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Introduction The "Ripple Effect" Watercolor Exhibition seeks to illuminate the intricate connections between environmental degradation, social injustice, and human rights violations stemming from the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) projects. This significant exhibition, scheduled from May 1-5, 2024, in Tbilisi, Georgia, serves as a platform for impacted communities to voice their concerns and convey a potent message using the evocative medium of watercolor. Theme The exhibition's core theme delves into the far-reaching consequences of ADB-funded destructive projects on global social and ecosystems. Artists will utilize watercolor as a poignant medium, capturing the innate beauty of water juxtaposed with the challenges and destruction wrought by ADB initiatives. Furthermore, these watercolor paintings will undergo digital reproduction to extend their reach via social media platforms. Objectives Raise Awareness: Through the eloquence of artistic expression, the exhibition aims to elevate public consciousness regarding the detrimental impacts of ADB projects on local communities, emphasizing the human and ecological toll. Advocacy: Foster advocacy for sustainable and responsible development practices, compelling the ADB to reevaluate and refine its funding portfolio for the collective betterment of the environment and affected communities. Dialogue: Establish a dynamic platform for open dialogue and discourse among artists, environmentalists, policymakers, and the general public, emphasizing the critical importance of preserving water ecosystems. Empowerment: Empower individuals to take meaningful action and make informed choices by providing information on alternative, sustainable development practices prioritizing environmental health and human rights. Venue and Schedule The exhibition will be held at an art gallery in Tbilisi, Georgia, from May 1-5, 2024. The comprehensive schedule includes an opening ceremony, guided tours, artist talks, and panel discussions designed to engage the audience actively, fostering a nuanced understanding of the complex issues. Check the art pieces 🖼️

Mr. Muhammad Ehsan Khan, Regional Director, East Asia Dept. Mr. Dustin S. Schinn, Project Officer, East Asia Dept. Asian Development Bank (ADB) Cc: Mr. Priyantha Wijayatunga, Senior Director, Energy Sector Office, ADB Mr. David Morgado, Senior Specialist, Energy Sector Office, ADB Mr. Bruce Dunn, Director, Office of Safeguards, ADB Ms. Christine Engstrom, Senior Director, Finance Sector Office, ADB -        Via Email - Re: Climate-Smart Mining for a New Climate Economy (Project 57273-001) March 5th 2024 Dear Mr Muhammad Ehsan Khan and Mr. Dustin Schinn, We are writing to raise specific questions and concerns in relation to  Project 57273-001 in Mongolia, which has a stated outcome to improve the “enabling environment for climate-smart mining and processing of minerals” and output to enhance the state’s “capacity to catalyze investment in exploration and processing of climate-smart minerals”. According to the available project document, in December 2023, the ADB’s “President, acting under the authority delegated by the Board, has approved the provision of technical assistance not exceeding the equivalent of $500,000 on a grant basis to the Government of Mongolia for Climate-Smart Mining for a New Climate Economy”. As a result, we understand that several board members may remain unaware of this particular transaction[1]. We find this concerning on several fronts. This is the first time that ADB has approved financing for a stand-alone technical assistance grant supporting the transition mining sector[2] (also termed ‘critical’ mineral sector), setting an important precedent that should require heightened due diligence. Approving it without any board discussion and without advance posting on the ADB’s website meant there was no time for debate, discussion or questions to be raised. The track record of ADB’s involvement in the extractive sector, for example, at the Marcopper Mine in the Philippines, was marred by irreparable harm wrought on local ecosystems and the rights of communities. Meanwhile, in Mongolia, there’s no shortage of information about the grievances of herders affected by the Oyu Tolgoi mining operations, a project which received support from the World Bank Group (WBG) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and was the subject of two separate cases filed under the WBG’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (2012-2020) as well as a case filed under the EBRD’s Project Complaint Mechanism[3].  It is therefore highly alarming to see the lack of any evidence of careful consideration of human rights and environmental legacies of IFI financing in the sector, as well as of addressing broader questions of accountability and transparency, which we would have expected to be integrated into the “Lessons Learned” section of the associated project documents.  We note also that Mongolia is actively implementing the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), yet there is no clarity provided on how this TA will  interface with and benefit from the application of  EITI. The ADB Senior Management has been alerted on multiple occasions in relation to the threats posed to environmental human rights defenders in Mongolia, including those who have been involved in monitoring the Oyu Tolgoi Mine, new mines and mining infrastructure in the country. Yet, not once does the TA mention ensuring human rights due diligence or consideration for ensuring an enabling environment for herder community leaders, women’s rights advocates or other human rights defenders to engage in discussions about the impacts of the expansion of the mining industry, let alone for ensuring the mining industry consistently seeks and respects community rights to give or withhold consent through non-coercive, non-threatening channels. The silence about human rights due diligence in this TA risks the possibility of encouraging a situation in which mine-sites in Mongolia become “sacrifice zones” that will be mined for exports (serving the markets of other countries), while Mongolians bear the brunt of the impacts of mining. The TA fails to take into account specific current harms, damages and losses attributed to the mining industry in Mongolia, and to make any mention of precautionary measures required to consider in relation to associated production and storage of vast amounts of toxic waste materials from mining. Nor is there any consideration for ensuring mapping takes into account areas that should be demarcated as ‘no go zones’ due to cultural, heritage, social, conservation or ecological considerations. ADB’s recent blog about this technical assistance references uranium extraction arrangements for transporting to France via China as a “possible option” to explore for expanding the export of ‘rare earth’ minerals from Mongolia. In this regard, we are aware that several business newswires have reported that France has sealed deals with Mongolia to develop mining sites for extracting both lithium and uranium, and that some of ADB’s member countries consider uranium as a critical mineral. Despite the massive ecological and health harms that can result from uranium extraction, and ADB’s prohibition on financing support for nuclear facilities, we are alarmed that there is no information about how the ADB hired consultancy firm will consider uranium mining options in the recommendations and mappings expected to be provided. We are dismayed by the simplistic assumptions embedded in the TA related to “climate smart” mining. There appears to be no due consideration on the part of the ADB for how mining can be considered ‘climate smart’ in a landscape where the losses and damages of climate change are acutely felt by the pastoralist population, and would inevitably exacerbate problems related to increasing water scarcity, droughts, dzuds and dust storms. In this regard, we would like to inquire what parameters have been developed by ADB to confidently assume or claim that a certain mining project has achieved “climate-smart” status? We understand that typically, the definition of climate smart mining is applied to sites in the region where there is an assumption that countries can generate financing through extracting mineral resources to be used in the manufacturing of components for renewable energy technologies, primarily for export, and that such mining operations may be powered by non-fossil fuel options. As explained above, this arrangement does not resolve the irreversible damage to local ecosystems and communities that are directly dependent on the land for their livelihoods, nor the reality of toxic tailings left in the wake of such extractivism. Finally, we are aware that the project documents suggest the intention of the ADB’s effort is to “create the momentum for a green, just transition in rare earth mineral mining, processing, and manufacturing” in Mongolia. However, it is unclear how the element of ‘justice’ in these processes is being ascertained given the lack of strong regulatory policies in place to ensure communities have the "Right to Say No," while workers’, environmental, women and other human rights advocates face highly constrained options to join consultations, let alone give inputs into mappings or organize to assert concerns at specific sites[4] without fear of intimidation or reprisals. We request specific information regarding why the above points were not addressed and how they will be moving forward. We would be open to discuss further, following hearing from you on each of the above points in writing. Thank you for your time and we look forward to receiving your response. Sincerely, 350.org Asia, Regional - Asia 350 Pilipinas, Philippines Accountability Counsel, International Aksi! for Gender, Social and Ecological Justice, Indonesia Alyansa Tigil Mina, Philippines Asia Indigenous Peoples Network on Extractive Industries and Energy (AIPNEE), Philippines Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), Regional - Asia Asian Peoples' Movement on Debt and Development (APMDD), Regional - Asia Balay Alternative Legal Advocates for Development in Mindanaw, Inc. (BALAOD Mindanaw), Philippines Bank Climate Advocates, USA Bayansharga NGO, Mongolia Bangladesh Working Group on External Debt (BWGED), Bangladesh CAMBIUM, Colombia Center for Energy, Ecology and Development, Philippines Center for Environmental Justice, Sri Lanka Centre for Human Rights and Development, Mongolia Community Resource Centre, Thailand CLEAN (Coastal Livelihood and Environmental Action Network), Bangladesh Conseil Régional des Organisations Non Gouvernementales de Développement, DR Congo Equitable Cambodia, Cambodia Freedom from Debt Coalition, Philippines Friends with Environment in Development, Uganda Gender Action, International Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives (GAIA), International Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives - Asia Pacific, Regional - Asia Globe International Center, Mongolia Green Advocates International, Liberia Growthwatch, India Indigenous Women Legal Awareness Group (INWOLAG), Nepal International Accountability Project, USA Jamaa Resource Initiatives, Kenya "Khovdiin Toli Newspaper" NGO, Mongolia KRuHA (Peoples’ Coalition for the Right to Water), Indonesia Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center-Kasama sa Kalikasan (LRC-KsK), Philippines Lumière Synergie pour le Développement, Senegal Mines, Minerals and People, India MiningWatch Canada, Canada Mongolian Women's Employment Support Federation, Mongolia Mongolian Mother Nature Salvation Foundation NGO, Mongolia Nash Vek Public Foundation, Kyrgyzstan NGO Forum on ADB, Regional - Asia Oil Workers' Rights Protection Organization Public Union, Azerbaijan Oyu Tolgoi Watch, Mongolia Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum, Pakistan Peace Point Development Foundation (PPDF), Nigeria Psychological Responsiveness NGO, Mongolia "Public Administration New Initiative" NGO, Mongolia Recourse, Netherlands Rivers without Boundaries International Coalition, International Rivers without Boundaries Mongolia, Mongolia Sayanaa Wellbeing Association NGO, Mongolia Steps Without Borders NGO, Mongolia Trend Asia, Indonesia Urgewald, Germany Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (WALHI), Indonesia Witness Radio, Uganda [1] This was verified during meetings that NGO Forum on ADB held with several board members at ADB Headquarters in Manila during early February 2024. [2] However, we have taken note with similar alarm of the active tender on mining and extractives (explicitly to support the transition mining supply chain development) in Indonesia associated with the Regional TA “Accelerating the Clean Energy Transition in Southeast Asia” (Project 55124-001), and therefore recognize that similar stand-alone projects in other ADB borrowing member countries may already be under consideration. [3] See: https://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/mongolia-oyu-tolgoi-01khanbogd and https://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/mongolia-oyu-tolgoi-02khanbogd. See also: https://www.ebrd.com/documents/occo/cr-report-ot-23022017.pdf [4] As an example of an expression of broad concerns being raised across civil society sectors in relation to transition mining, please refer to the declaration issued in October 2023 from the Thematic Social Forum on Mining and the Extractive Economy.

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Nianshan Zhang Head, Office of Safeguards Asian Development Bank (ADB) Dear Mr. Zhang, This is in reference to the ongoing Phase 3 consultations pertaining to ADB’s draft Environmental and Social Framework (ESF). Consistent with the bilateral email of the NGO Forum on ADB (“Forum”) last 19 January 2024 and the Philippine country consultation last 26 January 2024, we are writing officially to express our request: To extend the deadline of submission of written comments from 31 January 2024 to 31 May 2024; and That the same be reflected in ADB website’s safeguard policy review. The said request is aligned with ADB’s subsequent plans of regional consultations in South Asia and the Pacific and in – country consultations in India, Fiji and Cambodia respectively. As per the ADB website, the latest consultation will be with government stakeholders from Central West Asia indicatively scheduled for May 2024 (TBC). Thus, the extension of submission of written comments after the conclusion of the regional and in – country consultations is not only reasonable but also justified. As what the Forum has been raising in different platforms, the Phase 2 consultation was extensive from June 2021 – March 2023. The similar rigorous consultation process should likewise be the same now that the draft ESF has been released for public commenting. We reiterate that the ADB is at the critical juncture of the review process in ensuring that the highest standards will be upheld by the bank to protect the environment and project – affected persons. Thank you. Respectfully yours, Rayyan Hassan Executive Director NGO Forum on ADB Endorsed by: 350.org Asia 350.org Pilipinas Aksi! for gender, social and ecological justice, Indonesia Asian Peoples' Movement on Debt and Development (APMDD) Bangladesh Working Group on External Debt (BWGED), Bangladesh CEE Bankwatch Network, Georgia Centre for Environmental justice, Sri Lanka Centre for Research and Advocacy Manipur, India CLEAN (Coastal Livelihood and Environmental Action Network), Bangladesh Community Empowerment and Social Justice Network (CEMSOJ), Nepal Environmental Public Society, Armenia Equitable Cambodia, Cambodia Freedom From Debt Coalition (FDC) Growthwatch, India Indian Social Action Forum (INSAF), India Indus Consortium, Pakistan Initiative for Right View (IRV), Bangladesh Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center-Kasama sa Kalikasan/Friends of the Earth, Philippines Nash Vek Public Foundation, Kyrgyzstan Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum, Pakistan Participatory Research & Action Network- PRAAN, Bangladesh Recourse, The Netherlands WALHI, Indonesia Youth Group on Protection of Environment (YGPE), Tajikistan Download PDF here.

During COP28 in Dubai in early December 2023, NGO Forum on ADB took the opportunity of the presence of the ADB senior management to call for meetings when Network members, allies and the Secretariat would be able to collectively raise critical policy and project-related questions about the two institutions’ respective climate finance portfolios. Several of us managed to meet with senior management of the ADB’s Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department, outlining our call for ADB’s recently launched Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) to be thoroughly overhauled (as elaborated in our recent statement and collective open letter) and bringing forward specific points related to: The high number of projects tagged as climate finance that are associated with unresolved grievances (i.e. the reality that loans for so-called ‘climate smart’ or ‘climate resilient’ development are resulting in harms on the ground for affected communities) ADB’s recent announcement and posting about new support for expanding the hydropower sector in Nepal and in Sikkim, NE India. In the case of Nepal, there are long-standing unresolved grievances and an open case at ADB’s Accountability Mechanism regarding the development of the Tanahu Hydropower Project. In Sikkim, ADB’s proposal to support planning for more hydropower/associated facilities is most especially alarming in light of the Teesta III dam collapse in October 2023. This means that the ADB appears prepared to move forward with considering financing hydropower expansion despite the toll on communities and river ecologies, the surrounding Indigenous Peoples’ communities vocal opposition to damming the rivers upon which their survival depends, the risk of exacerbating sovereign debt levels, and all evidence showing that building out large hydropower projects will undermine — not enable — 'climate resilience'. ADB’s support for Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) in the region, which is proceeding without necessary frameworks to deal with heightened risk of reprisals against people working on energy transition issues and the resulting silencing of civil society voices. In Vietnam, for instance, leaders of social, energy, environmental and climate justice groups — and even one woman who worked as a consultant for multilateral development banks — have been jailed. The ADB, World Bank Group and UN-affiliated institutions are all implicated in the JETP processes; it is incumbent upon them to put forward a joint, proactive response, calling for an end to the intimidation and incarceration of civil society advocates, grounded in international human rights standards. ADB’s current approach to including waste incineration as ‘clean energy’ (including as mentioned in the new CCAP) remains of high concern. Relying on burning waste does not help position us on a pathway for a just energy transition and fails to take into account methane gas and other GHG emissions, dependence on perpetuating waste production as well as the rights of waste workers, for example. Civil society groups in the Philippines are still waiting for a response to the collective submission outlining critical concerns about the Climate Investment Funds “Accelerating Coal Transition”  Investment Plan (CIF-ACT), which was sent to ADB, World Bank Group (WBG) and Philippines Department of Energy representatives. We expect a response, not for all three institutions to shirk their respective responsibilities. As explained in our submission about the ETM/CIF-ACT model: In the pilot cases for coal projects identified for ‘repurposing’ in Indonesia and the Philippines, private sector companies involved in the coal projects which stand to benefit from funding arrangements are still heavily invested in the coal sector, and continue to be involved in building out the coal fleet. This means that companies are continuing business as usual while getting support from the ADB and World Bank Group to repurpose mid-aged assets, escaping accountability for harms, losses and damages incurred on residents and workers. In response, ADB management followed a seemingly scripted reply of explaining they want to make “every dollar of investment more effective” by following the CCAP, suggesting that all projects will be adhering to current safeguard standards / the forthcoming Environmental and Social Framework (once finalized), and suggesting that though they feel civil society groups’ concerns concerns about the Energy Transition Mechanism are “misplaced”, they would nevertheless look into the lack of response to the CIF-ACT Letter. The inadequacy of the replies received were telling, indicative of the ongoing pressure we need to leverage collectively moving forward into 2024 to push back on models and schemes being proposed within the scope of climate finance by the ADB as well as other Multilateral Development Banks. We subsequently secured a meeting with the ADB’s Deputy Director for the South Asia Department, during which concerns were specifically raised about the joint ADB and World Bank announcement to support the development of two more mega dams in Nepal (Upper Arun and Dudhkoshi), most especially in light of the range of unresolved grievances of communities to be affected by the Tanahu Hydropower Project, and the recent posting of proposed support for the hydropower sector in Sikkim. The response that we received was that in both Nepal and India, the ADB is evidently focussing on providing capacity to state authorities to maximize transmission and distribution of energy being generated, adhere to safeguards when developing new projects, and to “avoid inefficiencies”, for example by installing meters to minimize “people stealing power” from the main grid. Together, we questioned such assumptions being made by the ADB management, highlighting: the devastating realities of large-scale hydropower developments for Indigenous Peoples’ communities and mountainous riparian ecosystems across Nepal and India, the fact that Indigenous Peoples’ communities in both countries are actively opposing further damming of these rivers, and instead in many cases, calling for decommissioning of those which currently exist, the real risks to lives of people upstream, downstream and across borders due to climate-induced glacial outbreak floods, extreme weather events as well as seismic prone geographies, and the reality that power generated is often not accessible to local people, in no way creating better living conditions for the majority of people affected. In contrast to our ability to engage with the ADB senior staff present at COP28, AIIB representatives did not confirm any options to meet with Forum representatives and allies, despite multiple requests. Nevertheless, Forum Secretariat and allied groups made our presence known, visiting the AIIB pavilion to introduce ourselves and assert that we have project as well as policy concerns which we will continue to bring forward through online and future in-person interactions. Beyond raising critical questions in the presence of ADB and AIIB management, Forum members and allies were active in a number of spaces at COP28. This included convening discussions about just transitions in South Asia, advancing the urgent need to halt the expansion of fossil gas infrastructure in Southeast Asia, denouncing the ways in which MDB-backed models for energy transition support the fossil fuel industry to survive, leading to further debt burdens for governments and the building-out of large-scale RE projects that violate the rights of affected populations, raising the implications of shrinking civic space in the midst of negotiations for JETPs, highlighting the need for  zero waste solutions, not building new waste incineration facilities, exposing hydropower dams as false climate solutions, and joining together in collective civil society actions unifying the urgent calls to stop the genocide of Palestinian people through an immediate, unconditional ceasefire, lifting of the seige on Gaza and an end to the occupation, along with an equitable, fast, fair, fully-funded, feminist phase out of fossil fuels. As we move into 2024, all of these calls remain priorities, requiring collective coordinated responses across the region and beyond.

Dubai, UAE — The culmination of the Just Transition in South Asia press conference, which took place on December 11, 2023, at COP-28 in Dubai, has illuminated the pressing need for immediate action to confront the impending climate crisis. The event delivered a stark call for decisive decisions and collaborative endeavors by major economies to ensure an equitable and just transition in South Asia. Key insights from the conference include a global south's call for urgent action, emphasizing concrete decisions to curb excessive emissions and meet the 1.5-degree goal by 2050, as outlined in the Paris Agreement. The conference underscored that 83% of the carbon budget has already been exhausted, leaving a precarious 50:50 chance of achieving the Paris Agreement goals by 2030. Further, the Climate Risk Index revealed that six South Asian nations, including Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, are among the top 10 most vulnerable countries impacted by climate change. The region bore witness to the devastating impact of seven cyclones in 2023 alone, resulting in loss of lives, destruction of homes, and severe economic repercussions. Hasan Mehedi from CLEAN (Coastal Livelihood and Environmental Action Network), Bangladesh, firmly stated, "The people of South Asia are bearing the brunt of climate change impacts, and their plea for urgent action is a call to the global community. The decisions we make today will determine the fate of vulnerable communities and the sustainability of our planet." Recognizing the challenges faced by South Asian countries, representing a quarter of the global population and nearly a third of the world's poor, the conference shed light on the intricacies of energy poverty. The imperative to decarbonize the energy sector is acknowledged, yet challenges persist in meeting basic electricity needs and overcoming economic crises, particularly in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. A positive development emerged with the signing of the Global Renewables and Energy Efficiency Pledge (GREEP) by 123 countries, including Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Maldives. However, concerns were voiced about the adequacy of the target, considering the escalating global electricity demand and the need for more ambitious goals to achieve a just transition by 2030. The event underscored challenges such as the concentration of renewable energy technologies in specific countries, giving rise to a form of 'Climate Colonialism.' The dominance of large corporations in renewable energy projects, notably hydropower, raised serious environmental and human rights issues, with indigenous communities facing the imminent threat of displacement. Hemantha Withanage from the Centre for Environmental Justice (CEJ), Sri Lanka, shared, "South Asian nations face a delicate balancing act: meeting the basic electricity needs of their citizens while navigating economic challenges. Big economies must acknowledge and support our transition efforts, ensuring a just and equitable pathway towards sustainability." Opposition was against false solutions like hydrogen, ammonia, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies. The conference emphasized the need for proven, affordable, and sustainable alternatives, rejecting the promotion of unproven technologies. In the aftermath of the conference, key demands were outlined to address the climate crisis in South Asia. Organizers called for an ambitious target to generate at least 60% of global electricity demand from renewable sources, a cut-off date for using coal, gas, and petroleum in the power sector, cessation of financing for LNG as a transition fuel, and support for South Asian countries in building national renewable energy institutions. "The concentration of renewable energy technologies in specific countries is a form of 'Climate Colonialism.' We must shift focus towards community-owned decentralized systems to ensure not just environmental sustainability but also uphold the rights of local communities," says Vidya Dinker of Growthwatch, India, Furthermore, the demands included financing for community-owned distributed renewable energy systems, ensuring local communities' human and environmental rights during the energy transition, and discontinuing the promotion of false solutions like hydrogen, ammonia, and CCS technologies.

5 December 2023 At COP28, the ADB announced the launch of a new Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP). In response, the NGO Forum on ADB urges the Bank’s management and board to review the collective concerns about the CCAP raised in an open statement endorsed by over 40 civil society organizations and social movements, and calls on them to take full advantage of CCAP’s ‘iterative’ framework by urgently reconsidering and rewriting its provisions. To make a credible attempt to address the very real climate crisis at hand, an overhaul of the CCAP would include consideration of the following issues as minimum starting points: Explicitly commit to a comprehensive rights based approach – hinged on first doing no harm, and the corollary, to remedy and redress harms done. Climate demarcated financing which will lead to harms, losses and damages borne by affected communities, workers and surrounding ecosystems should be withdrawn from – and avoided – in the ADB’s pipeline. This would require for example, incorporating provisions into the CCAP to recognize and respect no-go zones for project development, inclusion of clear wording to ensure technical assistance, FIs and other financing modalities do not undermine the Conventions of the ILO and UN, and explicitly affirming a commitment in policy and practice to respect Indigenous Peoples’ and Local Communities’ rights to give or withhold free, prior and informed consent for projects that will affect their territories, lands, resources and /or livelihoods. Thoroughly overhaul provisions which advance the financialization of planetary commons, the reduce the response to the climate crisis into “new business prospects for the private sector” and the flawed assumption that solutions can be found in “innovative carbon finance” (para 9). None of these approaches tackle greenhouse gas emissions at source, instead creating the very real risk of resource grabbing while inherently depending upon continued operations of high carbon emitting industries. In addition, we urge revisions to provisions suggesting the ADB will prioritize providing technical advice to governments to “design fiscal policies that provide incentives for the private sector” (para 55); as written it risks exacerbating pressure on governments to even further weaken existing environmental, labor, health and other social protections. Commit to the polluters’ pay principles in policy and practice, and to internalize the “loss and damage agenda” (para 30). Provisions must be incorporated that mandate steps towards providing remedy, redress and reparations where communities have been affected by ADB’s climate finance in the past and have outstanding grievances. In addition, this would require a reversal of current approaches for supporting market based schemes that incentivize coal project operating companies to repurpose aging or stranded assets without accountability for remedying and redressing human rights harms and environmental damages. Ensure that climate-demarcated sub-projects supported via financial intermediary (FI) arrangements, technical assistance, as well as investments in trade and global supply chains are i) screened to avoid exposure to coal, oil, gas and petrochemicals (for instance, by cross-checking against the Global Coal Exit List and the Global Oil and Gas Exit List), ii) explicitly required to exclude extractivist industries, including mining, smelting and other ecologically and socially damaging projects such as hydropower and waste-to-energy incineration, as none can be reasonably tagged as contributing to climate mitigation/adaptation, and iii) fully disclosed publicly with timely and specific information regarding the sites/operations receiving financing on ADB’s website. FI sub-projects must also be disclosed at project sites, providing communities with clear information on how they can file grievances and avail of the ADB’s Accountability Mechanism. Commit to an urgent time-bound institutional review of exposure to fossil fuel associated interests of current and pipeline financing (across all sectors) and an immediate process for extricating the ADB institutionally from these partnerships in line with a 1.5C pathway. Commit to forward-looking requirements and timelines across all sectors (including, but not limited to, revisions to the ADB’s Energy Policy) to ensure phasing out of current financing – and no new support – for fossil fuel associated projects. This includes technical assistance, bonds, equity finance, trade finance as well as financial intermediary, blended and direct project financing. While we recognize that fewer fossil gas projects are being directly financed by the ADB since the introduction of the 2021 Energy Policy, ADB’s online database still shows recent project approvals including for example for the 120MW Rokia Combined Cycle Gas Power Plant in Tripura, India (November 2022) and a coal to gas switching project in Almaty, Kazakhstan (March 2023) as well as support to the Indian Oil Company to pilot carbon capture, utilization and storage at refineries in Assam (October 2023). Take into account the resource intensive toll of trade and global supply chain finance across all sectors and associated implications for people who work and live in multiple geographies affected by finance to be disbursed by the ADB. This would include consideration of how to close off associated loopholes for supporting the business of conventional energy (oil and gas) companies, as well as the implications for violations of the rights of coastal, riparian, forest dependent and small-holder or pastoralist communities as well as people in border zones and workers (not just at sites of production and shipping, but also, for example, at call centers). Acknowledge the importance of environmental human rights defenders and workers’ rights advocates for advancing climate, energy, ecological and economic justice, and the need to ensure all climate demarcated financing, including via FIs, undergo robust reprisal risk, human rights and climate change vulnerability risk assessments prior to project approval. Provide assurances on how the ADB will provide transparency and accountability in relation to the disbursement of blended climate finance to ensure stringent application of safeguards, access to information policy, and the accessibility of its own Accountability Mechanism when grievances arise. Remove references to speculative ‘climate smart’ technofixes proposed in the current CCAP. By design, dependency on the “climate tech ecosystem” (pg 11) comes along with prohibitive patent regimes while failing to take into account the diverse realities of how climate change induced extreme weather and slow onset events impact communities, and obscuring the necessity for donor countries to provide finance based on their historic and current positioning as the primary drivers of the climate crisis. Building local, national and regional climate resilience requires: explicit respect and recognition for community knowledge systems, a commitment to follow evidence-based science to keep global heating thresholds to 1.5C (as per the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the World Meteorological Organization and UN Environment Programme, for example), equitable, direct, rapid, managed fossil fuel phase out pathways as recommended by the reports of the Civil Society Equity Review, as well as fully functioning, transparent, accessible and accountable flows of reparative financing for losses and damages. Withdraw proposals for providing “a pipeline of PPP projects able to access green and blue finance” and revamp national legal and regulatory frameworks to “generate enabling environments for private sector finance” (para 39-41); public-private partnerships have a track record of undermining respect of workers’ rights, as well as accessibility and affordability of services in a range of sectors. Withdraw proposals for financing resource-intensive schemes which exacerbate environmental, social and economic injustices and risks borne most heavily by marginalized communities, including as proposed in the CCAP. This includes but is not limited to waste to energy projects, hydropower projects, carbon capture and storage, promotion of ‘Climate Smart Agriculture’ ventures and promotion of plantations/agroforestry for carbon sequestration. (para 96; Appendix 1 and 2). Remove references to detours from direct transition to distributed, decentralized renewable energy options; withdraw provisions which endorse schemes that will serve to extend the life of fossil fuel industries, such as carbon capture and storage as well as use of hydrogen and ammonia. Withdraw proposals to support Debt for Nature or Debt-for-Climate Swaps; the heavy burden of sovereign indebtedness faced by many countries across the region will only be resolved by unconditional cancellation of the accumulated illegitimate debts. Debt for Nature/Climate Swaps have a track record of imposing conditionalities on borrowing member countries under duress, failing to be transparent or accountable to the public and instead leading to land/resource grabbing that exacerbate marginalization of land-dependent communities. The above list is not exhaustive, but rather indicative of the range of concerns with the current version of the CCAP. We look forward to hearing specific timelines and processes regarding how and when the provisions of the CCAP will be opened up for further review and revision, during which time, we urge the ADB to seek broader input, including from communities where projects designated by the ADB for climate adaptation and mitigation are sited. ###

To: Luis Tineo, Interim CEO, Climate Investment Funds (CIF) AbhishekBhaskar, Lead,ACT Program/JETP, CIF Martín Illescas, CIF Clean Technology Fund Trust Fund Co-Chair Abby Demopulos, CIF Clean Technology Fund Trust Fund Co-Chair Cc: Hon. Raphael Lotilla,Secretary, Department of Energy (DOE),GOP Felix William B. Fuentebella, Undersecretary, DOE Michael O. Sinocruz, Director, EnergyPolicy and PlanningBureau (EPPB), DOE William Quinto, AssistantDirector, EPPB, DOE Hershey Dela Cruz, OIC Division Chief,EPPB, DOE Letty Abella, OIC Supervising ScienceResearch Specialist, EPPB,DOE Ayato Kurokawa, Energy Specialist, ETM and Partnerships Team, Energy Sector Office, ADB Andrew Jeffries, Advisor, JETPs,Energy Sector Office,ADB David Elzinga, Principal Energy Specialist (ClimateChange), Southeast Asia Department, ADB Genevieve O'Farrell, Senior Environment Specialist,Southeast Asia Department, ADB Rangina Nazrieva, Senior Social Development Specialist, Southeast Asia Department, ADB Kate Hughes, Sr. Climate Change Specialist, CCSD, ADB Christian Ellermann, Sr. Climate Change Specialist, ADB Karan Chouksey, Climate Finance Specialist, ADB Andrey Shlyakhtenko, Sr. Climate FinanceSpecialist, IFC Charu Suri, Sr. Investment Officer, IFC Jonathan David Santos Chu, Investment Officer,IFC Bipul Singh, Sr. EnergyEconomist, World Bank Ditte Fallesen, Sr. Social Development Specialist, World Bank Feng Liu, Sr. Energy Specialist, World Bank -Via Email- 8 November, 2023 Re: Philippines CIF ACT Investment Plan Dear Mr. Luis Tineo,Mr. Abhishek Bhaskar,Mr. Martín Illescas,and Ms. Abby Demopulos, We are writing collectively to highlight critical concerns and questions about the Philippines’ Climate Investment Funds Accelerating Coal Transition Investment Plan – specifically with regard to the relatedADB, World Bank as well as IFC project proposals – which we understand will be tabled for discussion at the upcoming CIF Clean Technology Fund (CTF) Trust Fund Committee Meeting on 8thNovember. For your reference, we are appending the following threedocuments: (i) a letter dated 13th Septembersent to ADB and World Bank Group representatives and signed by nearly 60 civil society organizations representing local, national, regional and international constituencies (“Annex A”), (ii) a request to delay publicconsultations to enablemore time for civil societygroups to review the draft Investment Plan (IP) that was submitted prior to the stakeholder engagement session convened on 22nd September in Manila (“Annex B”), and (iii) a formal submission to the DOE’scall for publiccomment on the draft IP duly delivered on 28th September (“Annex C”). To date,we have yet to receivea comprehensive responsein writing to either the initial letter (“Annex A”) or the range of detailed points raised in the submitted comments (Annex C). While we are dismayedby the apparent failure so far of responsible institutional representatives to take the time to address the points raised in any substantive way, we are even more so alarmed by the fact that the version of the CIF ACT Investment Plan submitted to the CTF Trust Fund for discussion has not yet been substantially revised to take into account pivotal concerns that have been raised in good faith by civil society groups in the appended documents, and explained in detail during the stakeholder engagement sessions. We will continue to await written responses from the respective institutional representatives to address the issues brought forward in the appended documents – which we expect to be specific and not a simple consolidated formulaic reply. In the meantime, crucially, we are seekingclarity from you on the steps that will be taken to ensure the IP will be revisedin order to reflect commentsand concerns raisedby civil society groups. Detailed explanations of the critical points of contention can be found in the appended documents, among them are the following: Meaningful Time and Optionsfor Comprehensive Inputsfrom Civil SocietyGroups Across Sectors, Especially in Coal Affected Communities The CIF ACT Investment Plan implementation has broad cross sectoral implications. As such, much more widely attended, meaningful, inclusive consultativeprocesses are necessary, not only in Manila, but also in communities surrounding proposed pilot sites, as well as other existing sites of coal power projects. Specifically, for example, the Mindanao STEAG Coal Fired Power Project (CFPP) has already been identified as a target site for the use of ETM financing arrangements (Appendix 8 of the IP). Logically, then, there could have been specific channelsmade available for integrating inputs and feedbackon the IP from residents around this site and local labor alliances representing affected formal and informal workers. Transparency Civil society groups in the Philippines have consistently called for disclosure of information about the sites being considered for early retirement along with with clear information about the criteria by which coal fired power projects are being selected, not sheltered by non-disclosure agreements. Yet this information still remains vague in the IP. Specifically in the case of the Mindanao STEAG CFPP, identified in the IP, which is being operated by an independent power producer and has bankable Power Supply Agreements, we are not clear the rationale for (i) why the plant owner requiresfinancial support to retire the plant and (ii) why its transition must be relinquished to the privatesector rather than decommissioned by the government. According to the IP, hundreds of millions of dollars from public institutions are planned to be expended to ‘incentivize’ coal power project proponents to repurpose or retire facilities. Through these arrangements, it appears that private corporations are not going to be held liable for the harms, losses and damages incurred on the environment and residents in surrounding areas, or financially culpable for the range of remedial work required, but rather rescued from the risks of their investments. Nor would it appear that the ADB and World Bank Group are prepared to require the operators to disclose information about the adjusted Power Purchase Agreements to enable full transparency of financial flows. It therefore would appear that the model for transition as outlined in the CIF ACT IP will be enabling companies to be rewarded with early investment returns, contrary to international polluter pays principles. Decommission, Not Repurpose Coal Projects; No Time False Solutions Our position as social, economic, gender, environmental and climate justice advocates is clear – coal power facilities need to be fully decommissioned, with no extension of life through techno-fixes that will serve to further violate affected communities’ rights to a healthy environment, land, water,sustenance and a dignified living. Yet to date,the models proposedfor support by the ADB, IFC and World Bank consistently appear to be dependent upon the suggestion that coal power projects will be ‘repurposed’, for example by refurbishing the plants to run on biomass or refuse derived fuels. Meanwhile,there is a glaring lack of attention to rethinking and reconceptualizing just transition planning, including for instance to exploring the potential, benefits, or planning options for small-scale, community operated or distributed renewable energy options. We reaffirm our position that there is no place in a just transition for projects which require burning organic matter through biomass and waste resources through refuse derived fuels, or depend upon the build out of utility scale hydropower dams – all of which take a heavy toll on the health and well-being of local communities and the environment, have onerous GHG footprints, and cannot rightfully be categorized ‘renewable’. We also reiterate the critical need for the CIF ACT Project Concepts to avoid undermining existing national environmental laws and standards (including but not limited to the Clean Air Act and the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act [1]) as well as international commitments. Allocate Funds for Reparative Justice We are specifically alarmed at the lack of indication of any plans for reparation and redress for the residents of communities surrounding coal fired plants to be selected for early decommissioning/repurposing under the IP. In the case of the Mindanao STEAG CFPP for instance, there is no mention of how the multiple environmental, social, and health impactsof the project will be resolved, including legacy issues related to land allocation and ongoing chronicrespiratory diseases, including high incidences of childhood asthma rates. Notably, the USD 1 million grant from CIF to be allocated for ‘just transition-related activities’ remains highly insufficient to cover land and water rehabilitation and remedial work along with redress and reparations. Take Responsibility for Past Coal Power Project Financing We consider it shamefulthat the grievances and calls for redress from affected residents living around coal power projects that were financedby the ADB and World Bank Group have been renderedinvisible in all aspects of the proposed Investment Plan. As of the time of writing, the IFC is still in the midst of implementing a Management Action Plan (MAP) [2] in relation to its own support for financing several coal-fired power projects in the country via RCBC as a financial intermediary. One of the key aspects of the MAP was for the IFC to follow through with “assessing and addressing environmental and social impacts associated with the 10 power plants RCBC financed and the status of their compliance with IFC’s Performance Standards,” yet to date, the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman has concluded that “delays in the progressare concerning”. This should serve as an alarming red-flag for the CTF Trust Fund Task Force, as it poses serious questions of credibility and legitimacy in relation to the proposed role of the IFC in implementing the “Accelerating Development of Renewable Energy and Transition From Coal” project. We urge both ADB and the World Bank Group to accept the demands from affected residents living around the coal projects they financed that both institutions be accountable for redress, reparations as well as financially responsible for a comprehensive clean up of the sites. Re-Thinking and Reconceptualizing Just Transition The proposed development of a “National Just Transition Approach” (IP Appendix 12) has implications for questions of social and economic development beyond the energy sector and for people across, which should be subject to rigorous democratic processes, guided by input of elected officials and rights-holders from the local to the nationallevel, not by a one-timeconsultation with a target of 20 people as outlined in the IP. In addition, the “Just Transition Framework” proposed in the IP by the ADB and WBG as currently conceptualized fails to take a holistic approach underpinned by explicit respect for international human rights, labor and environmental conventions and internationally accepted principles, such as polluter pays and precautionary principles. Of furtherconcern is the fact that the proposedprogram appears to be set to saddle the national government with USD 8 million in debt (see below). Plans Should Not Exacerbate CurrentDebt Burdens Components proposed for financing from the ADB and World Bank both entail the issuing of loans, meaning government institutions will be required to take on more debts to implement measuresand deep reformsas prescribed by the World Bank Group and the ADB. This effectively means implementing the IP will have the outcome of further burdening the Philippines with servicing illegitimate debts at the very time when publicfinance is neededmore than ever to supportFilipino communities confronting head-on the impacts of the climate crisis. In light of the above, and in the more detailed documents appended, we collectively consider the process for the development of the Investment Plan and the plan itselfas thoroughly flawed. We look forward to having clarity on options that exist to address the points of concern as outlined about the current Investment Plan before it is approvedand funds are disbursed, taking into account the initial proposed steps for an overhaul as outlined in the end of the appended letter (Annex A). Thank you for your consideration. We are happy to arrangea time to share these concerns through an online format or to provide further details if clarifications are needed. Sincerely, 350.org Asia 350 Pilipinas Asian Peoples’ Movementon Debt and Development (APMDD) Freedom from Debt Coalition Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives-Asia Pacific Kilusan para sa Kabuhayan, Kalusugan, Kalikasan at Katiyakan sa Paninirahan sa Quezon City (K4K QC) Legal Rights and Natural ResourcesCenter-Friends of the Earth Philippines NGO Forum on ADB ORIANG Women’sMovement PhilippineMovement for ClimateJustice The Center for Energy, Ecology,and Development [1] To be clear, at the current time, Refuse Derived Fuel, biomass and municipal waste to energy incineration technologies are bannedunder the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003)and the CleanAir Act (RA 8749), and therefore from the get-go should be struck out as options being considered in this Investment Plan. [2] https://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/philippines-rizal-commercial-banking-corporation-rcbc-01 Download letter here.

We are writing to express our collective concerns with the draft text of Asian Development Bank’s Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP), a copy of which has undergone limited circulation but not yet been publicly disclosed on ADB’s website. In this regard, the ADB is now in a laggard position in comparison to other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), including the AIIB, which publicly released its Climate Action Plan on 25th September 2023, during its recent Annual Meeting. However, as we understand that the text is still under review, we urge ADB’s management and Board of Executive Directors to take this opportunity to reconsider its provisions and go back to the drawing board to position itself to do no harm in the face of the climate crisis. This would mean first and foremost, ensuring the institution does not continue to approve projects and programs which will exacerbate the climate, biodiversity, ecological, water, food and socio-economic crises within and across the borders of borrowing member countries. Specifically, it is critical for the ADB to proactively screen all current and pipeline financing to sever complicity and partnerships with entities that define their primary business as that of extracting, burning or transporting fossil fuels. It would also mean assuming responsibility for redressing the harm, loss and damage at ADB project sites that are labeled by the Bank as ‘climate finance’ – as well as at the sites of fossil fuel projects that the ADB has helped finance, where community grievances have yet to be resolved. We would have expected the CCAP – which we understand is intended to guide staff – to read as a plan of decisive action, urgently taking direction from the most recent climate science and evidence from first hand realities of climate-change induced havoc witnessed across the region. Instead, the CCAP is underpinned by a set of business as usual assumptions that call for de-risking and spurring on “new business prospects for the private sector,” with the unstated effect of leaving the public – i.e. those who already face the brunt of the climate crisis – to cope with associated risks, harms and damages. In this regard, a reality check is required, as it is the very same corporations now seeking to benefit from elaborate technocratic schemes, staking claims over planetary commons to earn carbon credits or initiate other market-based schemes, that have been – and continue to be – complicit in exacerbating key inequities and injustices faced by communities across the region. While the CCAP suggests the ADB is “aligning its financing with the mitigation and adaptation goals of the Paris Agreement, for 100% of sovereign operations and 85% of nonsovereign operations by July 2023, and 100% of nonsovereign operations by July 2025,” (para 10) the explanatory footnote reads that “ADB follows the Joint MDB Alignment Approach to the Paris Agreement, of which ADB is a signatory, and the common MDB assessment methodologies developed as part of that framework”. Importantly however, the MDB joint methodology and principles fail to follow a strict 1.5C trajectory, simply only identifying extraction and burning of coal and peat as “universally not-aligned”. Other MDBs, such as the World Bank, EBRD and AIIB, have all developed and disclosed additional guidance. In fact, the EBRD opened up its draft Paris Alignment methodology for public consultation. However, so far, the ADB has not provided any explanation to demonstrably show how it will step forward to shift its portfolio towards compliance with a 1.5C trajectory, with ambitious targets and indicators, let alone a commitment to end support for fossil fuel related infrastructure, investments and trade financing. Without any such clear and firm guidance, the suggestion in the CCAP that ADB is taking an ambitious approach to Paris Alignment rings hollow. Whether during ADB’s Annual Meetings, Asia Clean Energy Forums, or policy-related discussions, civil society groups have consistently reiterated the call for ADB to commit to urgently phasing out support for fossil gas infrastructure, stop supporting speculative technologies such as carbon capture and storage/carbon capture, usage and storage (CCS/CCUS), end reliance on fictitious offset arrangements, and avoid continued build-out of large-scale private sector energy, transport, urban, water and agriculture sector projects. Therefore, at a minimum, if the ADB is to genuinely ‘walk the talk’ in averting overshooting global heating thresholds, among the first steps it would take would be to account for the need for a rapid, direct, managed phase out of reliance on fossil fuels. This would require severing of support to expansion of fossil fuel-dependent infrastructure across all sectors, while protecting – not commodifying – planetary commons, and turning away from pinning hopes on the piloting of futuristic techno-fixes or carbon market initiatives. We also reaffirm our position that MDBs, including the ADB as well as the World Bank, are in no position to take a role in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s loss and damage facility. Civil society groups worldwide have resoundingly called for the facility to be independent with a just and democratic decision-making structure providing non-conditional, non-debt creating, accessible, readily available, transparent and accountable support. We urge the ADB to avoid (i) interfering in any aspect of the governance of the facility – which should reflect the inclusive and representative nature of existing multilateral climate frameworks – and (ii) standing in the way of global efforts to ensure financing dispensed is additional, without onerous conditionalities and furthermore tackles the question of climate reparations. The arena of loss and damage remains one where ADB is yet to ‘walk the talk’ — which would mean assuming and not absolving itself of its own financial responsibility and accountability for addressing harms and providing reparations for damages where its own investments have been complicit in exacerbating climate-related impacts and risks as well as undermining the climate resilience of affected communities. There is no excuse to delay redressing ecological, social and economic harms wrought by current and past projects, including resolving outstanding grievances of project affected communities across the region. There have been two formal series of online exchanges with civil society and senior staff from ADB’s Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department about the draft CCAP, first in December 2022 and subsequently, in August/September 2023. However, there remains a lack of clear information on how civil society feedback is being taken into account and addressed in the ongoing drafting and revision process. At the current time, we understand the ADB will be aiming to finalize the CCAP before this year’s UN Climate Change Conference of Parties (COP 28), by November 2023. In the interim, while the text is still being finalized, we affirm that any Climate Change Action Plan fit for the purpose of guiding staff and rooted in the realities of the Asia Pacific region would, at a minimum: Be underpinned by an approach which clearly and explicitly references international human rights norms and principles, the precautionary principle and polluters’ pay principles as well as the ADB’s own environmental and social safeguards. Reference and reflect standards incorporated into the latest international agreements on climate, the environment and biodiversity, including for example, the Global Biodiversity Framework. Acknowledge the importance of environmental human rights defenders to advancing climate ambitions, and the context of lack of safe civic space for such advocates to speak out, making it incumbent upon international institutions such as the ADB to ensure its own consultation processes and grievance redress mechanisms make appropriate provisions to limit risk of retaliation and to react when instances do arise. In addition, the CCAP should incorporate commitments to undertake and integrate reprisal risk assessments, specifically in relation to environmental human rights defenders, into all projects and programs being considered as part of the Bank’s climate-related financing. Acknowledge that the heavy burden of sovereign debt faced by many countries across the region will only be resolved by unconditional debt cancellation (not conditioned by restrictive swaps negotiated under duress) – including but not limited to public debts incurred for past financing of fossil fuel infrastructure and associated facilities. Recognize the call for any new public sector-oriented financing to be explicitly non-debt creating. Exclude reliance on debt for nature / climate swaps – which typically introduce onerous conditionalities, include lengthy technocratic negotiations and complex transactions that exclude affected community representatives and fail to be fully transparent, inherently lead to further commodification of the planetary commons as well as the loss of sovereignty over natural resources, and do not provide the additional, accessible financing that is necessary to urgently fortify climate resilience at local and national levels. Avoid approaches that prioritize “de-risking investments” for the private sector (which leave the public sector to bear the burden of risk, typically leading to pressures to introduce austerity measures, including the weakening of environmental, labour and social protections). Acknowledge that not only must a ‘do no harm’ approach be taken in the context of the climate crisis when considering new project-based, technical assistance, bond or equity financing, but that the corollary is also the case, i.e. where harm has been done, redress is required. This includes instances where ADB has supported the expansion of the coal and fossil gas fleet, waste-to-energy incinerators, hydropower projects and large-scale agribusiness, thereby contributing to spikes in GHG emissions, dislocation and negatively impacting communities’ and ecosystems’ climate resilience. Provide clear, scientifically sound screening criteria based on the timelines and recommendations outlined in the most recent reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), UN Environment Program (UNEP) and World Meteorological Organization (WMO) to rule out support for activities that fail to take heed of global heating thresholds and planetary limits, including those which are high GHG emitting or lead to spikes in emissions such as through large-scale land and water use changes. This would require setting up clear, unequivocal standards to avoid supporting carbon lock-in across all sectors, based on time-bound, scientifically sound definitions and methodologies. In addition, calculations and estimations of GHG emissions must be considered comprehensively, incorporating the entirety of the project lifecycle as well as processes associated with project development. Among other aspects, this would include: operation of machinery and project components (such as turbine degassing in hydropower dam projects), impacts on soil and water, waste/debris accumulation and management during project implementation, as well as the processes required for decommissioning. Exclude “nature based [climate] solutions” that rely on schemes demarcating areas for ‘offsetting’ greenhouse gas emissions, effectively leading to land, water and resource grabbing from local communities, most especially in cases when areas encroach upon ancestral territories of Indigenous Peoples. Meanwhile, carbon market schemes – which are dependent on the speculative trading of carbon credits and lead to further commodification of planetary commons while enabling high GHG emitting industries to continue business as usual – have no place in an equitable and just response to the climate crisis. In addition, we reiterate that it is incumbent upon responsible ADB staff and management to respect and implement provisions to verify whether communities are collectively providing Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) throughout the course of project cycles (i.e. being conditional, which may be withdrawn at different stages of project implementation). Account for transboundary implications of projects being developed in border zones and/or intended to provide cross-border connectivity, including in relation to impacts on the climate resilience of ecosystems and communities as well as on shared commons (water, land, air). Include clear provisions that integrate time-bound methane mitigation pathways. Note and encourage the highest level of climate ambition already being taken by some member country governments, including Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Niue and Timor-Leste, to endorse the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty. Advance a progressive, proactive approach to alignment with a 1.5C trajectory with no distractions (i.e. IPCC P1 pathway). This would require explicitly excluding financing for CCS/CCUS and similar speculative schemes - which end up diverting finite resources into prolonging dependence on fossil fuels in a range of sectors, and raising risks of negative social, environmental and economic impacts for communities surrounding the associated infrastructure build-out. It would also mean that Nationally Determined Contributions and corresponding National Action Plans should not be used as the sole basis for identifying projects, given they generally follow pathways which will far overshoot the 1.5C threshold. Commit to ensuring that climate-demarcated sub-projects supported via financial intermediary arrangements as well as investments in trade and global supply chains are i) screened to avoid exposure to coal, oil, gas and petrochemicals (for instance, by cross-checking against the Global Coal Exit List and the Global Oil and Gas Exit List), ii) explicitly required to exclude extractivist industries, including mining, smelting and other ecologically and socially damaging projects such as hydropower and waste-to-energy incineration, as none can be reasonably tagged as contributing to climate mitigation/adaptation, and iii) fully disclosed publicly with timely and specific information regarding the sites/operations receiving financing on ADB’s website. FI sub-projects must also be disclosed at project sites, in a manner and form accessible to local communities, as well as information about the ADB’s accountability mechanism. Avoid approaches which allocate green and blue finance for public-private partnerships (PPPs), given these typically involve arrangements that undermine respect for internationally recognized labour, environmental and human rights standards. Screen all FI, blended finance, equity and bond as well as direct financing arrangements to exclude exposure to coal, oil or gas. This would include partnerships with utility companies that have yet to set clear, timebound fossil fuel phase out dates or with consortia that include oil, gas or petrochemical companies. Commit to ensuring communities affected by projects tagged as part of ADB’s climate mitigation/adaptation portfolio – including via FIs and blended finance arrangements – will be not only fully informed of ADB’s involvement and ways to access ADB’s Accountability Mechanism (i.e. both the problem-solving and compliance review functions), but also are informed of - and can - access channels by which to give substantive input into any climate change, environmental, social and human rights-related risk assessments being done (with corresponding disclosure of information, translated into local languages) to inform project-related decisions and designs from the get-go, grounded in local knowledge and collective awareness. Ensure that any partnerships with insurance companies on climate-related activities (as explained in the draft CCAP) are conditioned on the requirement that insurers are already implementing a clear coal exit policy and have - or are in the process of adopting – a time-bound oil and gas phase out policy, which aligns with recommendations of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report. Avoid bolstering support for schemes which allow coal/other fossil fuel project operators to pull-out of aging or stranded assets with little to no loss and without accountability, and/or to ‘repurpose’ facilities via ‘fuel-switching’ to fossil gas, biomass, refuse-derived fuels, hydrogen, ammonia and other resource and greenhouse gas intensive technologies Incorporate provisions for plans and preparatory works to be suspended and withdrawn where Indigenous Peoples’ Territories, sacred sites and/or land with ancestral significance to traditional and Indigenous Peoples’ communities, Community Conserved Territories and Areas (ICCAs) or community-based conservation areas may be affected by any of ADB’s climate-demarcated programs, projects or investments, and free, prior, informed consent by affected communities is not obtained. In this regard, we reiterate the critical need for ADB management and staff to respect – in policy and practice – community rights to say no to developments that will impact their lands, territories, resources and/or livelihoods. Provide clarity on implementation and revision processes – including but not limited to explaining how adjustments will be made in a timely manner to reflect the updates to ADB’s safeguard provisions, explicitly providing assurances of adherence to ADB’s Access to Information Policy and indicating how civil society as well as communities affected by projects/programs being tagged as climate-related financing will be able to engage in – and contribute meaningfully – to future reviews and revisions of provisions. The above measures – to align with international norms, avoid further complicity in exacerbating climate harm, and steer clear of approaches that undermine and distract from direct, rapid, equitable just transition in the face of the climate crisis – are non-exhaustive, instead being reflective of key concerns based on our understanding of the current status of the CCAP text. In closing, we look forward to hearing how the revision process proceeds, having clarity on how civil society concerns will be addressed in an updated version, seeing the disclosed action plan posted on the ADB’s website, and receiving information on the process as well as timeline for future revisions. Co-signed by the following organizations: 350.org Asia | Regional 350 Pilipiias | Philippines Accountability Counsel | International Aksi! for gender, social, and ecological justice | Indonesia Asian Peoples’ Movement on Debt and Development | Regional Bangladesh Working Group on External Debt (BWGED) | Bangladesh Bank Climate Advocates | USA Bomenstichting Achterhoek | Netherlands Building and Wood Workers International | International Center for Energy, Ecology and Development | Philippines Centre for Environmental Justice | Sri Lanka CLEAN (Coastal Livelihood and Environmental Action Network) | Bangladesh EarthRights International | International Freedom from Debt Coalition | Philippines Friends of the Earth Japan | Japan Gender Action | International Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives-Asia Pacific | Regional Global Forest Coalition | International ​Green Alternative | Georgia Growthwatch | India Inclusive Development International | International Indigenous Women Legal Awareness Group (INWOLAG) | Nepal Indus Consortium | Pakistan Initiative for Right View | Bangladesh International Accountability Project | International KRuHA | Indonesia Life Haven Center for Independent Living | Philippines Mekong Watch | Japan Nash Vek Public Foundation | Kyrgyzstan NGO Forum on ADB | Regional OT Watch | Mongolia PACOS Trust | Malaysia Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum | Pakistan Participatory Research & Action Network​ (PRAAN​) | Bangladesh ​Philippine Movement for Climate Justice | Philippines Recourse | International Rivers without Boundaries Coalition | Regional Rivers without Borders - Mongolia | Mongolia Save Sual Movement (SSM) | Philippines Trend Asia | Indonesia Urgewald | Germany WALHI | Indonesia Download PDF here.

October 2, 2023 To: Independent Accountability Mechanisms Network (IAMnet) members Re: A call to defend the independence of IAMs Dear IAMnet members, As civil society organizations and advocates who support communities to use independent accountability mechanisms (IAMs) harmed by internationally financed projects, we value the role of IAMs in facilitating access to justice, but we are deeply concerned about the escalating threats to the independence of these mechanisms that we have observed in recent years. On the occasion of its upcoming annual meeting in London, we call on the Independent Accountability Mechanisms Network (IAMnet) and its members to reaffirm their commitment to the independence of IAMs. For two decades, IAMnet has been an important convening of IAMs, providing capacity building and legitimacy to its members. As recognized by IAMnet’s name and its criteria for participating in the network, independence from the parent institution is crucial to the legitimacy and effectiveness of these mechanisms. However, recently, we have observed an alarming trend of management interference with – and even capture of – several IAMnet members that have made decisions and findings that the leadership and legal departments of their respective institutions did not like. Recently, there have been several troubling instances of interference that are a direct assault on the independence of IAMs: Efforts to capture and undermine the compliance function at the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO): Since its inception in 1999, founding CAO Vice President Meg Taylor imbued the Office of the CAO with a vibrant culture of independence, which continued through the term of her successor Osvaldo Gratacos, who came from an oversight background. During this period, the IFC tried to limit the independence of CAO and yet the office nonetheless issued a series of hard-hitting compliance reports that drew public attention to the social, environmental and human rights impacts of IFC projects, prompting a number of systemic reforms that improved the institution. In 2020 CAO Vice President Gratacos’s contract was not renewed by the President of the World Bank after he resisted intense pressure to compromise the independence of the office from management. Rejecting qualified candidates with backgrounds in accountability, the World Bank President then selected a new CAO Director General with a background in bank management at another international financial institution. The Director General has since hired several other CAO staff and consultants with bank management backgrounds, a departure from previous CAO hiring decisions. This included an attempt in 2022 to hire an IFC manager to lead the compliance unit, which members of the undersigned organizations decried. The personnel changes at CAO have occurred as the Office of the General Counsel has stepped up its interference, most notably through the approval of a non-disclosure agreement that impedes CAO’s ability to disclose a forthcoming investigation of child sexual abuse in an IFC project in Kenya (Bridge International Academies). Meanwhile, CAO has removed the former head of the compliance unit - who worked on the Bridge case - and advised staff that he is on leave until further notice, without providing further information. This is amidst reports that CAO staff who raise concerns about the erosion of the office’s independence are marginalized and retaliated against. Retaliation against a Panel member at the Independent Complaints Mechanism: A panel member at the Independent Complaints Mechanism (ICM) of the German, French and Dutch development banks (DEG, Proparco and FMO, respectively) was informed that her contract would not be renewed because he was unhappy with an eligibility determination that the panel made in regards to a complaint about a financial intermediary investment. She was told that they wanted a panel member that is more amenable and cooperative with management. This explicit retaliation against a panel member by management for exercising her independent judgment in making an eligibility determination calls into question whether the ICM is in fact operationally independent from management and meets the criteria for membership in IAMnet. Interference of the General Counsel at the Compliance Review Panel of the Asian Development Bank: We have long-running concerns about interference from the General Counsel’s office limiting the independence of the Compliance Review Panel. The concerns go back more than a decade to when the General Counsel forced the CRP to change one of its recommendations in the Cambodia Railways case calling for ADB to set up a remedial compensation fund. Years later, the Office of the General Counsel issued an interpretation memo regarding the Accountability Mechanism policy that limits the powers of the CRP. This memo was used by management in a recent case to limit the monitoring mandate of the Panel. A panel member at the Compliance Review Panel resigned early from her term in July in protest. Attack on the independence of the Independent Redress Mechanism of the Green Climate Fund: In a recent complaint filed by Nicaraguan Indigenous complainants with the GCF’s IRM, the General Counsel agreed with the IRM to implement a firewall between himself as advising the management, and the Deputy General Counsel as advising the IRM. Despite the firewall, the Deputy General Counsel intervened during the Board deliberations on the case to respond to management related issues around project oversight in the context of the Accreditation Master Agreement with the CABEI, the Accredited Entity. The same Deputy General Counsel who had advised the IRM was then acting as General Counsel and did not respect the firewall. Consequently, the IRM was kept out of discussions by the Board on its draft decision and on the advice of General Counsel, the Board adopted a decision that undermined the monitoring mandate of the mechanism. IRM was prohibited from monitoring whether the project has been brought into compliance, and that assessment was placed in the hands of management, contrary to established procedures and guidelines adopted by the Board. The effect of the decision was to undermine the independence, procedures and mandate of the IRM. Efforts to Undermine the Independence of the World Bank Inspection Panel: In establishing the World Bank Accountability Mechanism (AM) the Bank's Board of Directors seriously compromised the ability of the Inspection Panel to operate independently by requiring that the Panel get approval for its budget through the AM Secretary and by requiring Panel staff to officially report to the AM Secretary. When concerns were raised around this structure, the AM Secretary requested an opinion from the General Counsel in the matter, which is contrary to operating independently of management. Additionally, the AM Secretariat has also sought to prevent cases from moving swiftly to compliance, continuing to pursue the possibility of dispute resolution despite clear indications that requesters have chosen compliance. In one case, these efforts led directly to a government initially refusing to permit a visit by the Inspection Panel for a compliance investigation, delaying the process by several months. Problematic involvement of general counsel offices in IAM policy development: We also understand that representatives from banks’ legal departments have joined the drafting teams of IAM policies, including policies governing the World Bank Inspection Panel/Accountability Mechanism and CAO, and are slated to be a decision maker in the upcoming ADB AM review. While this is not a new development - as IFI legal departments have historically weighed in on IAM policies - we are concerned that their influence over the policy drafting processes is growing and undermining the independence of IAMs. These are but a few examples of efforts to capture IAMs and undermine their independence. In addition to concerns about management capture and interference, we also have concerns about structural independence – several IAMnet members do not have their own office at the parent institution. For instance, the AIIB’s Project-Affected People’s Mechanism (PPM) is housed within the Complaints-Resolution, Evaluation, and Integrity Unit (CEIU), and does not have a direct reporting line to the AIIB Board of Directors. The managing director of the CEIU reports not only to the Board but also to the president, who in fact appoints the director and is responsible for the staffing and resourcing for the PPM. This lack of structural independence may be one of the reasons why the PPM has yet to accept a single complaint since its establishment five years ago. To address these grave threats to the integrity and effectiveness of IAMs, we are calling IAMnet to: Reaffirm independence, both structural and operational, as a criteria for membership to the network; Establish a Standing Committee on the independence of IAMs, which reports regularly on the extent to which each IAMnet member meets the structural and operational criteria, as well as any specific threats to the independence of IAMnet members; Speak out against inappropriate interference and threats to the independence of IAMnet members by the management of parent institutions. Sincerely, Accountability Counsel Arab Watch Coalition Asia Indigenous Peoples Network on Extractive Industries and Energy (AIPNEE) Bank Information Center Both ENDS Bretton Woods Project African Law Foundation (AFRILAW) Center for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) CEE Bankwatch Network Community Empowerment and Social Justice Network (CEMSOJ), Nepal Counter Balance DamSense Friends with Environment in Development Fundeps Gender Action Green Advocates International Inclusive Development International International Rivers Jamaa Resource Initiatives, Kenya Lawyers’ Association for Human Rights of Nepalese Indigenous Peoples (LAHURNIP) Lumière Synergie pour le Développement (LSD, Senegal) NGO Forum on ADB Oxfam Recourse Swedwatch Urgewald Download PDF here.