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The Asian Development Bank is about to embark on a review of its Public Communications Policy (PCP). Also known as the Disclosure Policy, the PCP has been the subject of debate among stakeholders and has received criticisms from affected communities and civil society. They have questioned the Disclosure Policy in terms of the merits of its content and implementation based on their experience at the ground level. Information is both power and empowering. With it, people are able to make sound and informed decisions. It allows them to participate actively and effectively in the decision‐making process, which in turn ensures that their respective communities would benefit directly from the development agenda of international financial institutions such as the ADB in their communities without causing any harm and danger to them and the environment. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, has recognized the right of the people to seek and receive information. The ADB has continued to claim its support of the right of the people to access information in relation to its operations in the field. In spite of this, the ADB has continued to fall short in recognizing and respecting the right of the people to information. Experiences at the ground level have shown that the Bank lacks both the political will and the resources to recognize this right. In Northeast India, the Khasi indigenous people, who have been fighting to recover their ancestral land due to a cement project supported by the ADB, have been denied access to project documents and reports by the Bank’s review missions. In Cambodia, only a few people from the 2,000 families directly affected by the ADB’s Highway One project have been invited to consultations. In Kyrgyzstan, a local non‐government organization monitoring an ADB‐funded power and heating project has been denied access to project information. And in Aceh, women suffering from a cement facility which is a component of an ADB‐funded reconstruction project have neither been consulted nor informed about it. These are only a handful of cases clearly manifesting the ADB’s violation of people’s right to information. Access to information should not be viewed as a discriminatory privilege given to a select few. Information should be provided to the public at the least possible cost ‐‐ if not totally free ‐‐ and in the most practical manner. The Bank has been speaking of inclusiveness when it comes to its development agenda. At present, this has not been the case. The ADB has equated making information public to providing information only in its website, clearly excluding the poor who should be the foremost beneficiaries of its very existence. Adequate resources should be allocated to effectively implement the Disclosure Policy. People should be informed in the most simple and affordable way.    A long exception list that allows certain projects not to be covered by the PCP is also a strong indication of the ADB’s lack of political will to be transparent in its operations, denying people their right to be informed. Project documents should always be made publicly available. Non‐disclosure of documents should only be allowed in instances wherein the harm that could be caused by disclosing such information outweighs the interest of the public.   For sure, if one goes through the existing PCP, s/he may assume that the ADB is supporting the public’s right to information. However, taking the sideline and merely playing the role of a cheering squad is not enough. The Bank should play its role. Merely putting it on paper is not acceptable, especially to those whose houses are being dismantled; to those whose ways of life are being drastically altered; and to those whose lands have been robbed. The ADB is about to embark on a reviewing of its Public Communications Policy. It is high time to recover from what it has fallen short of.

By Tea Soentoro What is the incentive for affected people when their case is filed to ADB’s accountability mechanism was one of the significant questions raised during a briefing session on ADB’s accountability mechanism hosted by the Office of Special Project Facilitator (OSPF) and the Office of the Compliance Review Panel (OCRP) for civil society groups on 19 November 2009 at Discovery Suits, Manila. Robert May of OSPF and Bruce Purdue, the Secretary of OCRP, presented ADB’s accountability mechanism.[1] Present in the session were also Rusdian Lubis, Chair of CRP, Tony La Viña, member of CRP, and some other ADB staff. About 15 representatives of Manila-based NGOs, among others Transparency International, Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific, WWF, PRRM, LRC, PSI and the NGO Forum on ADB attended the session. That question raised after the two hours of discussion might reflect a skepticism to the accountability mechanism, among others, due to the narrow scope of its terms of reference, its difficulties in defining immaterial harms and long-term impacts, its site specific corrective measures without touching the project as a whole, and its incapability to restore lives of uprooted affected people. As mentioned by Lubis, the briefing session was a part of ADB’s accountability mechanism outreach program to civil society groups. After Manila, another briefing sessions will be held in Jakarta and Sidney (or Melbourne). It seems that those two offices need a pro-active approach because only a small number of cases were filed. This condition can be perceived as ADB is doing the job well. This is a matter of existence too as Purdue said “… and therefore it might downsize the Offices…” Since the Board approved the new Accountability Mechanism in May 2003 and has taken effect since December of the same year, OSPF received only 24 complaints. Out of which, 15 cases were found not eligible because they were not addressed to the Operation Department before going to accountability mechanism; 8 were eligible and 1 is still under review. Meanwhile, only 3 claims were filed to the OCRP. However, May felt encouraged as many of the 24 complaints were submitted during the past two years. It shows some improvement due to active outreach and also more NGOs are working with affected people, he said. May’s statement still didn’t answer a question raised about their assessment on why not many cases were brought to the accountability mechanism. It seems that those offices are ignorant to various matters that can be the reasons for this situation: lack of information to affected people about the accountability mechanism. They are not aware that they can file their grievances. Furthermore, most borrowers are not informed about this mechanism; even ADB’s consultants and staffs of the project. Affected people also fear their oppressive governments that’s why they don’t want to show their disagreement to a project. Lack of confident that the accountability mechanism can solve the problem in favor of the affected people is another reason for this situation. Though the accountability mechanism handles grievances of affected people due to ADB projects –from infrastructure to co-financing and financial intermediaries– the scope of handling is too narrow because it only looks at direct and material harm caused by a project, and targets cost effective solution. Regarding a question on how to define or quantify material harm related to damage or lost of cultural site, the answer was “…it is the matter of interpretation… the material harm can be defined broadly to include such damage or loss…” Another question that was not answered was about immaterial harm and long-term impacts from ADB’s Sharia banking project, as an example. The ADB is indirectly promoting the compliance to Sharia law by Muslims.[2] In a country such as Indonesia, Sharia law is a manifestation of the raising Islam fundamentalism that, among others, targets women to forcedly comply with and therefore leads to gender injustices. May said “… I really don’t know how to answer the question, and need to look at the case when it comes to me…” However, Purdue said that he wasn’t sure that ADB is not allowed to involve in project with religious dimension. The ADB is not allowed to intervene in the political affairs of a country, he said, though he was aware that the Sharia issues are becoming a political matter in a country such as Indonesia. Lubis added that the accountability mechanism is not the right venue to address this issue. The issue on eligibility was raised particularly for projects that have already been closed– after the submission of the Project Completion Report (PCR)–but harm to people is still ongoing, just like in the case of the privatization of the power industry in the Philippines. Though those offices are aware that some projects have longer impacts beyond the submission of the PCR, they have to work within the terms of reference of the accountability mechanism. The role of OSPF is limited to facilitating or mediating only a problem that evolved directly from a project. Purdue said, once the financial stake is out, no more can be done. Therefore, a participant suggested that the scope of the accountability mechanism should be broadened by covering the continuing damage of a project and the scope of damage itself. Regarding sanctions for non-compliance of a project to a policy of the ADB, they said the ADB is responsible for the project, not for the individual persons. According to Purdue, there are many factors that cause non-compliance. It could be some departments at the ADB or could be the borrowers. So there is no sanction or punishment to individuals. He continued that the significant change is to admit the problem and have the willingness to change the problem to make it more accountable. Furthermore, Purdue said that the CRP cannot cure non-compliances to the policy, but look for solution to correct them. La Viña added that the ADB will act accordingly on the recommendations from OSPF and OCRP to solving a specific problem. Therefore, it should be kept in mind that accountability mechanism is about correction of the problem that has occurred at the project level and there is no mandate to stop the project. Though on the other hand, the ADB cannot prescribe what governments should do. The ADB will not interfere with governments, but only give recommendation because it is a matter of sovereignty of the countries. Reaction to this statement came from a participant who said the sovereignty issue is a false issue. In the contract of the privatization of the power industry with the Philippine government, for example, the ADB required a particular policy reform. This was a clear evidence that ADB had intervened to the government’s sovereignty. A double standard is in practice. The accountability mechanism has two separate but related phases – the consultation phase under OSPF and Compliance Review Phase under OCRP, according to Purdue. The SPF is for problem solving at the project level, and once the problem is shifted to addressing a policy of the Bank, it is then brought to the CRP as it is about Bank’s compliances with the policies. He emphasized that the CRP is not an appeal panel of the consultation phase if the complainants are not satisfied with the results of the consultation. For example, if complainants go to CRP because the compensation rate is lower as expected, this would be found as not eligible. Complaint process starts at the consultation phase at the SPF to look for solutions first, then it can be continued to be filed to CRP. Not only project affected people, but ADB Board of Directors (BOD) can also file a complaint. However, they can go directly to CRP without going through the process of the SPF. Furthermore, Purdue explained the institutional arrangement of accountability mechanism: SPF is reporting to the ADB president; meanwhile CRP as an independent panel is reporting to the BOD. The ADB president is the chair of those two entities–the management and the BOD. This explanation invited a response about the president’s conflict of interest. Integrity, independency and output of decisions are questioned due to these dual positions. “The best system cannot help if the people in it are corrupt,” said a participant who is a judge. Purdue responded that this position is as stated on the Bank’s charter and has never been amended, though it can be done. However, he said, there is system of check and balance and more approach to accountability. Many issues raised during the briefing session are key points for the next review of the accountability mechanism. However, Purdue said that they are yet to determine the date; but for sure, the review will be done next year. The Board will decide on this soon, and the management will do the review. The briefing sessions are the start and ground work for the review. However, it still remains open whether the review is capable to fill principle gaps as raised during the briefing session and to make the new accountability mechanism more accountable and responsible to project-affected people by restoring their–material and immaterial, direct and indirect, short and longer terms–loss of livelihood and also open for a possibility to review the whole project once it proves harming people. Otherwise, the accountability mechanism will continue to serve its existing purpose, which is an image polishing that the ADB is accountable to people, and furthermore that this financial institution will again miss the point of being accountable and responsible. Endnote: 1 More information about OCPF at www.adb.org/spf, and OCRP at www.compliance.adb.org 2 Living complies with Sharia law is among others pray 5 times a day, fast during Ramadhan (fasting month), Muslim dress code for women (head cover), zakat (donation) and borrow money from Sharia financial institutions

Asian Development Bank President Haruhiko Kuroda opened the 41st Annual Meeting of the ADB today under a hail of questions from civil society groups critical of the ADB’s pursuit of private sector development at the expense of  poverty-alleviation efforts and community and environmental interests. “The corporatization of Asia is obviously the main agenda under the ADB’s Long-Term 2020 Strategy,” said Isagani Serrano of the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement. “It is clear forty-one years after its founding that there is no future for Asia’s poor under the ADB. Under the ADB, physical, economic and political displacement of communities in Asia will be massive,” Serrano said. ​ The Madrid meeting is taking place under a pall of doubt, as criticism from civil society stakeholders and the ADB country shareholders converged regarding the legitimacy and direction of the ADB’s role in Asia. Debate within the ADB recently spilled over to the public arena, particularly involving its investments in off-shore private equity funds, and an unprecedented delay in the vote to replenish the Asian Development Fund. Replenishment of the ADF is usually agreed months ahead of the ADB Annual Meeting. The ADF provides grants and low-interest loans to the Asia and Pacific’s poorest countries. The new ADF will cover the period of 2009-2012. ​ “The ADB can boast all it wants about the replenishment of the ADF but the fact is that the delay is a reflection of dissatisfaction and disagreements amongst the Bank donors,” Stephanie Fried of Environmental Defense Fund said. During the negotiation, the US made a strong connection between the ADB’s Safeguard Policies and replenishment of the ADF. ​ Last week, the Financial Times reported on material risks associated with over US$600 million in ADB investments close to 40 offshore private equity funds, many of which are domiciled in the Cayman Islands. “We are deeply concerned at the near-total lack of transparency regarding these funds and their unclear relevance to poverty-alleviation efforts,” said Titi Soentoro of the Indonesian group, NADI. “The ADB has environmental and social safeguards which must be applied to private equity operations but we see no evidence that this is happening,” said Red Constantino of the Bank watchdog NGO Forum on the ADB. “We have requested that President Kuroda release the names of all companies and projects financed by these funds as well as all of their social and environmental assessments.” ​ “If the ADB actually applied meaningful environmental and social standards to private equity funds, this would be a true breakthrough in the realm of alternative investments,” said Fried. ​ Kuroda was left with a number of questions to be answered regarding corruption in ADB projects in Afghanistan, the use of child labor in an ADB projects in Central Asia and development projects gone awry in ADB developing member countries such as West Seti in Nepal.

On July 25, 2005, the ADB announced that it was conducting an ‘update’ of its safeguard policies for purposes of “enhancing its effectiveness, and ensure its relevance to changing client needs and new lending modalities and instruments.”1 The ADB recognizes that the implementation of its policies on the ground has been a problem. A key aspect of the update is a plan to streamline operations and consolidate the three safeguard policies into one. At present, ADB’s Social and Environmental Safeguard Division (RSES) within the Regional Sustainable Development Department (RSDD) is leading the safeguard policies update. A steering committee, and internal and technical working groups were formed to facilitate and discuss the safeguard issues. They are in charge of distilling the principal policy elements of the SPU and drafting the policy paper (also known as the W-Paper). ADB’s expects to finish the entire update process is in November 2007 where the Board is expected to review the final policy paper. Between July and October 2006, the ADB will have its own internal consultations. After which, the Bank will conduct external consultations. ADB’s Safeguard Policies The ADB’s safeguard policies require the Bank to avoid, minimize, or mitigate adverse environmental and social impacts from its funded projects extended to its Developing Member Countries (DMCs) in Asia and Pacific region. Currently, the ADB has three safeguard policies: Involuntary Resettlement Policy (1995) Indigenous Peoples Policy (1998) Environment Policy (2002) The Involuntary Resettlement Policy states that forcible resettlement should be avoided whenever possible. Resettlement plans must be developed in consultation with affected communities. Affected people should be fully informed about the resettlement. They should be justly compensated and provided with appropriate land, housing and infrastructure, among others. Affected communities must be at least as economically and socially well off after the project as they were before the project. The Indigenous Peoples Policy states that the ADB should ensure that equal opportunity for indigenous peoples are provided. Projects should be implemented with the informed consent and participation of the IPs. Interventions that will affect the IPs should be consistent with their needs and aspirations. The Environment Policy states that the environmental impacts of projects should be evaluated and minimized. The public should be involved in the evaluation of environmental impacts. Environmental impact assessments should be conducted and disclosed to the general public. The safeguard policies are very important to the civil society organizations (CSOs), concerned stakeholders and affected communities because these are the basic guiding principles that ensure the Bank’s accountability as regards the environmental and social impacts of its projects. When the operational policies and procedures are violated, affected communities and concerned stakeholders can file a complaint with the ADB’s Accountability Mechanism. Complaints are filed with the Office of Special Project Facilitators for problem-solving purposes, and elevated to the Office of Compliance Review Panel for compliance. Problems with the Safeguard Policies There are some key problems with the safeguard policies. One is that they do not allow communities to say “no” to a certain project. The policies only help lessen potential social and environmental impacts. Another one is that the ADB has a poor track record in implementing its own policies. Despite the existence of the safeguard policies, evidence suggests that many ADB projects have damaged the environment and caused social and economic harm to vulnerable communities. Some high profile ADB-funded projects have exposed serious shortcomings, such as the Southern Transport Development Project (STDP) in Sri Lanka, Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project (CRBIP) Phase III in Pakistan, and the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project (SPWMP) in Thailand, just to name a few. Another issue is the lack of accountability for safeguard compliance. In STDP (Sri Lanka), ADB’s own Compliance Review Panel (CRP) reported that “the ADB management has not complied with most of the proposed remedial action in the CRP report prepared in July 2005 to solve the problems of the STDP.” The ADB rarely sanctions its clients or its own staff and management for failure to comply with the safeguard policies. CSOs’ concerns with the Update CSOs are concerned that the update will weaken the safeguard policies that could result in ADB being less accountable for its projects and interventions. CSOs believe that the present update is related to ADB’s ability to successfully compete with export credit agencies and other development financiers in the region that do not require borrowers to follow stringent safeguard policies. CSOs are also concerned that the ADB is following what the World Bank did in the mid-1990s when the latter initiated a similar process and resulted in the simplification of its safeguard policies. Another concern of the CSOs is ADB’s adoption of a ‘country systems’ approach in addressing social and environmental safeguard issues. This approach means that for certain projects it finances, the Bank will rely on the borrowing government’s own environmental and social systems rather than its own safeguard policies. National systems will be evaluated against a set of the Bank safeguards and if judged ‘equivalent’, they will be used for project preparation and implementation. Although CSOs have always advocated the strengthening of social and environmental standards and the building of institutional capacity at the national level, they have been concerned that the shift towards country systems will result in a dilution of the Bank’s own responsibilities for its safeguard policies. What Do CSOs Want? CSOs want the ADB to stop supporting highly destructive projects and to be held responsible and accountable for social and environmental damages its projects bring. The ADB should seek the informed consent of affected communities before developing projects, and retain this strong voice throughout the project cycle. These strong requirements, among others, should be part of the safeguard policies. CSOs want the ADB to view environmental and social planning as a way to minimize problems arising in the future, rather than as a constraint on competitiveness. In evaluating the effectiveness of its safeguard policies, CSOs believe the ADB needs to listen to the voices of project affected people and civil society from developing countries. In response to ADB’s Discussion Note in March 2006, forty eight CSOs sent an open letter to the ADB, expressing concerns about the update. The letter contained a number of recommendations for the ADB to strengthen its environmental and social standards and hold ADB management accountable for policy implementation. These include: complying with international human rights, labor and environmental laws, conventions, and norms; developing clear and comprehensive social and environmental policy frameworks; establishing mechanisms for compliance and ensuring accountability for results on the ground; and protecting the rights of all affected communities and ensuring respect for indigenous peoples’ internationally guaranteed rights. (Footnotes) 1 See http://www.adb.org/Safeguards/policy.asp 2 For more information on the recent trends at the World Bank, see Shannon Lawrence “Retreat from the Safeguard Policies: Recent Trends Undermining Social and Environmental Accountability at the World Bank,” January 2005, available at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/4279_RetreatSafeguardPolicies_0105.p

By Abby Don As the Asian Development Bank gears up for the comprehensive review of its Public Communications Policy (PCP) by 2010, the NGO Forum on ADB has jumpstarted its own independent and parallel process of on-the-ground consultations. The series of community-level consultations kicked off in Yogyakarta, Indonesia on January 22-23, 2010. Spearheaded by the NGO Forum on ADB, Solidaritas Perempuan Kinasih and Forum LSM Yogja, the consultation was attended by project-affected people and non-government organizations monitoring ADB projects from Kalimantan, Java and Yogyakarta. YOGYAKARTA, 12 Feb 10 — “Access to comprehensive, accurate and timely information” is a strong sentiment expressed by communities from West Kalimantan and Java in Indonesia. Their current experiences exemplify how project-affected communities often find themselves on the receiving end of either misinformation or disinformation about the projects that are being planned by the Bank. There are misleading and inaccurate information circulated with regard to the number of households affected by the project, such as in the case of an ADB-funded regional road development project in Kambayan, West Kalimantan. The final draft of PPTA (Project Preparatory Technical Assistant) prepared by ADB says only 63 houses are directly affected on the proposed road-link in West Kalimantan. The people strongly disagree and stress that the number of affected households is more than 63, in fact, way beyond 63. The corridor of impact (COI) is one of the contentious issues. It seems that the Bank has not given this concern a forethought and consideration in determining the actual number of households that will be affected by the project. It was a unilateral decision made by the Bank’s consultant hired to prepare this Project and the Indonesian government. The project-affected people say that they were not informed. But beyond the numbers, the people’s concern is the far reaching implications of the project on their lives and livelihoods. The people’s feeling of uncertainty and fear are well founded. This is the sentiment of the people living nearest to the project site — “Our houses and land are taken away from us. We live very near the project site, and we are talking about just a few meters and not ten kilometers away as claimed by the Bank.” In Kalimantan Barat, access to information is again a pressing issue. Mr. Petrus Atus, a “binua” or head of an indigenous people’s village in Sambas district, said that they are not aware. Even SP Kinasih Yogyakarta, a non-government organization monitoring the Java south road project and supporting the concerns of project-affected people has this to say “There has been no public participation since the beginning of the road development project. People go there and just do measurements.” SP Kinasih underlined that information (and in the language understandable to the people) is wanting. According to SP Kinasih, the limited information is in English and accessible only through the ADB website. “We try to make information accessible to the affected people and seek audience with the local government, but even local officials cannot give information.” Similarly, other non-government organizations monitoring ADB-funded projects have problems accessing project-related information. During the consultation, Peoples Alliance for Citarum (ARUM) coordinator Mr. Dadang Sudardja underlined that it is a challenge getting accurate information on the US$ 500-million Integrated Citarum Water Resource Management Investment Program (ICWRMIP) financed by the Bank. ‘There have been no consultations with the families affected, almost nothing about the project. This is about demolition of houses and massive displacement of hundreds of families. We’ve been patiently requesting information since 2008, but until now nothing has been disclosed.” This is also evident in the experience of KIARA (Fisheries Justice Coalition) in monitoring the Coral Reef Triangle Initiative. The main problem, according to KIARA representative, is the lack of public consultation and the ideas did not come from the people. AMRTA Institute, the organization monitoring the West Jakarta Water Supply Development Project share similar sentiments. Mr. Irfan Zamzami noted that the ADB invokes that ‘certain information are confidential”, and withholds finance-related information, like the detail plan on how the loan was used. He also said that “this ADB-funded project is a pressing issue because water cost in Jakarta is the most expensive in Southeast Asia.” The on-the-ground realities in Java and West Kalimantan bespeak of the kind of inclusive and transparent information disclosure that the Bank is talking about. Undoubtedly, these affected communities have very little knowledge of, or worst, have no information at all on the ambitious Bank-financed regional road project. And in the absence of comprehensive, accurate and timely information, how do you expect people to have meaningful participation in the consultation and decision-making processes that directly affect their lives? It is time for the policy to catch up with reality. * The Asian Development Bank approved a Technical Assistance (TA) to prepare the regional road development project in West and East Kalimantan and southern part of Java Island. This assistance is in preparation of a project proposal by the government of Indonesia for a road development project in the aforementioned regions. The project preparatory technical assistance (PPTA) was included in ADB’s Country Strategy and Program 2006–2009 for Indonesia. The Government’s medium-term strategy for the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) identified road development in less developed regions, including northern Kalimantan and southern Java, as a priority.

By Tea Soentoro A story of Ming Chhin’s struggle in getting her life back after being involuntarily displaced by the ADB-funded Highway One Project in Cambodia [1] MANILA, PHILIPPINES, 15 Feb 11 — “I would extend my coffee shop, paint it with new bright colors, put more chairs and tables. I would by a new kitchen set, so food will be served too, not only coffee. I will bake cookies which I will sell in the market. I can do many things. My shop is along the Steoung Slaut River, so if I make my coffee shop nicer, I would get more customers. If only I can get the money soon.” This is a dream of Ming (aunt) Chhin, 60 years old, who is waiting for a fund from the Income Restoration Program [2] of the Asian Development Bank that was introduced in October 2009. This is Ming Chhin’s last hope to restore her livelihood after the Highway One Project ruined it. After eleven years, she is still waiting for a promise made by the ADB that her life, together with those of her neighbors, will be made better off through Highway One Project in Cambodia which was funded by the bank[3]. Ming Chhin is one of the affected people by the ADB-funded road project which stretches from Phnom Penh in Cambodia to Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam. At the Cambodian part, this Project included reconstruction of around 105 km of road from Neak Leoung to the border with Viet Nam at Bavet. It affected 1,068 households.[4] “They promised our lives would be better off with the new road. We were told to relocate in year 2000. So, we moved our home. But they did neither gave us full compensation nor a new land for our house,” recounted Ming Chhin. At first, they received what they called a resettlement cost because they lived on a state/public land. “I received around US$340 before the relocation. The amount was so little to buy a new land or build a new house,” she added. According to Chhin, most of them were able to afford renting a small place to live, and they had to move from one place to another for several times. “Some of us, at first, had to live on land that was flooded in the rainy season, or had to squat on someone’s land, fearing to be kicked out any time. Others had to pay a high rent. We had to spend much money on each relocation.” Recalling her experience during their displacement, Ming Chhin said, “After moving many times, finally we came to a resettlement site that was constructed in 2003. Other communities were able to move in 2006. However, our lives at the resettlement site were still difficult. “We received the full compensation only in 2006. Yes, four years after the relocation. After coming to the resettlement site, we still had to fight for land filling, toilets, and wells to improve our living conditions. Though we received the compensation money before we entered the resettlement site, still it was not enough for continuing our lives,” Chhin said. “At that time, I received US$1,400. In total, I have received around US$1,700 as compensation for giving up my land, my house and my coffee shop. Many of us used to run a small store before. We lost our stores and did not have the money to build new ones,” she recounted. Moreover, Chhin thought that many others had more difficult lives. “Some of us faced harder situation because they remained landless until now. A few members of our communities still have not received compensation for their lost of land. They could not even join us in the Resettlement Site. I still do not understand why they cannot get new land.” 1 Based on several interactions with Ming Chhin in Kyoto, San Pablo and Quezon City 2 ADB, October 2009, Capacity Development Technical Assistance (CDTA), Kingdom of Cambodia: Capacity Development for Income Restoration Programs at http://www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/CAM/43174-CAMTAR.pdf 3 Formally, the Project is called Kingdom of Cambodia and Socialist Republic of Viet Nam: Greater Mekong Subregion: Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh City Highway Project. Information about the Project can be obtained at http://www.adb.org/projects/project.asp?id=30513 4 ADB, Completion Report, December 2007, Kingdom of Cambodia and Socialist Republic of VietNam: Greater Mekong Subregion: Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh City Highway Project, para 64, p.18 at http:// www.adb.org/Documents/PCRs/VIE/30316-VIE-PCR.pdf

by Cai U. Ordinario THE Asian Development Bank (ADB) will conduct a review of its public communication policy to ensure that the policies are still effective, transparent and relevant. The ADB will conduct the study from today to April 2010, during which time the Manila-based multilateral financing institution will seek views from various parties through the Internet. The review is a mandatory requirement for policies every five years. It will also conduct consultations with stakeholders like government officials, civil society and the private sector, both in developing member-countries and donors. “The ultimate goal of the consultations is to give all interested stakeholders the opportunity to improve the effectiveness of ADB’s public communication policy,” said Ann Quon, ADB Department of External Relations principal director. The NGO Forum on the ADB, a network of 250 civil-society organizations (CSOs), welcomed the move and said it was time to review the public communication policy since many of the poor, who benefit or become affected by the projects that the ADB has in the region, are not that well-informed. In a statement, the CSOs said they are hopeful that reviewing the public communication policy of the bank will lead to better project implementation. “It’s about time the ADB’s narrow information-disclosure policy is reviewed. If it is to be of use to communities facing displacement due to ADB-funded projects, the bank has to recognize that public access to information is not an option but a fundamental human right,” forum executive director Red Constantino said. Souparna Lahiri of the Indian-based National Forum of Forest People and Forest Workers said the review will also improve project participation in communities. Lahiri said that extensive consultations are needed to carefully examine the provisions and how best to improve them. Further, Leak Kay of Conservation Development of Cambodia said that access to information is one of the ways to empower and enable affected communities to participate in projects funded by the ADB. The current public communication policy, which took effect in September 2005, guides the ADB’s external-relations strategy and its stance on disclosure of information, with the aim of ensuring its business is widely known and understood. The policy recognizes that transparency is critical to the effectiveness, sustainability and accountability of ADB operations, and the trust and support of member-governments. A second round of public comments will be sought in October, before a revised draft document is submitted to the ADB’s board of directors in the first quarter of 2011. Final approval of the new policy is expected by next February.

Forum finds itself once again at the forefront of civil society engagement on Safeguards with the ADB, four years after a successful campaign to strengthen the said policy. An omnibus policy encompassing environment, involuntary resettlement, and Indigenous People policies, 2009 Safeguard Policy Statement protects the people and the environment from any harm caused by ADB operations. It officially took effect in January 2010. SPS Internal Evaluation In the first half of 2013, the Bank’s Independent Evaluation Department or IED commenced an internal evaluation process of the SPS. ADB expects to end it by September 2014, in time for the mid-term review of the Asian Development Fund XI in the last quarter of the year. The first phase is an operational assessment of its Country Safeguards System and Financial Intermediary investment in selected client countries. Based on ADB’s original timeline, this process should have been completed in December 2013, with the release of an Approach Paper. Bank insiders said the Approach Paper will most likely be released by April 2014. This means that the process has been delayed by four months. The second phase of this internal evaluation will be a full policy review of the SPS. Both are being undertaken by IED under the supervision of the Development Effectiveness Committee (DEC). Historically, Forum Network members and partners have spearheaded efforts of civil society actors in the creation of these safeguard policies. They have led the fight to enhance policy provisions as well as preserve these provisions in both letter and spirit. In the last Safeguards Policy Update that lasted from 2005 to 2009, Forum has successfully pushed for the following: the elaboration of requirements for meaningful consultation; the provision for the improvement of lives and livelihoods for involuntary-displaced people, a more detailed description of processes and requirements in regard to CSS; safeguard requirements for other financing modalities including FI; and the improvement of gender language. However, some of the Network’s concerns particularly those related to the language of the involuntary resettlement policy has remained a point of contention. Concerns and Issues The forum is closely following the SPS evaluation process (and subsequent reviews) to ensure that the SPS remains a reliable tool of protection for peoples and ecosystems unwittingly displaced, disrupted or destroyed by the Bank’s development agenda. Forum advocates against any dilution of the SPS and urges the Bank to resist caving in to pressure from its public and private clients to water down the policy. After the SPS became effective in 2010, more borrowers have complained about the long process and strict safeguards requirements for a project or program loan. Hence, there is both increased pressure from these clients for less stringent safeguards requirements. The ADB is also threatened by the possibility of these clients getting loans from other banks with no safeguard conditionality's at all. Furthermore, ADB financing in the form of project loan and technical assistance grants are increasing in many countries. A weaker SPS increases the vulnerability of communities and marginalised groups to social, economic and environmental problems, especially in the face of escalating climate-induced disasters. Process-wise, an issue that has repeatedly surfaced pertains to how transparent and inclusive of external stakeholders, particularly civil society and affected communities, this internal evaluation is. Compared to the last Safeguards review process, which went on for more than five years, this process has less transparency and inclusivity. Likewise, Forum recognises that IED’s role as of the SPS evaluation/review is in compliance with SPS Paragraph 82. This was a last-minute addition of the ADB to the SPS document prior to its final approval. This precluded Forum members from intervening on or questioning the appointment of IED. Under the policy, IED is mandated to conduct the 3-year operational review and the 5-year full policy review upon the effective date of the SPS, which was January 2010. As indicated in the IED approach paper , however, the evaluation will be delivered 4 years and not 5 years after the 2009 approval of the SPS. This is because ADF donors have requested the finalisation of the evaluation before the ADF XI mid-term review in late 2014. It should be emphasised that the IED web page has not updated its timeline despite the delays in the process. Similarly, there is no significant information about the SPS operational review on the web page of the Safeguards Policy. While it is an internal process, Forum believes that civil society and other stakeholders deserve transparent and up-to-date information on this operational review. In this regard, Forum has lobbied and sent official correspondence to ADB Board members, top Management officials, and IED to involve civil society in the internal SPS evaluation. ADB’s reaction is limited to getting case studies on its CSS and FI implementation from Forum or other CSOs. Similarly, Forum has urged the Bank to undertake a full-scale policy review and meaningful stakeholders’ consultation to further strengthen the policy language and provisions of the current SPS.

by Nina Somera When I brought out my laptop, a crowd immediately gathered around me. Our informant remembered quite well the moment he returned to his hometown after years of studying in Kathmandu. The sheer amazement of people over a sleek electronic pad just speaks of their remoteness from such technology. But such sense of surprise-turned-curiosity suggests a people’s plain desire to know and engage. During that homecoming, West Seti was opening itself to an ambitious developmental project. But although the teeming forests and valleys were still there, an ominous atmosphere was just palpable. Its snaking river, which has become the basis of human settlement and even animal migration spell the end of West Seti. Not that the river has engulfed such resources but it will eventually do, submerging its teeming forest, grasslands and animal life and washing away the reminders of vibrant communities and diverse cultures. Thanks to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), West Seti is about to host a massive hydropower project, shouldering about 15 per cent of the total cost of US$125 billion for the period of five years. Other investors include the Australian Multinational Company, Snowy Mountain Engineering Corporation (SMEC), China National Machinery Equipment Import and Export Corporation (CMEC), India’s Infrastructure Leasing and Finance Systems (ILFS) and the Nepalese Government. Of the 750 megawatts that the dam will generate, 90 per cent is intended for India at a cost of NRs 3 (US$0.4) per unit. This, despite 80 per cent of Nepal are languishing in the dark while the rest pays NRs 7 (US$0.9) for every bit of electricity, that is not even continuous. Meanwhile the communities that were to be affected by the project were the last to know of such impending displacement and disaster. To date the communities have yet to obtain the more detailed plans on the project. In 2000, an environment impact assessment (EIA) was approved and revised six years later. But this document was never shared. While a summary was recently made available on ADB’s website, it was in English. According to the Asia Pacific Digital Review 2009-2010, Internet penetration in Nepal remains low, with .31 per 100 Internet users. Although the cost of equipment such as personal computers and Internet services generally tends to lower through time, even the more cosmopolitan cities are not spared of power cuts that last for up to 12 hours. “Sometimes when we study, we need to wait until midnight just to connect with the Internet,” said one student. Furthermore, not all Nepalese can understand Nepali, the country’s national language. Literacy is likewise low, standing at 53.74 per cent on the average and among women, less than 50 per cent. Srijana Subedi, one of the affected residents in eastern Nepal where another ADB-funded hydropower project is being constructed could only agree, adding that of all the media in Nepal, community radio remains the most accessible to people, especially women, who can listen to programmed while working. “Radio can reach even the most remote village. It is also good even when there is no electricity,” she described. Listeners may also participate in the radio programs by calling the station and giving their views during a live broadcast. Although telephone density is quite minimal and problems persist in communication lines, mobile phone usage is on the rise. Like the West Seti hydropower and Melamchi water supply projects, benefits from Khimti hydropower project are bound elsewhere. It was only because of the communities’ persistence that some electricity was provided to the village development councils (VDCs). Such provision however remains incomplete for out of the 10 VDCs in the area, only six are enjoying electricity. The Khimti hydropower project costs US$140 million with 75 per cent loan from the ADB, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Norway’s Eksportfinans AS, Finland’s Nordic Development Fund and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). But however strategic and appropriate community radios are as a communications platform, respect for people’s communication rights is ultimately based on one’s desire to share information and empower communities. As another community leader asserted, “We only learned about the project through the radio. Local people must be informed through the local media beforehand.” Dipkshika Dahal added that the timeliness and quality of information also lies to the extent the ADB has corrupted people within the communities. There were instances when VDC officials were bribed to keep vital information among them. With the increasing encroachment on the land, people are eventually surrendering their lands, with some members of the households and sometimes, whole families migrating to other areas. Dipkshika also revealed that some have become engaged into sex work and some more have been sexually exploited. Meanwhile indigenous groups such as the Masi have been forced not to rely on fishing, their main occupation, given the scarcity of water. Communities around the Khimti project have actually demanded a face-to-face exchange with people from the Bank. “Before planning the project, ADB must take steps who are the affected people and address them as well. Both the positive and negative consequences must be told to the people. ADB must also be informed directly about the impact of the project and there must be no other people between us,” Dipkshika remarked. Our informant likewise asserted that all project information must be disclosed to the communities in a timely fashion and in languages that people understand before any decision by the Bank’s board is made. “Multi-stakeholder consultations and public hearings must take place in a meaningful and effective manners after the disclosure of such information,” he added. Indeed Marshall McLuhan’s famous line, “the medium is the message” resonates in these cases. With ADB’s choice of medium and mode of communication with the public, its message is just as clear as glass.