked to:

- ❖ undertake an initial fact-finding mission to identify and interview key stakeholders and assess the nature and scope of their social concerns related to CRBIP—particularly those of affected communities;
- ❖ produce a report summarizing the results of the fact-finding mission and suggesting institutional approaches that might be considered for resolving the issues to the satisfaction of all stakeholders
- ❖ design and facilitate a multi-stakeholder workshop to discuss and plan mitigation strategies for the most pressing social concerns related to the CRBIP .

This **draft** report presents the findings of the first phase of the process and will serve as the discussion document for a multi-stakeholder workshop to be held on 19 September 2001. This report is intended to help the stakeholders better understand each other's primary goals and concerns and consider options that might simultaneously address the concerns of communities affected by the project and meet overarching social, economic and environmental goals. In doing so, the assessment team has synthesized and organized the views expressed by various stakeholders.

After interviewing the various stakeholders the SAS Team identified five broad stakeholder categories:

- ❖ Communities living in the project area
- ❖ Project organizations
- ❖ Civil Society organizations
- ❖ Provincial and other government organizations
- ❖ Financing organizations

Also based on those interviews, and also on a series of community meetings and RRA exercises conducted in the project area, we identified five sets of key issues that are of principal concern to the major stakeholder groups:

- ❖ Flooding and Resettlement
- ❖ Land Acquisition
- ❖ Compensation
- ❖ Lifestyle Disruption
- ❖ Information

Without taking a position on any particular solution, the report presents the views of various stakeholders on these key issue areas, including their suggestions for possible solutions. In light of these, the report suggests three possible approaches to improving communication and problem-solving among stakeholders during the remainder of the design and construction phase of the project:

- ❖ Information Sharing
- ❖ Enhanced Community Consultation
- ❖ Regular Stakeholder Meetings

Looking towards the longer term, the report also suggests three possible options for promoting effective management of CRBIP social issues during the operations and maintenance phase:

- ❖ A managerial approach based on existing irrigation management practice
- ❖ A representative approach using the new system of district governance (Nazims)
- ❖ A participatory approach based on an expansion of the Irrigation and Drainage Act

In light of the above, the report proposes a design and structure for an initial multi-stakeholder workshop on the social impacts of the CRBIP. It suggests that the workshop should focus on the following shared goals:

- a) To review and discuss the priority social concerns of communities living in the project area in relation to the CRBIP.
- b) To initiate a dialogue for identifying options and processes for addressing these concerns while meeting overarching social, economic and environmental goals.

The workshop process will be spread over three days and would include a set of field visits and meetings. The formal workshop itself will be an all day event to be held on Wednesday, September 19. The report suggests a list of possible participants for the workshop and also a set of proposed groundrules.

# 1.0 Introduction

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In July 2001 the Asia Development Bank (ADB) asked the Consensus Building Institute (CBI) to undertake an independent and neutral process of social assessment for the Chashma Right bank Irrigation Project (CRBIP), Stage III with the goal of initiating a multi-stakeholder dialogue on the subject.<sup>1</sup> An independent Social Assessment (SAS) Team was constituted for this purpose consisting of Dr. Adil Najam (senior consultant CBI) and Syed Ayub Qutub (President Pakistan Institute of Environment-Development Action Research) as international and domestic Social Assessment Specialists, respectively.<sup>2</sup>

The SAS team does not have a stake in the issues under discussion. Our aim in conducting the assessment and in presenting this written report is to assist the CRBIP stakeholders in conducting a joint assessment of CRBIP social issues, and in developing a mutually acceptable resolution of those issues, using a process that all stakeholders would consider fair and effective. The SAS team was asked to:

- ❖ undertake an initial fact-finding mission to identify and interview key stakeholders and assess the nature and scope of their social concerns related to CRBIP—particularly those of affected communities;
- ❖ produce a report summarizing the results of the fact-finding mission and suggesting institutional approaches that might be considered for resolving the issues to the satisfaction of all stakeholders
- ❖ design and facilitate a multi-stakeholder workshop to discuss and plan mitigation strategies for the most pressing social concerns related to the CRBIP .

The first phase of this process began on August 10, 2001 and culminates in this report. The second phase of the process will include a multi-stakeholder workshop to discuss the report and explore institutional options.

This first section outlines the rationale and goals for this report, describes the methodology and process adopted for this analysis, and provides a brief background to the CRBIP. Section 2.0 presents our identification of key stakeholder groups in terms of the social issues related to the CRBIP. The next section (3.0) presents the key concerns and interests of stakeholders, with a particular focus on those concerns identified by the communities living in the project area. Section 4.0 presents a menu of institutional approaches and options. Finally, section 5.0 proposes a set of steps for initiating a process of multi-stakeholder dialogue, including the design of the workshop to be held on September 19, 2001.

## 1.1 Goals

The principal goal of this report is to present an initial assessment of a) who are the key stakeholders with regard to the social impacts of CRBIP, b) what are the most pressing and pertinent social concerns at stake, and c) how might the stakeholders initiate a process of multi-stakeholder dialogue and cooperation to address these issues. The report also serves

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<sup>1</sup> The Consensus Building Institute (CBI) is a not-for-profit organization based in the United States. CBI conducts research, provides training, and offers neutral mediation and facilitation services in public sector issues in the United States and internationally. ([www.cbi-web.org](http://www.cbi-web.org)).

<sup>2</sup> Dr. David Fairman, CBI Vice President, served as advisor to the team and provided additional inputs and guidance. Abdur Rashid and Mahjabeen Khan assisted the team as field RRA specialists.

as a discussion document for the proposed multi-stakeholder workshop. It seeks to organize this learning about stakeholder perceptions of the key issues in a manner that is conducive to a meaningful and constructive discussion that focuses on arriving at the most workable solutions to the most pressing problems.

We want to emphasize that this report is not intended to provide a definitive judgment on any social issue related to CRBIP, an evaluation of any stakeholder group or individual, or a set of engineering, social welfare or environmental expert recommendations on how the issues should be resolved. It is intended to help the stakeholders better understand each other's primary goals and concerns. It is also intended to help them consider options that might simultaneously address the concerns of communities affected by the project and meet overarching social, economic and environmental goals.

## 1.2 Process and Methodology

This report presents an independent and neutral assessment. Although the Asian Development Bank commissioned the report, the assessment team has worked entirely independently and the report is provided simultaneously to all relevant stakeholders, including ADB, without prior review. All stakeholders (including ADB) do, of course, have the right of comment on the report. The report is neutral in that it does not have a bias towards any particular set of solutions but seeks to clarify and present issues and interests on the basis of the views expressed by various stakeholders. Indeed, while the assessment team takes full responsibility for all that is contained in this report, these views are entirely based on ideas and opinions expressed by the stakeholders themselves. While the assessment team has synthesized and organized the views expressed by various stakeholders, we have not invented anything that is reported here.

Methodologically, we adopted four distinct but related fact-finding strategies.

- ❖ First, the assessment team conducted a set of semi-structured, in-depth interviews with key stakeholders (mostly in person, but a few over telephone). In a number of cases these were not one-to-one meetings, but were conducted as small group meetings. These interviews were conducted variously between August 14 and September 3, 2001.<sup>3</sup> (See Attachment B).
- ❖ The second strand of fact-finding enquiry consisted of a series of site visits and field meetings with residents of affected communities. Conducted on August 23 and 25, 2001, these meetings were arranged and facilitated by two NGOs—SUNGI Development Foundation and Damaan (henceforth 'Sungi/Damaan'). Each field meeting lasted between 30 and 90 minutes and consisted of gatherings of between 25 and 125 people. A total of 11 meetings were held, mostly in the southern half of the project area, and a total of approximately 520 people were present at these meetings. Typically structured as an open conversation between the community members and the Social Assessment Specialists, each meeting began and concluded with a statement from the Sungi/Damaan representative.<sup>4</sup> (See Attachment B).

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<sup>3</sup> Stakeholders from four of the five key stakeholder groups identified in section 2.0 were interviewed individually or in small groups. Given the time and physical limitations of conducting in-depth, direct interviews over a very large project area, we adopted a different procedure, combining large group meetings and Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) for interviews with community members.

<sup>4</sup> We are very grateful to Sungi Development Foundation and Damaan for arranging these meetings and for informing and collecting the community members of these meetings.

- ❖ Third, in order to get a more direct and in-depth assessment of community views, we designed and conducted a set of Rapid Rural Assessments (RRAs). The RRAs were conducted in nine separate communities between 23 and 31 August, 2001. Of the 9 communities in which these RRAs were conducted, 4 were on the west bank of the canal (threatened by flooding) and 5 were on the irrigated east bank; 7 were on the Punjab side of the canal and the remaining two on the NWFP side; 5 locations were identified by NGOs (Sungi/Damaan) and the remaining 4 by provincial On Farm Water Management (OFWM) officials. Two RRAs were conducted in each community, one for women and one for men. A total of 291 community members (157 women and 134 men) were involved in these 18 RRAs. On average, each exercise took 3-3.5 hours. Each RRA exercise yielded prioritized lists of what the participants considered the CRBIP's most important benefits and their most pressing social concerns about the project. Abridged results of these 18 RRA exercises are included in Attachment A.<sup>5</sup>
- ❖ Finally, in addition to the above, the SAS team reviewed relevant documents provided to us by various stakeholders, including WAPDA project staff and consultants, ADB, and the NGOs involved.

### 1.3 Background to CRBIP, Stage III

The Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project (CRBIP) began in 1978 with the goal of irrigating a total of 231,000 hectares of land through a 274 km long canal along the Indus River, beginning at the existing Chashma Barrage. The project also includes the construction of 72 distribution canals, 68 cross-drainage structures and 91 bridges. CRBIP comprises of three stages, the first two of which have already been completed. Work on Stage III began in 1991 and is expected to conclude in 2002. The project area for Stage III is 144 km long and 15 km wide, with a cultivable command area of 135,000 ha, of which 35 percent is in NWFP and 65 percent in Punjab.

According to the 1991 project appraisal report, the objectives are to complement the government strategy for socio-economic development—sustained growth with improved income distribution—and rural development emphasizing employment and poverty alleviation. The main thrusts of the project are to advance the agriculture sector strategy—to construct and improve rural infrastructure, to increase productivity, diversify production, and increase employment. It was also emphasized that the full potential of staged development under CRBIP could not be achieved without the completion of Stage III, since only 26 percent of the discharge capacity of the main canal in Stage 1 and about 20 percent in Stage II were required to irrigate their respective command areas.<sup>6</sup>

Project documents characterized the project area as barren, with limited agriculture, and dependent on undependable floodwater harvesting (a traditional system called *Rodh Kohi*) or on inadequate and unsuitable groundwater. Nevertheless, the terrain and soils were perceived as potentially highly productive under perennial irrigation. It was projected that the farm family household income for 23,400 beneficiary households would almost quadruple. The economic internal rate of return was estimated at 20 percent. The main

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<sup>5</sup> We are grateful to Sungi and Damaan and to the provincial OFWMs for helping us identify communities in which to conduct these exercises. PRA sepecialists Abdur Rashid and Mahjabeen Khan conducted the RRAs under the supervision of the Social Assessment Specialists.

<sup>6</sup> *Appraisal of the Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project (Stage III) in Pakistan* (Asian Development Bank, November, 1991).

risks perceived were delays and cost overruns, inadequate financial incentives to farmers to increase productivity in response to more water, lack of labor for farm development, uncontrolled extension of paddy cultivation leading to water table problems, and deferred on-farm water management and sub-surface drainage. Sensitivity tests indicated that the project would continue to be viable even under a combination of adverse conditions.<sup>7</sup>

Since mid-2000, some civil society organizations—particularly, SUNGI Development Foundation (a national NGO) and Damaan Development Organization (a local NGO)—have voiced concerns about the social and environmental impacts of CRBIP Stage III, primary with the Asian Development Bank. A project area survey conducted on behalf of these NGOs and published in December 2000, identified four areas of principal concern: a) the land acquisition process, b) environmental impacts, c) social impacts, and d) relocation and resettlement. Subsequently, these NGOs have also expressed other concerns including those related to a lack of consultation with affected people, insufficient compensation, a failure to consider locally appropriate alternatives, appropriateness of the technical design, inflated assumptions about economic returns, and the role of foreign consultants.<sup>8</sup>

To date, there has been little direct communication between these NGOs and WAPDA, and only limited (and largely electronic) contact between the NGOs and ADB staff.

## 2.0 Identification of Stakeholders

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One of the key goals of the SAS Team was the identification of the key stakeholder groups. Given the large size and complexity of the CRBIP, there are many different groups with varying interests and concerns about the project. After interviewing the various stakeholders we identified five broad stakeholder categories:

- ❖ Communities living in the project area
- ❖ Project organizations
- ❖ Civil Society organizations
- ❖ Provincial and other government organizations
- ❖ Financing organizations

In our assessment, the individuals and organizations within each of these categories have broadly similar views and concerns on CRBIP social impact issues. However, there is significant variety of interests and opinions within each category. In the subsections below we give a brief description of each stakeholder group.

### 2.1 Communities Living in the Project Area

Communities living in the project area certainly have a direct and long-term stake in the project. This is a very large and particularly diverse set of stakeholders. There are many

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<sup>7</sup> *Appraisal of the Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project (Stage III) in Pakistan* (Asian Development Bank, November, 1991).

<sup>8</sup> Based on a) *CRBIP's Survey Report* (by Khadim Hussain, prepared by SUNGI Development Foundation, December 2000); b) *Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project, Pakistan* (Briefing Paper 7, prepared by Ahsan Wagha, Damaan and Mushtaq Gadi, SUNGI); and c) interview with Mr. Muhtaq Gadi, Program Manager Advocacy Unit, SUNGI Development Foundation.

different ways to further categorize this group. Key amongst the many distinctions within this category are the differences between men and women, between those on the irrigated east side of the canal and those on the un-irrigated west side, those on the west side who are threatened by damage due to increased flooding and those who are not, small and large land holders, landed and landless farmers, and those whose lands have been acquired as part of the project and those whose land has not.

However, even with these important differences, the project represents a very major change in lifestyle for all communities in the project area. Depending on their particular situations, some communities and individuals embrace this change as a potential opportunity; others fear it as a potential threat. The large number of people who participated in our various field meetings and the passion they displayed testify to the fact that the communities are passionately interested in how the project proceeds since their own futures are so closely tied to it. While we saw little evidence of formal community organizations in the project area, recent growth in civil society interest (see 2.3 below) and the establishment of Water User Associations as part of CRBIP implementation are likely to spur the growth of more Community Organizations (COs) in the area.

## **2.2 Project Organizations**

CRBIP has many different components and requires a large project team. WAPDA, as the Executing Agency, is the lead project organization. However, there are also several project organization sub-categories. Of critical importance is the executive project team comprising of the Project Director and his staff (in DI Khan) and the WAPDA Headquarters leadership (in Lahore). The supervising technical staff of WAPDA is supported by a consortium of project consultants specializing in engineering design, project management, social and economic issues. The four large contractors working on various components of CRBIP Stage III and their sub-contractors are also an important sub-category, especially since their employees are the people that the affected communities tend to see or interact with the most. Finally, the provincial On Farm Water Management (OFWM) teams and the district revenue officials are also part of this category because they are integrally related to the project operation and work in close and direct collaboration with the Project Director and his staff.

## **2.3 Civil Society Organizations**

Civil Society Organizations are not as active in the project area as in some other parts of the country. However, there seems to be a growth trend in civil society activity, at least partly because of CRBIP Stage III. In recent months, Sungi and Damaan have become very active in advocacy and mobilization around issues directly related to CRBIP. They have developed a large and active network amongst the communities with the greatest concerns about the project, have held series of meetings with these communities, have held at least one regional workshop on CRBIP issues, and have published a report outlining their concerns about the project. Sungi and Damaan have also been very active nationally and internationally in publicizing their concerns about the project. While no other national NGO seems to have taken an active interest in CRBIP issues, a number of other national NGOs have expressed confidence in Sungi and Damaan's advocacy efforts. Recently, two well-known groups—the Trust for Voluntary Organization (TVO) and the National Rural Support Programme (NRSP)—have also begun work in the project area with a focus on issues that are not directly related to CRBIP (micro-finance and human development) but are relevant

to the economic and social development of communities in the project area. As NGO support organizations, both are likely to have an impact on the future development of civil society organizations in the region.

## 2.4 Provincial and Other Governmental Organizations

**Provincial government agencies:** Although WAPDA is the executing agency for the project, the provincial governments of NWFP and the Punjab have significant stakes in the project since they will be responsible for operating the canal once it is completed. For precisely this reason, Provincial Coordination and Management Units (PCMUs) were set up in both provinces. The PCMUs act as a link between the project executing team and the various provincial departments that have, or will have, a stake in the ultimate operation of the canal.<sup>9</sup> The staff of both provincial PCMUs is from the irrigation and agriculture departments of the two provinces.

**Federal government agencies:** At the level of the Federal Government, the Planning Commission and the Economic Affairs Division also have a clear interest in the project. In addition, the National Highway Authority (NHA) has come to have an important stake because the National Indus Highway (NIH) runs between and generally parallel to the canal and the Indus River. The Flood Carrier Channels (FCCs) being built as part of the project cross the NIH at various points; this has implications for the design of the FCCs and for additional works on and maintenance of the NIH. This has led to challenges in coordination between these two large infrastructure projects, and in increased apprehensions amongst the residents of the project area.

**District administrations:** Finally, the district administration in the CRBIP area has a direct stake in various aspects of the project, including issues related to land revenue, implementing the Land Acquisition Act(s) and other legal instruments, and in overseeing judicial appeals. Given that the structure of district administration has recently undergone a major overhaul, it is especially important to engage the new district setups in any stakeholder dialogue.

## 2.5 Financing Organizations

Finally, the financing organizations have an obvious stake in the project. Apart from the government of Pakistan, which provides 20 percent of the project costs, the two main financiers are the Asian Development Bank and KfW Germany, which provide about 65 and 15 percent of the funds, respectively. Being the main financier of all stages of the CRBIP, ADB has a long-term and enduring stake in the completion of the project and the CRBIP how it is perceived by the communities it serves. ADB also has an interest in ensuring that social concerns of communities in the project area are addressed, both to ensure conformity of the project with ADB's overarching social and poverty alleviation goals and to ensure that the project delivers benefits to the target groups it was designed to serve. Over the years its various review missions have raised a number of social concerns similar to the ones listed here and it has worked with the executing agency (WAPDA) in having these addressed within the context of the project.

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<sup>9</sup> Implementing two of the project components (OFWM and Agriculture and Livestock) is already the responsibility of the provinces. However, these components are considered as part of the project organizations (2.2) above.

## 3.0 Identification of Key Issues

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In our interviews, community meetings and RRAs, stakeholders outlined varied—and often very different—set of concerns. These ranged from very broad concerns about the efficacy of internationally-financed infrastructure projects to very individual concerns specific to one household's particular plight. This section seeks to synthesize and organize the views expressed by various stakeholders around a manageable set of the most pertinent and persistent social concerns that were identified in connection with the Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project. We have grouped the issues into five broad categories:

- ❖ Flooding and Resettlement
- ❖ Land Acquisition
- ❖ Compensation
- ❖ Lifestyle Disruption
- ❖ Information

The section describes the opinions of various stakeholder groups on each of the key issues. The purpose is not to validate or deny any view, but to present the salient opinions of key stakeholders in terms of each key issue.

### 3.1 Flooding and Resettlement

The traditional system of *Rodh Kohi* (or hill torrent) irrigation was developed to manage the torrential, but infrequent and unpredictable, flash floods coming down the Suleman Mountain Range. The canal is now in middle of the paths (*Paras, Nais, Nullahs, and Kass*) that the hill torrents followed and therefore a number of concerns have been raised about the impacts that these floods will have in the future. There is agreement amongst all stakeholders that these hill torrents can cause an increased threat at least to some people living in the project area, and to the canal structures themselves. However, there is much disagreement regarding the nature and extent of the threat, and on the effectiveness of mitigation strategies that are part of the project's design.

In particular, there is disagreement about whether the project design is sufficient to a) minimize the potential for increased flooding due to the project and b) mitigate the human and social impacts of these floods.

#### 3.1.1 Flood Risks

It was obvious in our community meetings that the arrival of a new and untested system to replace the traditional *Rodh Kohi* system—which, although unreliable, had been used and understood over the centuries—has left people in the project area with many doubts and fears. Many villagers believe that the design of Chashma Right Bank Canal (CRBC) is flawed in at least three ways. First, they claim that the sill levels of the super-passages across the canal have been kept too high and this will result in ponding of 3-7 meters deep water along 3-5 kilometer stretches of the West Bank of CRBC. Second, in their experience the course or size of hill torrents is not predictable. The catchment areas are extensive and cloudbursts at the farthest reach of the Monsoons can dump huge amounts of rain in any part of the Suleman Mountain range. Therefore, the actual paths of occasional, quite enormous, floods vary over the years. Villagers wonder what is the guarantee that the floods will not change course in the future, rendering the current cross-drainage structures useless? Third, they

believe that even with respect to recent flows in the hill torrent channels, some cross drainage structures have been over-designed and some under-designed. In their view, this happened because the engineers did not consult the local people about the discharges experienced in various *Paras*, *Nais*, or *Nullahs* in their collective memory. Instead, many community residents say, the engineers studied geomorphologic parameters only, such as catchments and widths of *nullah* bed to estimate the one-in-forty-years flood. They also say that the engineers arbitrarily assigned multiple *nullahs* and sheet flows to single drainage structures. Overall, there is a widely and strongly held belief among villagers in the project area that in “messing” with the traditional system of *Rodh Kohi*, the CRBIP may well have increased the danger of flooding not only on the west bank of the canal but also on the east bank, where the under-designed drainage channels may not be able to cope with what are likely to be less predictable and less manageable floods.

Community members and NGOs commented that recent rains caused much flood damage in the area and have deepened community fears about the potential dangers of future flooding. For example, the village of Sokar is the biggest settlement of all on the west bank, listed as having a population of 10,000 in the 1998 census. This large settlement, which lies very near the town of Taunsa, was not included in project surveys and was not considered by the project team to be under the threat of flooding. It was, however, hit by three floods this year—in April, in May, and lastly on August 14-15, 2001. In the last flood, a young man drowned, several were injured, 78 houses were damaged and many people lost all their belongings and stored wheat.

From the perspective of the project engineers, the 68 cross drainage structures—or Flood Carrier Channels (FCCs)—have been designed precisely to mitigate the dangers of these floods: they allow the flood water to pass over or under the canal and then channel it into drains that take this water to the Indus River. However, the project team agrees that some villages on the west side of the main canal are at an increased risk of flooding (because the canal will itself serve as a barrier to the water and therefore water will accumulate on the west bank). WAPDA’s project team acknowledges that some villages on the west side of the canal are threatened by flooding owing to the construction of the main canal and its flood protection bund. The extent of flooding varies from village to village, depending on topography and location relative to the protection bund and super-passages. WAPDA has surveyed 26 villages, and assessed the depth of maximum flooding to be in the range of 1-3 meters. WAPDA has provided people living in these areas with a number of options, including protective bunds, re-settlement or compensation. However, the project team stands by its design of the flood drainage channels and believes that they will be able to contain both current flood paths and new flood paths over time.

### **3.1.2 Mitigation Strategies**

**Protective bunds:** In principle, WAPDA prefers to provide flood protection where this is technically and economically feasible. WAPDA’s view is that additional protection bunds can provide sufficient flood protection, but if the villagers do not agree to protection bunds, then they must be relocated, preferably by providing them compensation. WAPDA’s flood protection strategy is now being implemented in a number of villages and in some villages protective dikes have already been built.

But there is divergence of opinion on the effectiveness of protective bunds. While the project team has a stated preference for bunds as the most efficient solution, many community members build on their *Rodh Kohi* experience (which required fairly sophisticated bund engineering) to argue that under the force of hill torrents protection bunds are not durable and water can seep through one mouse hole. Moreover, they argue

that over time silt will accumulate on the outer side, leaving the embanked settlement as a sinkhole, more and more susceptible to floods, in addition to perennial drainage problems. Residents of one west side village that has already opted for an embankment now feel that the tightly placed protection bunds feel like prison walls, that there is no provision for drainage of water inside the embankment, and that stagnant water will become a source of disease.

**Resettlement:** As noted above, the project team's policy is that there will be no involuntary relocation or resettlement. If villagers prefer resettlement, the project team says it is prepared to provide them compensation for their dwellings so that they can seek new dwellings elsewhere. (In relation to section 3.3 below, many villagers consider the compensations being offered to be inadequate). WAPDA's project team stresses that any settlement reached with those owning land or houses elsewhere will not adversely affect options offered to other villagers; where possible, solutions will be sought that satisfy all, not only the majority or influential few. The project team considers its resettlement strategy already in place to be adequate and based on consultation with affected community.

For many villagers a preferred option would be the provision of alternate housing on the irrigated east side of the canal on state lands. However, the project team believes that such an option will run into serious implementation problems. It is important to note that some villagers living on the west bank of the canal also own land on the east bank. They suggest that if the project provided them with irrigation and compensation for the land they are leaving on the west bank, they would be willing to resettle on the east bank. However, this solution would not work for villagers who do not already own land on the east bank.

Some NGOs suggest that the flood control strategy should also include the preparation and implementation of flood mitigation measures, including plans to manage hill torrents by, for example, constructing check dams in the uplands.

The complex issues of flooding and resettlement are intertwined and are of much urgency. All stakeholders do agree that they need to be addressed and all stakeholders agree that they should be addressed through a process of consultation with the affected communities. However, divergence persists on the appropriate shape and structure of such consultation, and on how to decide whether protective bunding, other protective measures, or resettlement is the appropriate strategy in particular cases.

## **3.2 Land Acquisition**

Quite apart from compensation (3.3 below), there are at least three distinct issues associated with land acquisition. The first relates to the process, the second to the extent, and the third to the consequences of land acquisition.

### **3.2.1 Land acquisition process**

There were consistent complaints by community members all across the project area that at least some land was acquired by the project for construction of works without prior informed consent. Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act concerns prior information, while Section 6 requires an award to be announced. Along Distributory No. 33, for example, some affectees reported that the first time they learnt that their land was going to be acquired was when they saw a contractor bulldozer come in the middle of the night. Such reports were shared with us throughout the project area and few could confirm having received the required announcement of award. This situation could well be due to a communication gap between

government bureaucracy and illiterate farmers. On the other hand, it is on record that formalities for imposition of Section 17.4 for 2,600 acres are in hand by the Land Acquisition Commissioner (LAC), Punjab. However, it is quite clear that community members have very little trust in the system of land acquisition and believe the process to be rife with corruption. There was a near unanimous call from community members and civil society organizations to make the process more transparent by involving community representatives, including newly elected Councilors, more directly in the process.

### **3.2.2 Extent of land acquisition**

Civil Society Organizations and many community members claim that far more land has been acquired for the project than was originally planned. We were not able to substantiate this claim in our discussion with the project team. A widespread belief amongst communities living on the east side of the canal is that some land has been acquired unnecessarily, especially for what they see as over-designed FCCs. For example, the people of Tibba Imam were bitter about the 60 acres they have lost under an adjacent drain. Community resentment is particularly strong about land acquired for FCCs. Unlike the canal and distributaries, these drains are not seen as serving the immediate needs of the farmers and therefore land acquired for this purpose is resented more. Moreover, given the generally small size of landholding in the area, large scale land acquisition can not only fragment already small holdings but can, in at least some cases, create new landless farmers. A widely held belief amongst farmers in the project area is that far more land has been acquired for these flood drains than for the canal or its distributaries. Farmers in the area tend to present this as a 'design fault.' The project team does not consider these to be design faults at all and believe that land acquired for flood drains was necessary for project viability. Since this issue does not fall under the mandate of the OFWM teams, there has been no direct communication between project team and the communities.

### **3.2.3 Consequences of land acquisition**

**Burrow excavation:** It is agreed among all stakeholders, including WAPDA, ADB, NGOs and community residents that significant amounts of farmers' lands have been damaged by deep burrow excavations on the sides of many distributaries. It is agreed that digging for borrow material by contractors is in contravention of the rules unless it is at least 200 feet from the waterway. There is agreement that the contractors should repair the damaged land. However, the modalities have yet to be worked out. Reportedly, there is also confusion on the part of the contractors about whether they will be given additional payments for filling in these burrows. The Project team is clear that the contractor is not to be reimbursed for this restitution work and money is being held back for this purpose. Many farmers are worried and unsure not only about whether these burrows will actually be filled but where the fill will come from. Many do not know about the contractual battle being fought between the contractor and the project staff, and those who do know are not sure when or how it will be resolved.

**Severance of landholdings:** , Many farmers complain that the distributaries, drains and watercourses have been aligned without taking into consideration the boundaries of farmers' land holdings. This has resulted in the severance of landholdings, which is particularly harsh for small landholders. It is not disputed that the canal, distributaries and drains were aligned on the basis of topography only, with information derived from GEONEX maps. The outlets (*Moghas*) were also located on the basis of engineering parameters only. However, OFWM reports that they adjust the alignment of watercourses to minimize severance of *Khasra* units, while remaining within plus/minus 5 percent of the stipulated command area for each watercourse. The limitation is that they work with dated Musavi maps. Most

landholdings are still in the name of a single ancestor, while the Khasra unit is actually farmed by a number of descendants.

**Impacts on pre-existing infrastructure:** Laying down the physical infrastructure has had two other consequences that were important to a number of community residents. Some investments, such as boreholes and brick kilns, have gotten buried under. These were not minor investments. During our field meetings and RAs we learned that at least one expensive deep turbine at Chatri Lohary on the West Bank that had cost Rs.600 000, was destroyed. Reportedly no compensation has been made and farmers remain unsure whether any compensation for these non-land property losses will be made. Also, there is the issue of severance from graveyards and of other traditional paths. From some villagers on Distributary No. 33, the distance to traditional graveyard has increased by six kilometers.

Once again, the level of community fear and apprehension is high even though at least some of their concerns are shared by other stakeholders, including the project team. Many of the interviewees commented that the lack of communication between the stakeholders seems to compound the situation. Amongst the options they suggested was the idea of more community involvement (through social mapping and other techniques) in the placement of watercourses, bridges, culverts, etc. It was also suggested that, as a part of command area development, bulldozer services should be provided to farmers for land leveling and that loans on easy terms could be arranged through Khushali Bank or other micro-finance providers.

### **3.3 Compensation**

While issues related to compensation as an option to resolve problems such as resettlements and flood damage have already been touched upon, our focus here is on the implementation of the legal requirements for compensation for property loss. The legal requirements for such compensation (in terms of the Land Acquisition Act) are historically defined and fairly well understood by all concerned, including community residents. The issue, as highlighted by various stakeholders—including the project team, communities living in the project area, and civil society organizations—related to the challenge of implementing a compensation system that is perceived by all to be fair and free from bias and corruption.

From the perspective of the community residents, compensation is the most frequently cited concern. Farmers highlight a number of issues associated with compensation for land. These include the large variation in awards within one *tehsil*, delay in announcement of awards, and the delay in payment of compensation. They identify similar and other issues associated with compensation for crops, trees, houses and earth removal. These include a unilateral procedure leading to charges of arbitrary assessment of damage, low rates of compensation, and the necessity of paying a bribe to get the compensation check. The project team acknowledges the complex and controversial nature of this issue and its troubled history in other larger infrastructure projects in the country. They point also to the need for inter-departmental coordination since awards are determined and disbursed through provincial and district government agencies. Moreover, the project team as well as the provincial governments claim that while the law is clear on how the compensation award is to be determined, there are attempts to manipulate the system by farmers themselves.

#### **3.3.1 Variation in awards**

Under the Land Acquisition Act, land awards are made by the Rate Assessment Committee headed by the Deputy Land Acquisition Collector, who reports to the provincial Board of

Revenue. These are to be based on a fair value assessment of the property, determined in light of sales of similar property in the recent past. While the basic principle of the legal stipulation is well-understood by the community residents, there is much lack of clarity in terms of the exact lines of control and information during this process of assessment. Many community residents and NGOs charge that the lack of clear lines of information and the non-transparent nature of award determination causes the cycle of corruption. They consider the very large variations in the awards given in the same area as a manifestation of corruption in the process rather than a real difference in the land value.

The project team confirms that there are, indeed, some unreasonably large variations in awards. For example, while the prevailing rate in CRBIP is around Rs. 40,000 per acre, it has been fixed at Rs. 200,000 per acre in some villages. WAPDA has already objected to some of these lavish awards. However, the project team points out that these variations are the result of an abuse of the system by some farmers, particularly by influential landlords, who create a recent history of manipulated sales in order to artificially jack up the price of their lands. Most community residents seem to agree but use this as a basis for demanding a more open and transparent process of land valuation for compensation.

### **3.3.2 Delay in announcement of awards and payment of compensation**

Till August 2001, only 7 percent of the land acquired for CRBIP III had been paid for in NWFP, and virtually none in the Punjab. It is widely perceived that the Land Acquisition Collector has an interest in late declaration of awards and slow release of land compensation (the SAS Team was not able to interview officials in the Land Acquisition Collector's office). A new target date of December 31, 2001 has been established for completion of the remaining payment for land in Stage III in NWFP. Many stakeholders, including NGOs, community residents, and some officials in the Punjab government believe that a firm target date agreed upon by all parties, needs to be established for the Punjab as well.

A senior staff in the project team estimated that of the 20 million rupees designated for crop and tree compensation, about Rs.5 million have reached the affectees. The procedure for crop, tree and infrastructure assessment calls for 3-4 staff members of the LAC to jointly sign off on a pro-forma certifying the crop or infrastructure on a unit area of land. The LAC classifies the assessment in terms of ownership and makes estimates. The Chief Engineer approves awards above Rs.60,000 and the Superintending Engineer below that sum. The LAC makes the payment. NGOs and community members point out that the procedure is one-sided with no community consultation on the value of the asset. This leads of dissatisfaction and some frustration on the part of farmers.

### **3.3.3 Other compensation issues**

From the perspective of the government agencies, a key issue is that of inter-departmental coordination. WAPDA claims to be eager to complete the compensation process and has transferred the required funds to the provincial governments. However, actual award and disbursement is the responsibility of revenue officers at the district level. Until all awards have been notified, it will also remain unclear whether the amounts allocated for various forms of compensation are sufficient. Given the sensitivity of the issue, and histories elsewhere of long-drawn legal battles around compensation issues, the challenges of inter-agency coordination tend to be high.

Amongst other compensation issues, community members were especially vocal about compensation for trees and for excavated soils. A common refrain was that trees are not properly counted. A person in Tibba Imam reported having received only Rs.1900 as compensation for 46 trees. Worse, he claimed that he had to pay a bribe before the check

for this petty amount was released. This was not a single instance. Every where we went, people reported having to pay 10-20 percent in cash up front to get the compensation check released. Similar complains were prevalent about compensation for excavated soils.

Another set of concerns relates to landless tenant farmers. On the one hand, the revenue record does not match the present land ownership and therefore there are many disputes about who gets the compensation. On the other hand, in situations of dual ownership between landlords and long-term tenants, the rights of the tenants are not recognized.

Communities we met had a number of complaints—some said they had been missed in the survey, many believed that the compensation rates (for land, dwellings, trees, etc.) was unfairly low, others reported that they could not get compensation without giving bribes to low level disbursement officials, some complained about the process of acquiring a national identity card necessary to cash the compensation check. Indeed, some had refused to accept compensation for these reasons. Most strikingly, however, communities throughout the project area expressed a lack of trust in the compensation process and sought a more transparent and inclusive process. Other stakeholders, including some members of the project team and of provincial governments also saw the need for a more open process but were cautious about the prospects of major changes in the system.

### **3.4 Lifestyle Disruption**

Beyond the immediate concerns raised in earlier sections, and overlaying on them, are the persistent fears associated with the major disruption in lifestyle that the canal spells for people living in the project area. Indeed, most people fully realize the potential opportunities that the canal also brings for them; especially in terms of economic opportunities. In a number of cases the community residents we met were interested only in making sure that a distributary does in fact reach their fields or that water provided in their channels as soon as possible. However, in general over the project area—and more apparently in downstream communities where the canal has arrived only very recently—the community members were prone to suggest that something has also been lost in this process. However, this does not relate simply to a psychological loss of an established way of life. It has very real and practical implications for the people living in the project area and the CRBIP infrastructure. Here we will focus on two key aspects of the losses caused by lifestyle disruption: a) the loss of the traditional *Rodh Kohi* system of irrigation, and b) the loss of valuable community support networks.

#### **3.4.1 *Rodh Kohi***

As already discussed, the traditional system of hill torrent irrigation—*Rodh Kohi*—was the mainstay of agriculture and subsistence in this area for centuries. While this was a harsh and unpredictable system, it was a system that the communities had learned to utilize. Indeed, their very lifestyle had evolved around this system. From the perspective of the project designers and funders, the CRBIP has given the communities a way out of the unreliability of flood irrigation and the expectation is that the communities will quickly, if not seamlessly, switch to irrigated agriculture. From the perspective of many community residents the change is very abrupt and imposes real costs on them in terms of giving up the *Rodh Kohi* system even before canal irrigation has actually started, of losing valuable flood waters without utilization, and of the costs of conversion to irrigated agriculture. From the perspective of some NGOs and some community residents, it also signifies a cultural loss of tradition that is beyond economic costs and benefits calculations.

**Costs of Conversion:** Community residents complain about the costs of conversion from *Rodh Kohi* to irrigated agriculture in two distinct ways. First, they point towards the losses they have had to bear during the years of construction of the canal when they were no longer able to practice traditional *Rodh Kohi* irrigation but were also not (yet) able to benefit from canal irrigation. Indeed, a common complaint is that even though many distributaries have been completed they have not been made fully operational which adds to the economic loss due to conversion. Second, they point towards the very high costs of actual conversion to irrigated agriculture (e.g., land leveling). They argue that the costs of conversion may be too high for many farmers in the area (who tend to be very poor and with small land holding). Some NGOs fear that this will lead to the small farmers being driven out by large landholders or 'outsiders'. WAPDA appreciates argument but believes that the ultimate benefits will outweigh the immediate costs. OFWM officials are also concerned about this issue not just in terms of the economic costs of conversion but about the farmer's willingness to convert to what is, technically, a very different form of irrigation. In this early phase it seems that even those who have begun receiving irrigation water continue to also use *Rodh Kohi*-like practices in the use of this water. This makes the challenge of making the Water User Associations operational more difficult and could, at a later stage, cause a higher likelihood to conflict between head- and tail-enders.

**Loss of Revenue:** One NGO activist commented that the canal has made *Rodh Kohi* waters, which were a source of joy and sustenance for the community, into something that is portrayed as a 'threat'—i.e., as 'flood'. Members of another community, near the Indus River and traditionally irrigated by *Rodh Kohi*, lamented that the system of flood drains created by CRBIP are a "loss of revenue" since very valuable flood water that had supported the livelihood of the entire region for so long would now simply be pumped back into the Indus River without giving the region any economic benefit. This community, like a few others, sought the continued use of *Rodh Kohi* water channelized in the FCCs. These views highlight the widely-held resentment about the FCCs, both in terms of whether they will be able to 'control' the flood danger from the hill torrents and in terms of whether this is in fact the best use of the valuable *Rodh Kohi* water. The project team's views on this issue remains that, once again, the benefits of the new system will outweigh its costs and once people start reaping the benefits of canal irrigation these concerns will subside. However, one senior member of the project team did suggest that if the farmers continued their *Rodh Kohi* practices on the irrigated side of the canal, it could be a threat to the canal infrastructure, particularly to FCCs (which are likely to be unsupervised or lightly supervised by the irrigation department). He suggested more community education on the subject.

**The Future of west bank *Rodh Kohi*:** For farmers on the un-irrigated west side of the canal, the future of *Rodh Kohi* is a particularly pressing issue. From their perspective, the canal brings little to no benefit at all since their fields on the west side cannot be irrigated. However, the canal has a net negative effect not only because of the floods it might exacerbate (see 3.1) but also because it disrupts their traditional system of irrigation. Some of the larger villages on this side, such as Sokar, are certain to continue with *Rodh Kohi* irrigation and many others are going to at least try doing so. The project engineers understand the dangers of this to the canal itself. These dangers were dramatically highlighted when a flood hit Sokar on the night of August 14-15, 2001. It ultimately forced the community to breach its own protective bunds and force a breach in the canal itself. In the case of Sokar, the community itself has begun suggesting viable options for mitigation of these dangers (see Box 1). The project engineers have also come to the conclusion that the continuing practice of *Rodh Kohi* on the west side of the canal needs more attention as a design issue. The NGOs involved suggest that studies be undertaken on the continued potential of *Rodh Kohi* on the west side of the canal and on developing hill torrent irrigation.

### Box 1: Learning from the Sokar Flood

After a last major flood in 1955, Sokar has been flooded thrice this year already, in April, in May and lastly on August 14-15, 2001. Village elders and 150 people gathered at our initial community meeting in Sokar were unanimous in their perception that the floods were result of the wrong design of super passages across the CRBC. They claimed that their sill levels had been kept several feet higher than the height of roofs in Sokar. We were told that in the April flood, two houses were damaged and in the August flood 78 houses were damaged. One poor man suffered twice and was now left with nothing except the clothes on his back. One young man drowned in August flood. There was local consensus that the cross-drainage structures were not only set too high, but their discharge capacities were wrongly assigned. They maintained that the Begari Nullah had been dry in living memory, yet its superpassage had been designed for a huge discharge; in contrast, the superpassage on Buglani FCC was much too small. The villagers of Sokar were less sure of the proper solution. The majority was in favor of completing the D-shaped dyke across the exposed southern, western and northern flanks of the village. However, a few opposed the measure for fear of losing their land under the embankment.

In discussing the problem of the flood with the project engineers, however, we were told that it was caused partly because the farmers had continued using *Rodh Kohi* despite the canal and had therefore diverted the flood waters towards their village. However, with the canal now in the way of what would have been the natural drainage for the flood waters, the village got inundated.



We returned to the village to conduct a PRA exercise (see attached results; the actual full sized sheet will be available at the workshop on September 19) to visualize the events of the tragic night by making maps about the August flood. In beginning with a larger map that not only included the village and the adjacent canal structures but also the catchment

area of the relevant *Rodh Kohis* the villagers were able to shed new and different light on the reasons behind the flood. Importantly, they began to realize that protection embankments are only part of the solution. To control future floods, they now suggest placing regulators across the Buglani Nullah as it emerges from the hills. For local drainage, the villagers have identified a low-level drain across the CRBC where it had to be cut in the last flood. This, they believe, could be accomplished conveniently before the breach is repaired.

The SAS team has shared the results of this community mapping exercise with the project engineers who found elements of it useful and similar to the results of their own field investigations. In addition to whatever light it sheds on a complex and unfortunate situation, the exercise also demonstrated the great utility of cross-learning and communication between various stakeholders.

### **3.4.2 Community Support Networks**

For the communities involved, the costs of disrupted lifestyle also include the potential loss of existing community support networks and the investments needed in creating new ones. These issues were most commonly raised in our meetings and interviews in the form of concerns about severance. For example, a common issue raised by various residents related to the severance of community structures, especially graveyards. Similarly, we heard numerous complaints about how the location of footbridges on the canal and distributaries were too far apart and how this caused many miles to be added to get from one adjoining village to the next. In one community a man complained that his extended family that used to live just half a mile away from him now was nearly ten miles away because he had to cross a bridge 5 miles away. A number of communities, particularly women, complained that the foot bridges are too narrow for a cart to pass through and this makes the severance issue more serious. Similar complaints were also heard about the FCCs, which do not have bridges on them. The NGOs consider this to be a larger social issue than just severance, since it effects the very social fabric on which these communities exist. Although we were not able to get the views of other stakeholders on this issue, it is particularly clear from the results of the RRAs that community residents place very high priority on issues of severance and the loss of support networks and other community resources.

## **3.5 Information**

The issue of information-sharing, as a possible solution to other issues, has already been raised a number of times above. Here we want to focus only on how the lack of access to information is considered by some stakeholders to be a major concern in its own right. There are two levels of access to information that seems to be in question. The first relates to information specific to particular communities and community members. The second relates to information in general about the project, including its technical dimensions.

### **3.5.1 Community-specific Access to Information**

Community residents throughout the project area have expressed concerns about the lack of a clear and widely known mechanism for obtaining specific information about CRBIP's effect on a particular community. This concern was raised most commonly in the context of the difficulties faced when a community wants to know whether a certain distributary is actually going to pass through their community or not, or when a farmer wishes to find out exactly how much of his land is going to be acquired for the project, what parcels, at what rates and when he might expect payment. The concern was also raised frequently in terms of the lack of prior information in terms of when contractor bulldozers might arrive to excavate earth or put up a bund. Residents of villages that are threatened by floods on the west side of the canal expressed similar concerns about the lack of or sporadic access to information that will impact their lives and livelihoods. From the community's perspective this lack of access to information creates both the incentive of abuse of power by those who actually have access to information and also a heightened sense of apprehension in the community.

For their part, the project team—both at the project office at DI Khan and the OFWM office at Taunsa—insist that they are willing to share the relevant information with the concerned affectees any time they want. Indeed, officials at both places point out that “our doors are always open” and that they receive and respond to scores of applications and letters from people in the project area. However, the community response to this is that it is beyond the means or ability of most small and illiterate farmers to figure out who to go to. They would much rather have a clearly defined point of information to whom they can go to for certain

types of information without having to go through a bureaucratic maze that they do not understand. Equally, they are concerned about how they receive information and the amount of advance notice they get of events that impact their livelihoods. Most often, they get the information when the contractor's vehicles show up at their village. In a number of instances this has led to physical violence between community members and contractor employees and in a few instances police has needed to be called in.

### **3.5.2 General Information about the Project**

The related concern expressed by NGOs relates to general access to information, including technical information, about the project. WAPDA believes that information that is of public relevance is already publicly available. It is reluctant to share project documents, especially technical document, because it does not consider these to be in the public domain and fears that such information could be misused or quoted out of context. This situation has resulted in the NGOs acquiring project related documents indirectly and without the project team's consent. It is also argued by the project team that some of the information that the NGOs propagate about the project is incorrect or outdated. However, in the absence of direct communication between these stakeholders and a clearly understood and mutually accepted policy of information sharing there has been limited opportunity for clarifying what information is correct and what is not. The existing situation is fairly uncomfortable for both stakeholder groups. The NGOs argue that they are not given access to the information they need and should have. WAPDA is concerned that NGOs misuse the information they have and also believes that all needed information is already in the public domain.

## **4.0 Institutional Approaches**

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As noted above, there are a significant number of issues on which the stakeholders could take action, and specific suggestions have been made to address a number of them. Without taking a view on those specific suggestions, we do want to suggest some ways to improve communication and problem-solving among the stakeholders during the rest of the design and construction phase. We also want to suggest some options for promoting effective management of CRBIP social issues during the operations and maintenance phase.

We offer these approaches not as a menu to choose from but as exemplars of the type of options that workshop participants might want to consider. Indeed, the SAS Team would encourage workshop participants to suggest other constructive options for how the social concerns related to the project can be better tackled both in the current design and construction phase and in the later operations and maintenance phase.

### **4.1 Institutional approaches to improve communication and problem solving during the rest of the design and construction phase**

The preceding discussion suggests that improving communication and interaction between stakeholders will contribute significantly to better addressing the social concerns related to CRBIP. Indeed, in agreeing to participate in the September 19 workshop the various stakeholders have already taken a first step towards improved communication. A useful output of this workshop would be to build on this and set up a process for maintaining and nurturing dialogue and communication. Building on the experience from elsewhere in the world and from Pakistan, a few possible approaches for doing so would include:

**Information-Sharing:** A program for making relevant information about the project more widely and easily accessible to relevant stakeholders. For such a program to be effective a clear understanding of what type of information can be shared, how and for what purpose would need to be developed. The primary focus of such a program should be to make information more accessible to farmers and community residents about the decisions that directly affect them and their communities. One way to do so might be for the project office to set up a central information office with a dedicated staff member whose task is to respond to queries from community residents. Another way might be to set up multiple information 'desks' at existing OFWM stations throughout the project area. These could serve as the points of information not only on issues directly related to OFWM but to all project related issues, possibly including land acquisition and compensation. In other instances, formal information centers have been set up which are jointly managed by the project teams and local NGOs. These require a high degree of mutual trust between the project team and the NGOs to be successful.

**Enhanced Community Consultation:** Enhancing community consultation is of particular importance at this stage of the project when community concerns and fears are relatively pronounced. Local community-based organizations and the newly installed system of Local Councilors and Nazims could be used in designing a process of enhanced consultation between the project team and affected communities. One model for doing so would be for the project to consider setting up sets of community consultation teams that include staff with engineering, land revenue, and social assessment skills. These teams could conduct periodical community meetings at selected locations throughout the project area, organized in conjunction with local community organizations and Local Councilors. The purpose of such meetings would be to address community concerns, answer their questions, and inform them of project developments. Such systems tend to work best when they are accompanied by a clear procedure for addressing community concerns (e.g., by taking them back to relevant officials and ensuring that a response is received within a prescribed period).

**Regular Stakeholder Meetings:** The stakeholders could agree to participate in an ad hoc body to discuss key social issues related to CRBIP that have been raised through the community consultation or independent of it, develop possible solutions, and review progress made on outstanding issues. The format of such a forum could be similar to (but possibly smaller than) that proposed for the September 19 Multi-stakeholder Workshop. Additional participants (e.g., people from a particular community, project engineers, etc. could be brought in for specific agenda items). The understanding would be that this is not a decision-making body, but it a forum designed to promote regular communication, deepen understanding of issues, develop new options, and build on areas of agreement where they exist. Such an approach could be adopted in conjunction with the approaches above. Such approaches have been used widely the world over and tend to be most successful when they are based on a clear set of groundrules about procedure as well as participation.

#### **4.2 Institutional approaches to improve joint management of social issues during the operation and maintenance phase**

The preparation for the operation and management of the canal begins well before the canal becomes fully operational. The On Farm Water Management component of the project has the responsibility for initiating and managing this process of transition from design and construction to operation and maintenance. The OFWM department has a set approach and methodology. It overlays the revenue map on engineering map of each distributary as received from the project's design office with its marked outlets and their command areas. OFWM transposes canal, distributary and drains onto the revenue map and ground truths the results. It makes *Goshwaras* and *Chakbandi* maps. Then OFWM

adjusts the command area for uncultivable land and its boundaries to minimize severance of the recorded *Khasras*. Then the department begins its interaction with farmers. It forms water user associations, registers them, provides them cost estimates of materials, and alignments and peg levels of the watercourses. OFWM helps resolve local conflicts that arise during marking out of watercourse, and finally provides materials to the water users association for *pucca nukkas* and control structure when they have deposited their 20 percent share in the bank. OFWM department expects to complete its work as per schedule on June 2003. It may even, with twelve teams instead of the current eight, accomplish its work by December 2002.

When OFWM has left the area, the bulk of the work for command area development and for dispute resolution and operational management of irrigation water will remain to be accomplished. A problem outstanding will be rough land leveling (RLL). It will be costly, time consuming and machine-intensive in the CRBC Stage III command. It is a terrain with relatively more relief than other irrigated areas of Pakistan. Another major outstanding issue will be fragmentation of holdings. As land becomes potentially more productive, siblings that had left their share for one brother to farm will return to operate their shares independently. Absentee landlords will also be tempted to oust long-term tenant farmers. Fragmentation has been made more severe through severance by irrigation infrastructure. Various stakeholders including the project team, provincial government departments, and community residents have identified these realities. There are three main institutional approaches or options for responding to these realities that are likely to characterize the operational phase of the canal.

**Managerial:** This is the mainstream option, implying a traditional application of the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 to the area by the relevant provincial Irrigation Department. With strong coercive power under Sections 33 and 68 of the Act, the Canal Officers can fine and jail individual irrigators and even entire irrigation communities for 'Warashikni' and related offenses. However, the system has come under much stress elsewhere in the country and on 8 September 2001 the government has announced a major re-examination of the existing provincial irrigation departments. With *abiana* collections in NWFP recovering 38% and in Punjab only 32% of just the current O&M costs some things have to change.

**Representative:** This is a new option that has become feasible with the introduction of district governments in Pakistan. Already OFWM intends to present proposals for rough land leveling and watercourse lining to the district Nazim. It may also be possible to access the Khushal Pakistan poverty alleviation funds through the district government. Pre-cast Cement Parabolic Lining (PCPL) of head sections of watercourses, especially where deep pits have been excavated by tributary contractors, of sections running in sandy soils, and where the watercourse crosses old *Rodh Kohi* paths, could be a great boon. District government may also be able to arrange subsidy for RLL of the type already enjoyed in NWFP. However, district government is new and will need to establish demonstrated capacity for conflict resolution and for establishing a support system for operations and maintenance of irrigation.

**Participatory:** This option is also new, but the legal basis exists in the Punjab (Frontier) Irrigation and Drainage Act, 1997. Indeed, the aforementioned decision by the government to re-examine the structure of provincial irrigation departments also mentions a more widespread use of this Act as an alternative. Under this law, operations and revenue recovery are handed over to a Farmers' Organization (FO) at distributary level. The FO must be democratically grounded in watercourse associations (WCAs) for each constituent watercourse. It may be helpful to establish FOs in CRBIP to promote effective and balanced

dialogue between farmer beneficiaries and irrigation department staff. WAPDA could engage local community organizations and NGOs as contractors to initially establish the WCAs and FOs. Once they are in place, the provincial Irrigation Departments could set up two Area Water Boards in collaboration with concerned District Governments to oversee their work. This option is being experimented with in pilot canals in the old irrigated areas in Punjab and Sindh. It may be better to test the model in a newly irrigated area. Changes in the provincial irrigation setups, now being discussed by the government, may well make this a preferred option.

## 5.0 Initiating a Multi-stakeholder Dialogue

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During our interviews, representatives of all major stakeholder groups agreed to participate in an multi-stakeholder workshop on the social impacts of the CRBIP. Based on our interviews, we suggest that the shared goal for this workshop could be described as follows:

- a) To review and discuss the priority social concerns of communities living in the project area in relation to the CRBIP.
- b) To initiate a dialogue for identifying options and processes for addressing these concerns while meeting overarching social, economic and environmental goals.

This goal reflects a shared sense among all stakeholder groups with whom we talked that the most immediate concerns of those most directly affected by the project should be discussed and addressed as soon as possible. Acceptance of this goal does not imply that any party abdicates its broader or longer-term interests and goals. It is merely a recognition that a genuinely multi-stakeholder process of constructive dialogue is most likely to emerge if we begin with the most urgent concerns and with issues on which some consensus already exists. We view the workshop as the first step in an ongoing process. We expect that, if successful, the process of dialogue will evolve and expand to include other concerns and issues that might not be fully covered in the limited time available for this first dialogue.

Although all stakeholders are interested in focusing on the immediate social concerns of those directly affected by the CRBIP, it should be obvious from preceding sections that large divergences exist in the perceptions and priorities of the various stakeholders. For example, a number of senior officials of the project executing team reaffirmed a strongly held belief that CRBIP is an extremely beneficial project in terms of its social and economic benefits to the communities involved. On the other hand, some civil society advocates believe equally firmly that the project has fundamentally erred in its design assumptions related to its economic and social benefits. It is unlikely that this one workshop will be able to bridge these wide differences of perception. However, given that there has been very limited direct interaction between various stakeholders, the workshop can provide an opportunity to begin exploring the various viewpoints and addressing differentiated concerns. Meanwhile, the expressed interest of all stakeholders to address the immediate social concerns of those living in the project area should provide a basis for constructive, solution-focused, dialogue.

### 5.1 The Workshop Consultation Process

The proposed workshop will be held in conjunction with an ADB field mission that will be visiting Pakistan from September 13-22. Along with representatives of other stakeholder

groups, the mission members will be invitees to the workshop. The two Social Assessment Specialists—Dr. Adil Najam and Syed Ayub Qutub—will also serve as members of the mission. However, the workshop process itself is part of the larger social assessment exercise related to this report and the workshop will be facilitated the SAS team in the spirit of independence and neutrality described earlier.

The formal multi-stakeholder workshop will be held on Wednesday, September 19, 2001. However, the dialogue process will begin on Monday, September 17, 2001. The proposed design for this three-day process is as follows:

#### **5.1.1 Monday, September 17 (2.30 - 5.00 PM).**

A formal presentation of the findings of this report and the proposed design of the September 19 workshop will be made to the ADB Mission, with key members of the WAPDA project team and concerned NGOs present. Along with the ADB Mission members, the WAPDA Project Director and three other members of the WAPDA project team (including engineering consultants, PCMU, etc.) will be invited to the meeting. Sungi and Damaan, as the key NGOs involved, will be asked to nominate four civil society representatives for this meeting. The agenda for the meeting will include a detailed presentation on this report by the SAS team followed by comments and discussion with a particular focus on the activities related to the next two days of consultations.

#### **5.1.2 Tuesday, September 18 (8.00 AM – 4.00 PM).**

The entire day will be devoted to field visits and meetings by the ADB Mission accompanied by representatives of the project team and NGOs. Given that the project area is quite large, it is proposed that the best use of this time would be to concentrate on a relatively small number of field stops that serve to highlight the range of issues identified in this report.

For the interaction (with the community members as well as amongst other stakeholders) to be meaningful, it is proposed that the ADB Mission and SAS team be accompanied on these visits by three (3) representatives each of the project team and NGOs already working on these issues. The WAPDA Project Director would be asked to nominate three persons (including himself) to represent the project team. Sungi and Damaan would also be asked to select three (3) civil society representatives to accompany the team for these visits.

The field meetings with community residents and leaders will be facilitated by the SAS team but assistance will be sought from the NGOs (Sungi/Damaan) and from provincial OFWM in arranging the meetings. It is proposed that the field visits include the following stops:<sup>10</sup>

- a) Meeting with community members of a Water User Association (arranged by OFWM).
- b) Visit to Jhok Katherey Wali (arranged by SAS team; no community meeting).
- c) Site visit and community meeting at Village Sokar (arranged by NGOs).
- d) Site visit (but no community meeting) to explain project's flood prevention strategy on the west bank of the canal (arranged by Project Director's office).
- e) Site visit to location highlighting alignment problems between National Indus Highway and FCCs, Parra Rabait (arranged by SAS team; no community meeting).
- f) Site visit and community meeting at relevant location (possibly on Distributary 34) to highlight concerns about land acquisition and compensation (arranged by NGOs).

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<sup>10</sup> It should be obvious that this will be a full day of traveling. The field visits are unlikely to be in this exact order. Once various stakeholders have agreed to a general outline for the say the SAS Team (via Syed Ayub Qutub) will coordinate an exact itinerary for the day's field visits.

### **5.1.3 Wednesday, September 19 (9.00 AM – 4.00 PM).**

This full day will be devoted to the formal multi-stakeholder workshop, which will build on the activities of the previous two days. The workshop will be facilitated, independently and neutrally, by Dr. Adil Najam and Syed Ayub Qutub as the two Social Assessment Specialists.

The final draft agenda for the meeting will be presented by the facilitators and finalized during the initial meeting on September 17 (see above). Overall, we expect that the agenda will include a) a brief presentation of this report by the SAS team and opportunity for participants to comment on it; b) a discussion of the key issues identified in section 3.0 above; c) focused discussions on appropriate mechanisms and processes for dealing with these and related concerns; d) decisions regarding future course of actions.

It is proposed that six representatives each from the five key stakeholder groups identified in section 2.0 be invited to attend the workshop as primary participants. Based on our stakeholder interviews and seeking the broadest possible representation in a manageable group size, we propose that the primary workshop participants be organized as follows:

- a) **Six community representatives.**
  - Three to be nominated by Sungi/Damaan since they are most actively involved in mobilizing project affectees. We suggest that at least one of these be from a community on the west bank of the canal threatened by flooding.
  - Two representative of community organizations active in the project area to be nominated by the Trust for Voluntary Organizations (TVO), Dera Ghazi Khan so as to broaden the base of community representation.
  - One community member representing a functional water user association to be nominated by project staff.<sup>11</sup>
- b) **Six representatives from project organizations.**
  - In addition to the Project Director we suggest he nominate one representative each from i) the engineering consultants, ii) revenue disbursement, iii) OFWM, iv) the NDC Social Assessment Team, and d) project contractors.
- c) **Six representatives from relevant civil society organizations.**
  - Three civil society representatives nominated by Sungi/Damaan (we suggest Mr. Mushtaq Gadi, Dr. Ahsan Wagha and one other nominee).
  - One representative from ActionAid (we suggest Mr. Khadim Hussain because of his prior work and knowledge of the issues).
  - One representative each from the Trust for Voluntary Organization and the National Rural Support Program (NRSP) both of which are active in the project area and can be instrumental in future activities.
- d) **Six representatives from provincial and other government organizations.**
  - One representative each from the NWFP and Punjab PCMUs since they are responsible for provincial coordination, importantly with irrigation departments.
  - One representative of the National Highway Authority.
  - Three representatives of the district administration setups in the project area. We suggest that these include the Tehsil Nazim and the District Coordination Officer from Dera Ghazi Khan (since they are very relevant to issues of land revenue).
- e) **Six representatives of the funding organizations.**
  - The five members of the ADM Mission (not counting the facilitators) will be invited to attend in this capacity.
  - KfW may also be invited to send one additional representative for this workshop.

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<sup>11</sup> It is hoped that some of these will be newly elected local councilors.

## 5.2 Stakeholder Interaction Groundrules

In order to facilitate an open and collaborative discussion, it is proposed that the participants in the dialogue process, particularly during the workshop, agree to abide by the following general groundrules:<sup>12</sup>

- a) Only one person will speak at a time and no one will interrupt when another person is speaking.
- b) Each participant will wait to be recognized by the facilitator before speaking.
- c) Each person will express his or her organization's and constituents' views rather than speaking for others at the table.
- d) In view of the time constraints and in order to allow for maximum participation participants commit to keeping their comments short and to the point.
- e) Each participant will refrain from making personal attacks, will make every effort to stay on track with the agenda, and avoid grandstanding and digressions in order to keep the discussion focused and constructive.
- f) The workshop is an open event and its record will be publicly available. However, to encourage a frank and uninhibited discussion no media members will be invited to the workshop itself.
- g) The facilitation team will help implement the groundrules once they are accepted by all participants. The facilitation team will be impartial and neutral in its facilitation and agrees to abide by the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution's (SPIDR's) Code of Ethics: "The neutral must maintain impartiality toward all parties. Impartiality means freedom from favoritism or bias either by word or by action, and a commitment to serve all parties as opposed to a single party."
- h) Following the workshop, the facilitation team will produce and circulate a report on the workshop to all participants. The SAS Team will also finalize this current report on the basis of comments received.

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<sup>12</sup> These ground rules are based on the experience of many similar exercises in many different parts of the world. They are designed to ensure that discussion remains as focused and productive as possible, while ensuring that all participants have an opportunity to share their views and concerns.