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Climate activists protest as ADB holds annual meeting, call on ADB to stop financing gas and cancel public debts arising from its fossil fuel projects A group of climate activists held a rally today in front of the headquarters of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) where the 55th Annual Meeting of the ADB is taking place. Carrying a giant symbol of a memo of Asian peoples’ demands, the protesters called on the multilateral bank to stop financing all fossil fuels and false solutions to the climate crisis, as well as cancel all public debts arising from ADB-funded fossil fuel projects. They issued the memo to a mockup image of ADB President Masatsugu Asakawa. “We are protesting the ADB’s continued financing of fossil gas, which seriously imperils climate action. It is not enough for the ADB to end financing for new coal. It needs to stop financing for all fossil fuels,” said Lidy Nacpil, coordinator of Asian Peoples Movement on Debt and Development (APMDD). “We are also demanding that ADB cancel outstanding debts fossil fuels and other harmful projects. It should immediately start with canceling debts from coal projects. ADB has already acknowledged that coal power is harmful to people and planet and committed to stopping new coal lending. It sjould cancel outstanding loans from its past support for coal or convert these outstanding debts to grants for renewable energy. Staggering debt burdens continue to plague most developing countries and the impacts of these burdens are far worse during this time of the multiple crises of Covid, climate, and economic hardships,” added Nacpil. Ian Rivera, coordinator of Philippine Movement for Climate Justice (PMCJ) said ADB’s conditional funding of gas provides justification for gas infrastructure buildout and prevents the transition to clean, renewable energy systems in developing countries. The bank’s new energy policy stopped financing for new coal projects, but allowed financing of gas projects in certain cases. It has spent over $4.7 billion on gas since the adoption of the Paris Agreement. Its gas finance accounts for over 96% of its fossil fuel financing from 2016-2020. ADB’s financing of fossil fuel projects has largely been in the form of loans, exacerbating the debt burden of ADB’s developing member countries. “Super typhoons and the pandemic have taught us that neglecting critical issues such as public health, energy access, and village-to-hospital infrastructure can lead to a massive human and capital cost. The ADB cannot pursue a pathway that remains bound to private profit in the name of development,” said Rayyan Hassan, executive director of NGO Forum on ADB. According to Annabel Perreras, Project Data Analyst of NGO Forum on ADB, the current safeguards policy of ADB meant to protect the people from harm is up for review. “We continuously demand that the ADB develop strong safeguards now. There can be no genuine progressive safeguards policy while turning a blind eye to the situation of human rights defenders, laborers, and a private sector operating in secrecy." As of April 2022, ADB has lent a total of $355.47 billion to Asian member countries as part of its cumulative loans, grants, equity investments, and technical assistance program commitments. India tops all countries with ADB loans and grants amounting to $57.65 billion. It finances 826 projects, including the Kolkata Environmental Improvement Investment Program that has displaced more than 300 small shopkeepers, and the Accelerating Infrastructure Investment Facility in Himachal Pradesh which violated labor policies. “Many projects funded by ADB loans have buried peoples of the South in illegitimate debts and caused significant health risks, environmental destruction, and erosion of local livelihoods,” said Atty Aaron Pedrosa of Sanlakas. Pedrosa said these projects include the $900 million loan in 2013 for the 600-MW Jamshoro coal-fired power plant in Pakistan; the $400 million loan for the Tangguh Liquified Natural Gas Expansion in Indonesia, the country’s very first private sector project in Oil and Gas; the $500 million loan to build the Rupsha 800-Megawatt Combined Cycle Power Plant Project; and the $120 million loan-funded Visayas Base-Load Power Project, a 200-MW coal-fired power plant.

Manila – The 55th Asian Development Bank (ADB) Annual Meeting kicks off this week in a hybrid format with the theme 'From Pandemic to Recovery: Ideas for Change in Asia and the Pacific.’ Despite the festive mood that the Bank is projecting, this was criticized by civil society organizations (CSOs) and project-affected communities, especially after super typhoon Karding (international name Noru) blasted the Philippines' main Luzon island, causing damage and losses of P141.38 million to the agricultural sector. “Super typhoons and the pandemic have taught us that neglecting critical issues such as public health, energy access, and village-to-hospital infrastructure can lead to a massive human and capital cost; the ADB cannot pursue a pathway that remains bound to private profit in the name of development,” says Rayyan Hassan, executive director of NGO Forum on ADB, an Asian-led network of over 250 CSOs worldwide. Hassan explained that the public interest and the public need have to be placed above all interests, especially when using Multilateral Development Bank (public) finance. “We remain vigilant on whether ADBs next phase of lending is pro-people and pro-environment, and let the Bank remain open to hearing critical views from the ground when it derails from that agenda,” he added Recently, Pakistan has also experienced one of the worst environmental disasters in the world; one-third of the country is underwater, proving that the climate crisis is a race that we cannot win. Hussain Jarwar from Indus Consortium stated that the current monster monsoon rainfall had affected more than 40 million people, causing damage to two million houses and one million livestock, damaging thirteen thousand road infrastructure, and washing away three hundred fifty bridges in the country. "Pakistan accounts for 0.7% of GHG emissions but is ranked the 8th most vulnerable country to climate change globally. The MDBs should support Pakistan in the rehabilitation of debt swaps for nature. However, in that crucial situation, ADB has released a tranche for unit 5 of Jamshoro Power Company Limited (JPCL)' comprising a 600 MW Super-critical coal-fired power plant." Jarwar added that "Indus Consortium demands from ADB, an immediate halt in disbursement activities related to any fossil fuel investments in Pakistan including JPCL, and reorient all the future investment portfolios towards the deployment of solar and wind energy projects for ensuring just energy transition and sustainable economic growth. Under ETM facilitation, ADB must first phase out its funded projects to set a model." The network is also raising its collective concerns about the debt crisis and political situation in Sri Lanka. According to Hemantha Withanage, from the Centre for Environmental Justice (CEJ), an organization based in Colombo, "Sri Lanka is suffering from a serious debt crisis, energy crisis, and food crisis as a result of the failed neoliberal policies and corrupt system of capitalism implanted in the country. Many infrastructure projects and burrowings became sources of corruption in the past two decades". Withanage also added that ADB should take responsibility for these systemic problems as a policy. "We believe ADB should cancel some ineffective and unfair debts and encourage other multilateral and bilateral lenders to do the same; it is time to assist the humanitarian crisis and avoid pushing draconian laws such as PTA to suppress the people." The ADB is also gearing towards the culmination of the safeguards consultation process with no indication if the new policy will be progressive, rights-based, and pro-community. Ritu Thapa from Indigenous Women's Legal Awareness Group (INWOLAG), a Nepal-based organization monitoring the ADB-funded Tanahu Hydropower Project, explained, "we believe that the ADB Safeguard policy is supposed to protect the rights of development-affected communities. Along with these expectations, the ADB must consult affected people, and information must be disclosed formally. The language must be accessible to them to understand better the project plans to avoid, minimize, or mitigate adverse environmental, social, cultural, and many more impacts, especially to indigenous and marginalized communities." According to Annabel Perreras, Project Data Analyst of NGO Forum on ADB, "The current safeguards policy of the Bank meant to protect the people from harm, are being up for review. We continuously demand that the ADB develop strong safeguards now. There can be no genuine progressive safeguards policy while turning a blind eye to the situation of human rights defenders, laborers, and a private sector operating in secrecy." The network is also raising concerns regarding the Energy Transition Mechanism (ETM) scheme that the ADB is piloting in practice. Avril De Torres from the Center for Energy, Ecology, and Development (CEED), an organization based in the Philippines, stated that many questions remain unanswered about the ETM. "Ambiguities over how the mechanism will be implemented leave many of us with skepticism. They are also yet to release their guidance notes on fossil gas. As coal and other fossil fuel prices today bring record high electricity rates amid skyrocketing costs of living, ADB and its partners must prioritize a rapid phaseout of costly coal power that will neither pass on burdens of costs to consumers nor make way for other costly fuels like fossil gas to take coal's place" says De Torres. Coal companies and financiers must shoulder their part in early closure expenses, including reparative and just transition costs. Any transition mechanism must also clearly contribute towards a 1.5°C-aligned shift to affordable energy from 100% renewables. There is also the pervasive shrinking of civil society space and reprisals against human rights defenders in Myanmar, the Philippines, and Mongolia. As we move towards the post - COVID - 19 era, it is undeniable that the pandemic has deepened inequalities and exposed a fragile health system, weak governance, and poorly designed infrastructure systems. Sukhgerel Dugersuren from OT Watch Mongolia explains, "In the name of post-COVID-19 economic recovery, the Mongolian Minister of Justice declared on August 3, 2022, that anyone objecting to strategic infrastructure projects would be investigated for criminal acts stipulated in Criminal Code 19.4 and 19.6 as sabotage and unlawful collaboration with foreign entities and individuals. This statement was followed by opening criminal investigations and arrests of civil society and community activists. It also opened doors for businesses to file retaliatory charges against activists and community groups they consider stalling their projects, claiming payment of onerous amounts to make up for "lost opportunity costs" without substantiated evidence." Dugersuren also added that criminal investigations started a few days before the visit of China's foreign minister, which resulted in agreements to increase coal exports to China with more support for port, road, and energy infrastructure. Investigations and arrests continue to date to assure investors gathered for the "Mongolia Mining 2022" week that energy and transport infrastructure projects will support their investments in mining. "It remains to be seen if the ADB will remain silent in the face of this context, simply continuing to provide loans and technical assistance to a government that makes reprisals an official tool for moving ahead with environmentally and socially harmful projects. The ADB must take clear measures to respond to the unacceptable risks this situation poses to project affected communities and their allies," according to Dugersuren. "The ways that ADB's investments exacerbate debt and encourage reliance on resource-intensive, extractivist forms of energy are things we have personally witnessed and experienced," says Hasan Mehedi from CLEAN (Coastal Livelihood and Environmental Action Network) and the International Convenor of NGO Forum on ADB. "As we have repeatedly stated in recent years, a just, inclusive, and sustainable transition across Asia and the Pacific cannot and will not be realized if the Bank continues to finance false solutions such as WTE incinerators, large hydro, fossil gas, and carbon capture. The ADB must support an equitable, forward-looking green recovery; we urge the ADB to prioritize people, and the planet over profit!”

ADB is conducting a comprehensive review and update of its 2009 Safeguard Policy Statement. As part of the process, it has organized a series of consultations with key stakeholders including developing member country governments, civil society organizations, and project-affected people. This session will reflect on the policy architecture of the Safeguard Policy Statement, challenges in its implementation on the ground, and existing limitations. NGO Forum’s panel will present project examples where a lack of meaningful consultation and information disclosure led to harm to communities. The panel will also discuss important issues related to gender, labor, sexual orientation and gender identity expression, and human rights in relation to safeguards.

Late last year, ADB adopted a new Energy Policy, joined with other multilateral development banks at COP26 to support a set of “Just Transition High-Level Principles,” and launched plans for operationalizing a coal retirement scheme in the region. This roundtable, convened by the NGO Forum on ADB, will promote timely, forward-looking debates on the issues of "just transition" and climate financing at the project, programmatic, and policy levels⁠—through the eyes of representatives from civil society groups in South, Southeast, and Central Asia/the Caucasus. A respondent from the ADB Energy Sector Group will also be present to engage in the discussion.

The Forum network is hosting two panel sessions at the 55th Asian Development Bank (ADB) Annual Meeting - Civil Society Perspectives on Just Transition and ADB’s New Energy Policy 26 September 2022 Monday 4:30 PM - 6:00 PM (PHT) Late last year, ADB adopted a new Energy Policy, joined with other multilateral development banks at COP26 to support a set of “Just Transition High-Level Principles,” and launched plans for operationalizing a coal retirement scheme in the region. This roundtable, convened by the NGO Forum on ADB, will promote timely, forward-looking debates on the issues of "just transition" and climate financing at the project, programmatic, and policy levels⁠—through the eyes of representatives from civil society groups in South, Southeast, and Central Asia/the Caucasus. A respondent from the ADB Energy Sector Group will also be present to engage in the discussion. A Decade of Safeguards: Lessons from the Ground 27 September 2022 Tuesday 4:00 pm - 5:30 PM (PHT) ADB is conducting a comprehensive review and update of its 2009 Safeguard Policy Statement. As part of the process, it has organized a series of consultations with key stakeholders including developing member country governments, civil society organizations, and project-affected people. This session will reflect on the policy architecture of the Safeguard Policy Statement, challenges in its implementation on the ground, and existing limitations. NGO Forum’s panel will present project examples where a lack of meaningful consultation and information disclosure led to harm to communities. The panel will also discuss important issues related to gender, labor, sexual orientation and gender identity expression, and human rights in relation to safeguards.

As the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) concludes the public consultation period for its Energy Sector Strategy Update 2022, civil society groups on Monday called on the Beijing-based bank to do right by its core values of being ‘lean, clean, and green’ and ambition of advancing sustainable, affordable energy in Asia by closing loopholes in its energy policies that allow financing for fossil gas, coal, and other destructive energy. A report from think-tank Center for Energy, Ecology, and Development (CEED) and regional civil society network NGO Forum on ADB reveals that despite support provided to develop solar and wind projects while avoiding direct financing for coal, the AIIB goes against climate imperatives and risks tying the region to decades more of continued fossil fuel dependence through fossil gas investments and indirect support to coal, among other loopholes. “The AIIB has yet to achieve its “Lean, Clean, and Green” ambitions. The Energy Strategy blueprint in 2016 failed to close loopholes for fossil fuel financing, leaving these ambitions in danger of becoming empty promises. However, the 2022 Energy Sector Strategy Update provides an opportunity for AIIB to translate its promise into a policy that can deliver concrete change,” said Executive Directors Gerry Arances of CEED and Rayyan Hassan of NGO Forum on ADB in the report, which was submitted to the AIIB at the conclusion of its April 8 to July 15 consultation period. The groups raised alarm over the bank’s growing preference for fossil fuels, as 11 of the 36 energy projects approved by the AIIB from 2016 to the first quarter of 2022 are fossil fuel focused infrastructures. With 10 projects, of which generation projects amount to nearly 2 GW, fossil gas (natural gas) accounts for the largest number of approved projects for a single type of energy source. “Claiming climate and energy leadership can be within reach of AIIB, if only it chooses to divert its attention to genuinely sustainable renewables. Instead, it touts fossil gas as a transition fuel, encouraging a massive gas expansion even as fuel prices and supply insecurity are at their all time high. With fossil gas, AIIB goes against the development interests of host countries, tying them to high electricity rates and a catastrophic climate future,” said Avril De Torres, CEED Deputy Executive Director and co-author of the ‘Greening the AIIB’ report. Civil society groups from across the world also registered dissatisfaction over AIIB’s online consultation process that was neither meaningful nor inclusive, with its tight window to communicate concerns and lack of transparency. CEED and NGO Forum on ADB are hopeful that the report can assist in steering the bank’s direction towards climate action. “Energy policies of big financial institutions like AIIB can make or break the climate fate of vulnerable peoples across all regions of the Bank's member countries, particularly those communities dispossessed to make way for the development of fossil fuel and other large-scale power projects still being supported by the Bank. With such implications, one would think AIIB as a development bank would exert the utmost effort to consult with stakeholders on the updates that need to happen in its energy investments, but that has not been the case. Now that the consultations have ended, we urge the AIIB to publish the feedback it has so far received and to open another round of comments for its updated policy prior to board approval,” said Tanya Lee Roberts-Davis, Energy Policy and Campaigns Strategist from the NGO Forum on ADB.

15th July 2022 We, the undersigned civil society groups from across Asia, the Levant, Europe and the Americas are advancing the following key points of concern in relation to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s (AIIB) Energy Sector Strategy Update, specifically in light of the opaque drafting process underway and the absence of meaningful opportunities for public engagement.[1] I. Process for the Energy Sector Strategy Update: Neither Inclusive Nor Meaningful While we acknowledge that the AIIB management extended the deadline for public submissions of written comments and scheduled a series of online discussions, we firmly reiterate our shared perspective that the compressed nature of the period for public comment – including the ad hoc, last minute set of virtual consultations – has not provided the space for meaningful and inclusive dialogues between diverse sectors of civil society across the institution’s membership and the responsible Bank representatives.[2] Our reasons for raising concerns about the process at hand are numerous,[3] but include: the overarching constraints of such a short timeframe for public comment on the proposed revisions to the Bank’s Energy Sector Strategy (leaving limited realistic possibilities for interested local, national or regional groups to effectively gather and provide perspectives from their respective constituencies); the lack of commitment to host online discussions with simultaneous translation into regionally relevant languages (necessary to open up clear possibilities for representatives of civil society groups to participate – most especially from across Asia and the Levant where energy financing has been concentrated to date); the lack of outreach about the ‘virtual consultation’ sessions scheduled at the end of June/early July to civil society constituencies by the responsible AIIB personnel, evidenced by the fact that participation in the initial sessions was highly limited to a small number civil society groups; the absence of time set aside to listen directly to people already affected by AIIB’s energy sector investments and consider their recommendations for moving forward;[4] the absence of time allocated for civil society groups to engage with responsible staff on questions related to regional nuances in the AIIB’s energy sector portfolio or to associated portfolios (including support for energy projects via on-lending facilities or in the urban sector), and the apparent absence of willingness to address specific questions on (i) the gendered implications of energy sector financing and future/planned projects in the pipeline, and (ii) the critical lack of attention to gender considerations in the overall energy sector portfolio of the AIIB to date (underscored by the fact that no time was allocated for dialogues with civil society on these issues as requested – nor was any gender specialist staff present during the ‘virtual consultations’). Critically, at this time there remains a lack of clarity on how – or even if – external comments from civil society will receive a response from the AIIB management or be taken into account in the final iteration of the text.[5] We therefore reiterate our call for the AIIB management to publish a summary of comments received – during online interactions and in writing – alongside responses from the AIIB management.[6] In addition, we urge the AIIB to release a revised draft of the updated Energy Sector Strategy in the months ahead that would be open for a period of public comment prior to Board approval. Despite being overdue, we also urge the AIIB to publish clear information on the expected timeline of the process for revising and approving the updated Energy Sector Strategy. The lack of public disclosure and meaningful consultation on the part of the AIIB – as a multilateral financial institution with a development mandate – extends to the processes surrounding the Bank’s project-related operations. Despite the significant long-term repercussions on peoples’ lives and livelihood prospects[7] as well as on ecological health and economic resilience, information publicly available on the AIIB’s website about the projects financed are often vague, and in some cases heavily redacted (examples include the BDMG Renewables and Asia Connectivity Facility and the Solar IPP Equity Investment), thereby limiting options for timely public review and any meaningful opportunities for affected communities to informed, let alone raise questions prior to project approval. Going forward, we urge the Bank to: (i) increase transparency in policy revision processes[8] and project-related matters (including for financial intermediary facilities and capital market investments), and (ii) be accountable and responsive to the concerns of project-affected communities and broader civil society actors across the Bank’s membership, and II. Draft Text of AIIB’s Energy Sector Strategy 2022 Update: Overarching Concerns As the deadline towards aligning the Bank’s financing with the Paris Climate Accord draws closer, we urge the AIIB to consider the 2022 updating process as an opportune moment for the AIIB to ground its Energy Sector Strategy in the urgent and most up to date recommendations of climate science as articulated by internationally accepted assessments such as those provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the World Meteorological Organization (State of the Global Climate Report) and the UNEP annual Production Gap Report.[9] Now is the time that the AIIB can take the cue from member states that are already leading the way towards fossil fuel-free futures,[10] including those that have joined the “Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance”. We would therefore expect an update to the Energy Sector Strategy to outline clear time-bound plans for a rapid pivot away from supporting or facilitating fossil fuel dependent developments, ruling out further support for coal, oil and gas related infrastructure while phasing out current investments in fossil fuels (inclusive of associated facilities as well as utilities), and any support to companies that are not do not have a scientifically sound, time-bound plan to power-down carbon-intensive activities in line with the recommendations of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to limit global warming to 1.5C (P1 Scenario).[11] In the meantime, all options for financing distributed, decentralized and appropriately scaled renewable energy systems should be exhaustively examined. III. Towards Climate and Human Rights Due Diligence From our perspective, an Energy Sector Strategy fit for purpose would unequivocally provide clear assurances that all proposed investments will be screened prior to approval to verify compliance with international human rights based standards[12] as well as the spirit and ambition of the Paris Agreement.[13] Such a proactive approach would rule out several proposed investments in the AIIB pipeline. For example, projects such as the proposed Meghnaghat Unique Gas Power Project in Bangladesh and the 280 MW Nenskra Hydropower Dam[14] in Georgia are both considered by civil society groups to jeopardize the livelihood rights of local communities. Furthermore, we reiterate our call for the AIIB to integrate a Zero Tolerance provision on reprisals directly within the text of the AIIB Energy Sector Strategy Update. In addition, from our experience, cross-border pipelines and transmission lines to transfer fuel and electricity have the potential to escalate major energy, physical and water and land insecurities for communities living in border zones, for instance in cases of territorial disputes or in case of accidents such as pipeline bursts or leakages. Reliance on large-scale centralized energy developments required for importing/exporting power can also end up exacerbating national debt burdens, especially in cases of infrastructure cost overruns and long unanticipated construction delays. It has also become increasingly clear that dependency on imported sources of power and fossil fuel resources in fact increases the vulnerability of nation states to global economic shocks, in some cases leaving local populations on the brink of widespread socio-economic despair, as witnessed currently in Sri Lanka. We note the absence of any references in the draft update of the Energy Sector Strategy to the precautionary principle that would explicitly elaborate aims to avoid complicity with – or exacerbating – conflicts, gross human rights violations, and severe economic disparities within and between member countries as well as the grabbing of land, resources and territories from Indigenous Peoples and local communities. Furthermore we reiterate the call issued to the AIIB to incorporate a “No Go Policy” into its Environmental and Social Exclusion List--and accordingly reference it explicitly in its updated Energy Sector Strategy -- to bar direct or indirect support for energy sector infrastructure that would encroach on any Indigenous Peoples’ and Community Conserved Territories and Areas where the free, prior, informed consent of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities has not been obtained, or that would threaten protected or at-risk ecosystems, free-flowing rivers, habitats with endemic or endangered species, or intact primary forests and vulnerable, secondary forest ecosystems (for a more comprehensive list of “No Go Areas,” see “The Banks and Biodiversity No Go Policy”). Furthermore, with the expansion of renewable energy and flows of transition finance, there is an increasing shift of resources towards investing in infrastructure related to expanding transition mining extraction, refining and export. However, given the related risks to human rights (including health, access to water and land, as well as reprisals for speaking out) and the potentially ecocidal consequences, we urge the AIIB to firmly identify that no direct or indirect financing (including via capital investment or financial intermediary facilities) will be diverted under any circumstances to transition mining ventures, companies or associated facilities, nor to its export (overland or by sea), or to support for exploratory drilling. IV. Re-Assessing Priorities of the Draft Update to the Energy Sector Strategy We urge the AIIB management and shareholders to re-visit the overarching priorities enumerated in the current draft text of the Energy Sector Strategy and clarify its applicability to non-regional member countries. The text should be clear from the outset that support channeled to the energy sectors of all borrowing member countries (regional and non-regional) will be part of an overarching response to the dire energy, climate, health and economic crises faced at this time, in line with international human rights jurisprudence and global climate commitments. Specifically, the AIIB must support an unequivocal shift away from not only reliance on fossil gas but also on the resource-intensive infrastructure build-out required for mega-dams. In addition, under no circumstances should financing for the operations, upgrading or associated facilities of nuclear generators be considered. Access to energy should not come at the price of sacrificing peoples’ basis of social, economic and cultural survival through land dispossession, loss of access to critical sources of water, or food. Accordingly, the AIIB should fully take into consideration the perspectives and recommendations of affected communities, with particular attention to systematically marginalized groups, including – but not limited to – Indigenous Peoples, ethnic minorities, women and self-identified LGBTQI2S+ people, in relation to planning project design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation stages. In line with the purpose of developing infrastructure suitable not just for today but also tomorrow, the AIIB has a clear role to play in mobilizing resources for the infrastructure required to develop distributed, decentralized renewable energy systems that can be owned and directly operated by local communities. Critically, project affected communities’ rights to access effective remedy as and when needed through local grievance redress mechanisms alongside the Project-affected People’s Mechanism (PPM) need to be upheld without exception. V. On the Energy Sector Strategy’s Draft Guiding Principles In relation to the transition to low carbon energy supply, we urge the AIIB to elaborate specific conditionalities for the category of renewables from the outset (excluding large-scale hydropower dams, waste-to-energy incineration and nuclear power sites) and specify support to enabling infrastructure as that which focuses on (i) scaling-up of decentralized, distributed renewable energy systems, and (ii) transitioning grid technologies to ensure uptake of variable renewable energy. It is critical that the AIIB take into account the latest climate consensus that developing new fossil gas infrastructure is neither compatible with a 1.5C trajectory (IPCC P1 Scenario), nor with the imperatives of the Paris Agreement, and consequently drop fossil gas as well as related fuels (such as blending green and blue or gray hydrogen) from any consideration as low-carbon fuel sources or as a ‘bridge fuel’. We also urge the AIIB to ensure any financing channeled towards climate adaptation/mitigation or the energy transition is centered upon considering guidance and leadership from civil society, including labor unions and groups representing – and advocating with – project affected communities, including – but not limited to – those led by Indigenous Peoples and ethnic minority groups, as well as by women and self-identified LGBTQI2S+ people. In the current context of drying and dewatered riverbeds, flash floods, rising sea levels, and unpredictable extreme weather events, access to energy security will not come from a build-out of resource-intensive infrastructure relying on maladaptive centralized systems, fossil fuel dependency or extractivist based solutions that undermine local community bases of survival. In this regard, we urge the AIIB to update references to energy access and security, focusing on investments in decentralized, appropriately-scaled renewable energy systems that meet the expressed needs of local populations. In relation to energy efficiency, we urge the AIIB to consider financing rehabilitation and upgrading options solely in cases of current operating wind, solar or water powered projects (i.e. non-nuclear, non-hybrid and non-fossil fuel dependent systems) with the full involvement and consent of surrounding communities. The AIIB must categorically avoid providing support to utilities for upgrading or extending the life of fossil fuel reliant infrastructure. In addition, any ‘efficiency’ related financing should provide assurances that measures taken will not lead to cuts in basic services or undermine worker and community rights to health and safety. If deploying financing intended to limit and mitigate local and regional pollution of existing sources of energy, we urge the AIIB to provide clear assurances that waste-to-energy incineration or any other burning technologies will not be supported for the purposes of waste management or energy generation[15] (given for example, the range of toxic pollutants, including dioxins, typically released from incinerators into surrounding areas, affecting people and contaminating the environment), and to also exclude support for: installing emission control technologies or carbon capture pilots in existing coal, oil and gas projects, the clean-up of tailings from transition mining or other environmental contaminants related to mining production chains (including smelting), or installing the infrastructure required for large-scale carbon capture schemes. Standards on pollution should be set according to international benchmarks, including but not limited to the Basel, Rotterdam, Stockholm and Minamata Conventions, with access to information protections – at a minimum – in line with the UNECE Aarhus Convention. In addition, the AIIB must provide clarity to ensure no derogation from the “polluters’ pay” principle, and that affected communities’ rights to remedy and reparation will be upheld. Based on years of monitoring the support lent by multilateral development banks (MDBs) to the private sector, we contest the assumption that privatization of energy services and power generation leads to positive outcomes for the public. Far too often, private sector oriented measures burden populations with services that are high cost, cut corners on compliance with environmental and labour protections, fail to uphold standards of transparency and are typically unresponsive to public grievances. In cases where the AIIB plans to mobilize private sector investment for energy, including via capital markets and financial intermediaries, we urge the AIIB to undertake full due diligence to unequivocally screen out any prospective corporate partners that have track records of involvement in: gross human rights violations, flouting environmental laws and regulations, complicity in current military operations and occupations[16] (within states and extraterritorial), violating MDB safeguards, or open/unresolved cases filed against them under other MDB Independent Accountability Mechanisms or a National Contact Point of the OECD. It is also imperative that the AIIB undertake screening throughout the project cycle, including initial stages of strategic programming, to ensure projects financed and supported as well as associated facilities are designed to be fully compliant with the IPCC’s P1 Scenario to limit global warming to 1.5C.[17] Similarly, no new partnerships with clients that have an established carbon-intensive portfolio (e.g. those involved in still developing coal, oil and gas assets and/or no immediate, credible, timebound plans to align with a 1.5C trajectory) should be approved – until and unless the client engages in clear, corrective and time-bound action to transition it’s portfolio away from fossil fuel dependence and lock-in. Support for regional, cross-regional and long-distance domestic connectivity infrastructure as elaborated under the current draft fails to address health, ecological, economic and geo-political risks at stake, in particular in light of inter-state conflicts, border disputes and the market volatility of fuel. As outlined above, cross-border energy trade relies on centralized, resource-intensive infrastructure, which is neither adaptive to the realities of the climate crisis, scaled to meet the needs of people for affordable, appropriate, reliable and sustainable energy sources, nor economically sound. We therefore urge the AIIB to – at a minimum – adopt clear guidelines to which clients must adhere in handling accidents such as spills, leakages and pipeline bursts, and develop specific procedures to deal with the loss and damage to peoples’ lives and environments, fully recognizing and respecting the right to effective remedy and reparations. VI. On the Energy Sector Strategy Proposed Implementation Process (Sectoral Approach and Cross-Cutting Issues) We note the lack of any clear timeline identified in the Implementation Section of the draft text for an expected future revision of the Energy Sector Strategy in the text and urge the AIIB to provide greater written clarity on when the Strategy will be expected to be opened up for a full review (as opposed to an update), inclusive of a meaningful period for public comment and input. The specific suggestion in this section of the draft text that revisions would take into account ways to “facilitate better use of fossil fuels,” such as through carbon capture and storage (CCUS), is particularly alarming. As verified by the recent IPCC Assessment 6 reports, the best chance we have of limiting global heating to 1.5C would rely on limited or no use of engineered carbon capture technologies. It is therefore not a viable or credible adaptive response to the climate crisis now – or in the future.[18] We are also concerned by the apparent willingness of the AIIB management to simply support member countries in meeting NDCs and long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies – effectively following a business-as-usual pathway. We therefore urge the Bank to step up its ambition and avoid offering direct or indirect support for projects that will hinder – rather than facilitate – local, national and regional just and sustainable energy transitions. Decentralized Systems Reliant on VRE, Not Resource-Intensive Cross Border T&D As outlined above, we urge the AIIB to focus on supporting resilient power systems that are decentralized, rely on variable renewable energy (VRE), and can be community owned and operated, building confidence in local energy security and respecting local communities’ / Indigenous Peoples’ rights to lands, territories and resources. Support to Utilities and Generators Conditional of Meeting Timebound Phase out of Fossil Fuel Dependency We urge the AIIB to explicitly require all energy subprojects supported via on-lending facilities and equity funds be publicly disclosed prior to site development (including clearly informing affected communities of the AIIB’s involvement, ESF standards, and rights to access the Project-Affected Peoples’ Mechanism alongside any local grievance redress mechanisms), as well as to explain how these subprojects will contribute to meeting the IPCC P1 Scenario (no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C).[19] In addition, the AIIB should require all support to utility companies to be conditional upon clear timebound phase out plans of all fossil fuel energy sources, to be evaluated over the course of the project lifecycle to ensure compliance. Support to generators and utilities that have yet to phase out coal should be ring-fenced, so as to ensure AIIB’s support is not complicit in maintaining coal operations. Energy Transition Should Not Undermine the Basis of Community Survival Notably, the AIIB has already explicitly excluded the financing of large hydropower projects from financial intermediaries in some on-lending agreements. We urge the AIIB to move beyond this limited commitment by undertaking a full reconsideration of its overarching support for hydropower infrastructure, including its unconditional identification as renewable energy. Specifically, investments in building out infrastructure required for new impoundment, pumped-storage and run-of-river hydropower dams and associated facilities should no longer be considered part of the AIIB’s ‘low-carbon’ portfolio. Furthermore, we urge the AIIB to review and withdraw from proposals for those dams currently identified in the Bank’s pipeline at this time given the social, economic, environmental, climate-related and reputational risks already noted by civil society groups in the respective member countries.[20] Hydroelectric dams of varying scales, whether built on mainstream or tributary rivers, have consistently been shown to impose incalculable losses and damage for the people and ecosystems around, upstream and downstream of the project sites, and as such should be not be considered part of an economically, socially or environmentally sound option for transitioning away from fossil fuel dependency. Indeed, long periods of drought or heat waves can lead to power outages due to dam reservoirs running dry, while torrential rainfalls or flash floods can lead to technical failures with devastating consequences for people living downstream. This means that dams cannot provide reliable, sustainable sources of power in the current context of climate change.[21] We note the reference to supporting “innovative and transformative projects” in the name of the low carbon energy transition, and would understand this category may include floating solar power infrastructure, large-scale wind farms and piloting green hydrogen production. However, it has become increasingly clear that these projects can lead to unsustainable extraction of ground and surface water as well as loss of access to land, territories and resources relied upon for survival by local communities.[22] We therefore reiterate the critical importance that any piloting of new technologies should focus on decentralized, appropriately scaled, and economically, socially as well as environmentally sound projects that are dependent upon renewable energy sources (with no reliance on fossil fuel-related infrastructure). We urge the AIIB to recognize that large-scale geothermal plants are highly site-specific and as a result, are often associated in the regions of the Bank’s borrowing members with loss of local peoples’ access to land/territories and clean water, along with serious health and environmental consequences. Exploratory drilling and development of geothermal power plants, for example, can trigger land subsidence due to the heavy extraction of groundwater. In addition, noxious gas leaks from open wells can have deadly consequences for residents living nearby.[23] Once operating, geothermal plant emissions and effluent can contaminate the air, water and land with hydrogen sulfide gas, as well as boron, arsenic, and mercury, causing chronic health problems for people living in the surrounding area and devastating local crop cultivation.[24] According to statistics compiled by the Business and Human Rights Resource Center, specific risks associated geothermal project developments that should be duly considered include: violations of local communities’ rights to access information and life-sustaining resources (e.g. land and clean water), violent reprisals when community members raise concerns, including intimidation, threats and arbitrary detention, and poor track records with regards to respect of labour rights.[25] Unequivocally Rule Out Support for Coal, Oil and Gas Dependency While we appreciate the commitment to avoid financing for new coal-fired power and heating plants as well as projects related to coal, including associated facilities, we urge the Bank to close off any loopholes for supporting efficiency measures in utilities and distribution systems which would in any way support the extension of the life of coal power project operations, condone any further expansion of national coal fleets, enable financing of coal co-fired facilities, or be used to justify continued coal mining operations. We urge the AIIB to clarify that any pooled financing provided for early retirement of coal projects would not undermine the IPCC’s recommendations to limit global heating to 1.5C (including avoiding expanding fossil gas-related infrastructure or facilities), or jeopardize national climate commitments. Support should instead be directed towards the scaling-up of distributed variable renewable energy systems. The process of closure for coal power plants should provide assurances of sustained support for restoring health of local communities, workers and surrounding ecologies, re-distribution/re-allocation of lands to ensure rightful return to community, access to grievance/redress mechanisms, and full respect for negotiated agreements resulting from workers’ collective bargaining. We also urge the AIIB to re-consider the outdated assumption that ‘clean and reliable’ energy can be provided to isolated locations by deploying oil-reliant hybrid systems or oil-fired power generation for isolated locations. Dependence on oil is neither clean nor sustainable. Most especially in light of the environmental havoc and devastating human health consequences of oil leakages or spills, the AIIB should unequivocally avoid any further promotion of oil-powered systems. We remain alarmed by the suggestion that the AIIB will continue to support LNG terminals, storage and transmission pipelines as well as gas-fired power generation and distribution facilities. In no way is it possible for the AIIB to undertake such support for gas infrastructure build-out, without undermining the scientific consensus on the urgent need to power-down current fossil fuel dependent infrastructure. Building new gas powered projects and infrastructure for importing gas will lock countries into dependency on expensive, polluting fossil fuels, jeopardizing not only the health and well being of entire populations for years to come, but also national economic stability, local marine, river and land based ecosystems, and the chances of meeting global climate commitments. We therefore urge the AIIB to re-assess and withdraw overarching support for any gas-related investments in light of the current climate, geopolitical and economic realities. Any Nuclear Investments Are Unacceptable It is imperative that the AIIB unequivocally clarify that the Bank will not – under any condition – consider support for nuclear power plants, associated infrastructure or services. Climate Change, GHG accounting and Paris Alignment Although the update to the Energy Sector Strategy acknowledges impacts of climate change and the AIIB’s commitment towards the Paris Agreement, we note the lack of reference to the recommendations of the most recent IPCC Assessment 6 reports as well as other recently released datasets that confirm the urgent need for proactive measures in this regard. In addition, the current draft update to the Energy Sector Strategy provides no clarity on the steps being taken to ensure financing operations will come into line with the provisions of the Paris Agreement, or how the provisions of the “MDB Just Transition High-Level Principles”[26] will be operationalized in the context of energy sector financing. We urge the AIIB to explicitly stipulate what types of projects will be considered as contributing to climate change mitigation/adaptation and just transition, clearly incorporating considerations of the climate change consequences exacerbated by financed projects.[27] Greenhouse gas measurements should be inclusive of the full lifecycle of a project (including scopes 1-3), incorporating all subprojects of financial intermediary facilities, with methodologies and calculations disclosed, estimated prior to approval, and adjusted to reflect changes throughout construction and operation stages. Meanwhile GHG avoidance should be strictly calculated with due regard for all project options, including the ‘no project’ option, and considered alongside screening measurements to ensure the water uptake does not put people’s daily /household /non-industrial needs at risk. Lack of Inclusiveness As outlined above, we do not in any way consider the process for developing this Strategy as inclusive or publicly accountable, despite the provision at the end of the Strategy on “Commitment to Social Sustainability and Inclusiveness”. Ironically, then, the process at hand in fact undermines the words written in the draft text (paragraph 58). An update to the Energy Sector Strategy that would tackle questions of social inclusion in meaningful ways should at a minimum aim to emulate such principles in practice from the initial drafting stage through to final approval.[28] We note that the adjustments to the section on gender equality (as the only paragraph in the entire Strategy Update that even refers to “women”) incorporates an overarching assurance that the AIIB will take into account ‘specific’ gender gaps in energy access along with considerations related to women’s participation and priorities. However, crucially there are no associated gender indicator/s to be monitored in any of the updated principles, outputs or outcomes listed in the Sector Results Based Framework. In effect, then, this provision fails to actually address the urgent institutional need for the AIIB to seriously tackle the systematic lack of attention to the implications of its energy financing on women’s lives and livelihoods. The provision on people with disabilities remains isolated, with for example, no known attempt of the AIIB to ensure its own strategies and policies are accessible in braille print-outs or audio versions, or to commit to simultaneous sign language interpretation during online consultation sessions. Additionally, there is an absence of any commitment on the part of the AIIB to take into consideration and act upon the recommendations or points raised by women-led organizations and community groups on questions related to both project-related and sector-wide concerns (as witnessed during the recent ‘virtual consultation’ sessions on the Energy Sector Strategy Update, see above for more details). VII. Going Forward: Update to the Energy Sector Strategy and Beyond The above points should in no way be considered an exhaustive list of our concerns related to the provisions of the draft update to the Energy Sector Strategy, but rather as illustrative of key points we could have elaborated upon – had the process for revision to date been more open to public input, especially from the wide range of communities impacted by the AIIB’s current and pipeline energy sector investments. Going forward, we sincerely hope and trust that future consultations on AIIB policies and strategies, including any further revisions of the Energy Sector Strategy, will reflect a more thoughtful, meaningful, inclusive process with full consideration of the diversity of communities across the regions and localities of the AIIB’s membership. For socially, economically, environmentally just, inclusive and sustainable energy transitions, BRICS Feminist Watch (Global) Gender Action (Global) International Accountability Project (Global) International Rivers (Global) Programme on Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Global) Arab Watch Coalition (Regional) Asian Peoples' Movement on Debt and Development (Regional) Building and Wood Workers International- Asia Pacific (Regional) EarthRights International (Regional) Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives – Asia Pacific (Regional) Latinoamerica Sustentable (Regional) NGO Forum on ADB (Regional) Rivers without Boundaries International Coalition (Regional) 3S Rivers Protection Network (Cambodia) Alianza Basura Cero Chile (Chile) Bangladesh Working Group on External Debt (Bangladesh) Both ENDS (Netherlands) Center for Energy, Ecology, and Development (Philippines) Centre for Environmental Justice (Sri Lanka) Centre for Financial Accountability (India) Citizen Consumer and Civic Action Group (India) Coastal Livelihood and Environmental Action Network (Bangladesh) Community Resource Center (Thailand) Ecological Alert and Recovery - Thailand (Thailand) Eco Society India (India) Ecotourism & Conservation Society of Sikkim (India) EcoWaste Coalition (Philippines) Equitable Cambodia (Cambodia) Environics Trust (India) Environmental Public Alliance (Armenia) Friends of the Earth (USA) Fundación Lenga (Chile) Foundation for the Development of Sustainable Policies (Argentina) Freedom from Debt Coalition (Philippines) Fundación Lenga (Chile) Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives-India (India) Global Responsibility - Austrian Platform for Development and Humanitarian Aid (Austria) Growthwatch (India) Health Environment and Climate Action Foundation (Nepal) Initiative for Right View (Bangladesh) Indigenous Women’s Legal Awareness Group (Nepal) Indian Social Action Forum (India) Jóvenes Ambientalistas (Nicaragua) Kagad Kach Patra Kashtakari Panchayat (India) KRuHA - People's Coalition for the Right to Water (Indonesia) Manushya Foundation (Laos, Thailand) Mekong Watch (Japan) Mother Earth Foundation Philippines (Philippines) Nagrik Chetna Manch (India) Oil Workers' Rights Protection Organization Public Union (Azerbaijan) Pakistan Fisherfolks Federation (Pakistan) Pelican Kenterra P Ltd (India) Pragya Seeds Nepal (Nepal) Red de Acción por los Derechos Ambientales (Chile) Stree Mukti Sanghatanaa (India) Sustentarse (Chile) Swach Pune Sewa Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit (India) United Kingdom Without Incineration Network (United Kingdom) urgewald e.V. (Germany) Vietnam Zero Waste Alliance (Vietnam) Youth Group on Protection of Environment (Tajikistan) Zero Waste Europe (Belgium) Zero Waste Maldives (Maldives) Zero Waste Network Aotearoa (New Zealand) [1] On 19th of May, during the online session on the Energy Sector Strategy Update hosted by the AIIB, civil society groups read out a joint open statement of collective denunciation to affirm the perspective that the one-off one hour ‘public consultation’ session was in no way considered a meaningful or inclusive space for discussion and dialogue with diverse civil society groups from across the AIIB’s membership on the subject of the bank’s growing energy sector portfolio. The statement can be read here and the accompanying press release here. In addition, following the notification that the AIIB intended to extend the deadline for public input and open up virtual consultations from June 23rd to July 6th, we issued two separate follow-up letters (June 13th and 21st, respectively) outlining concerns and recommendations to the AIIB. Though we had hoped to engage in good faith during the virtual consultation sessions set up by the AIIB at that time – despite the extremely short prior notice and the fact that several of the questions related to participation remained unfulfilled – we made the collective decision after joining the first set of sessions allocated for ‘general discussion’ to refrain from joining subsequent sessions. Details explaining the rationale for our absence were outlined in a letter to the AIIB Management and Board, for which we have yet to receive a response as of 4th July, 2022. [2] See for example: NGO Forum on ADB, “Follow Up Correspondence Concerning the 2022 Energy Sector Strategy Update” (28 Jan 2022); “Collective Call for a New Forward Looking AIIB Energy Sector Strategy”(15 February 2022), and “Re: AIIB’s Call for Public Input on the Energy Sector Strategy Update” (2 May, 2022). [3] See for example: NGO Forum on ADB, “Follow Up Correspondence Concerning the 2022 Energy Sector Strategy Update” (28 Jan 2022); “Collective Call for a New Forward Looking AIIB Energy Sector Strategy”(15 Feb 2022), “Re: AIIB’s Call for Public Input on the Energy Sector Strategy Update” (2 May 2022), AIIB’s Extended Deadline for Public Input on the Energy Sector Strategy Update (13 June 2022), Re: AIIB’s Virtual Consultation Sessions on the Energy Sector Strategy Update (23 June 2022) and Re: Virtual Consultations Hosted by AIIB on the Energy Sector Strategy Update (28 June 2022). [4] In the event of follow-up public consultation opportunities on the current or revised draft of the Energy Sector Strategy Update, we would urge the AIIB management to consider arranging in-person discussions at the soonest possible date in order to enable a more robust, meaningful engagement with interested civil society groups across the regions. [5] Notably, it does not appear the AIIB has sought to follow similar online public consultation processes on policy revisions that have been recently initiated by peer MDBs (such as those of the ADB, which typically span over several months and enable both written as well as discussion-based inputs). [6] See for example, the matrix published by the Asian Development Bank over the course of their Energy Policy review last year: “Summary of Comments from Stakeholders” (15 July 2021). [7] Although this document refers to ‘people’ and ‘communities’ as being affected by AIIB’s projects and investments, these categories should not be understood as monolithic; in particular as the depth of social, economic, energy, environmental and climate injustice experienced differs between and within communities and households, dependent on such intersectional factors as gender, economic class, ethnicity/racialization, age and able-bodiedness. [8] This should Include future updates to the Energy Sector Strategy, the Environmental and Social Framework and the Project Affected Peoples’ Mechanism Policy. [9] For example, among the most relevant conclusions of the Production Gap Report (released in October 2021) for the AIIB to consider is the unequivocal affirmation that “to avoid locking in levels of fossil fuel supply that are inconsistent with climate goals…there should be moratoria, bans, or limits on all or certain types of fossil fuel exploration and extraction (such as offshore or unconventional drilling) or infrastructure (such as oil pipelines or liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals).” (See pg 69) [10] Notably, according to a recent peer reviewed study in Nature, most of the coal, oil and gas reserves already tapped must remain in the ground if we are to have a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C. According to the study’s authors: “This implies that most regions must reach peak production now or during the next decade, rendering many operational and planned fossil fuel projects unviable”. See: Welsby, D et al., “Unextractable fossil fuels in a 1.5 °C world,” Nature, 597 (7875), 2021. [11] This can be verifiably put into practice by applying the most up to date internationally recognized independent screening criteria, the “Global Coal Exit List” or the Global Oil and Gas Exit List. [12] This should at a minimum include: all UN Conventions, the UNDRIP, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the Core Conventions of the ILO as well as ILO Convention 169. [13] Based on a meeting during COP26 in Glasgow, AIIB management confirmed to members of civil society groups that a strict screening process is in place before projects are admitted into the pipeline. Going forward, such screening processes should incorporate factors related to assuring the provisions of the Paris Agreement are not undermined (including it’s preamble) and that all projects are socially, economically and environmentally sound. [14] See the profile for example by CEE Bankwatch: “Nenskra Hydropower Plant in Georgia.” Accessed online: https://bankwatch.org/project/nenskra-hydropower-plant-georgia. [15] Notably, in both the U.S. and the E.U., waste-to-energy incineration is considered amongst the dirtiest sources of energy on the grid. Without exception, building new incinerators can therefore not be considered an environmentally, socially or logically sound investment. [16] In this regard, we note that despite placing direct project financing to Russia and Belarus on hold, the AIIB has yet to apply the same stance towards engaging in business with companies that identify Russian businesses, oligarchs or politically exposed persons as major shareholder, or offering support to companies controlled by Russian entities in third countries, such as those for the energy sectors in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. [17] For more details, see IPCC’s Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5C (2018). [18] See for example: CIEL, “Confronting the Myth of Carbon-Free Fossil Fuels” (July 2021) and CNBC News, “Shell’s Massive Carbon Capture Facility in Candada Emits Far More then it Captures” (24 Jan 2022). [19] While we recognize that the updates to the “Joint MDB Framework for Paris Alignment” as of 4th Q 2021 address FI lending, we are urging the AIIB to take these steps beyond what is already stipulated as minimum adherence to Building Blocks 1 and 2. [20] This recommendation is reflective of the consensus advanced by several UN Special Rapporteurs in a recently issued “Joint Statement on the Human Rights of People Affected By Dams And Other Water Infrastructure,” which called on “the World Bank and other financial institutions to take into consideration the serious social and environmental impacts of large dams, with the corresponding risks of unsustainability and socio-environmental inequity that they entail,” and recommended instead supporting: “the development of the many available alternative strategies and technologies that are truly sustainable and consistent with human rights-based approaches, particularly in the area of sustainable energy sources”. [21] For more information, see for example: “Rivers for Climate Declaration: A Global CSO Statement,” November 2021 (accessed online) and “Rivers for Recovery: Protecting Rivers and Rights as Essential for a Green and Just Recovery,” 2020 (International Rivers and Rivers without Boundaries, accessed online). [22] For example, typically green hydrogen is ‘blended’ with blue or gray (fossil fuel based) hydrogen when scaled up, is reliant upon intensive uptake of water resources as well as vast expanses of land, and cannot be transported through repurposed pipelines due to its volatile composition. See: Corporate Europe Observatory, “The Reality of EU Green Hydrogen Import Plans” May 2022. [23] See for example: JATAM, Trend Asia, and #BersihkanIndonesia, “Inviting Disasters: A Preliminary Portrait of Extractive-Dirty Energy Investments and The People’s Safety in Disaster-Prone Areas of Indonesia,” April 2021. [24] See for example: IWGIA, “The Impact of Renewable Energy Projects on Indigenous Communities in Kenya: The cases of the Lake Turkana Wind Power project and the Olkaria Geothermal Power plants,” Feb 2020, and Setyawati, D., “Injustice and environmental harm in extractive industries and solar energy policies in Indonesia,” International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy,” 2021. [25] See for example: Business and Human Rights Resource Center, “Investor Snapshot: Geothermal Energy & Human Rights” (accessed online: September 2018). [26] As posted on the AIIB’s website on 29 October 2021: https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/who-we-are/partnership/_download/MDB-Just-Transition-High-Level-Principles-statement._19.11.2021.pdf [27] As a post-Paris MDB with a global membership, we would expect the AIIB’s Energy Sector Strategy to clearly elaborate on how the energy portfolio will incorporate – and aim to reach beyond – the minimal provisions set forth by the Joint MDB Framework for Paris Alignment and associated updates/technical notes, such as those agreed upon at COP26 in Glasgow. [28] For example, leading regional frameworks for civil society engagement - such as the Escazu Agreement in Latin America and the Caribbean - are already being taken into account by peer MDBs, thereby acting as a practical reference point for the AIIB in planning future policy revision processes. Download PDF here.

July 11, 2022 MR. MASATSUGU ASAKAWA PRESIDENT Asian Development Bank CC: Asian Development Bank Executive Directors Asian Development Bank Independent Evaluation Department Director General Asian Development Bank HQ 6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City 1550, Metro Manila, RE: Hiring process for the Special Project Facilitator Dear Mr. Asakawa: We are writing this joint letter as NGO Forum on ADB with other concerned civil society groups around the world that share a common concern over accountability in international development finance, especially at the Asian Development Bank (ADB). We are writing to urge you, as President of the Asian Development Bank, to involve external stakeholders, especially civil society in the hiring process for the Special Project Facilitator (SPF). Given the importance of the SPF’s work in addressing grievances concerning ADB’s financing, it’s crucial that the person be appointed through an inclusive and transparent process. As a network of regional and international civil society groups closely following ADB projects and working with communities on the ground, we consider ourselves as legitimate and regular users of the ADB Office of the Special Project Facilitator (OSPF) mechanism. Throughout various complaints filed at the OSPF over the years, we have realized that an independent OSPF is the among the most critical structures in ADB, designed to ensure accountability and remedy for communities who are harmed or will be potentially harmed by ADB financed activities. To properly perform its work and be recognized as legitimate, it is vital that the OSPF be independent. This in turn requires the SPF to be independent, which is enhanced not only by maintaining a pre-employment cooling off period, a practice already in place at the ADB, but also by including independent external stakeholders, especially civil society, in the selection process. Furthermore, this would help ensure that the SPF is free from undue influence, including from management, governments and clients. We are aware that ADB is selecting a new SPF, as Mr. Warren Evans has left the OSPF and has been appointed the ADB Special Advisor for Climate Change. We strongly recommend that the selection process for his successor include formal consultations with external stakeholders. As noted in the Good Policy Paper: Guiding Practice from the Policies of Independent Accountability Mechanisms, consulting with external stakeholders in the hiring of members of independent accountability mechanisms (IAMs) is good practice and helps ensure legitimacy.[1] ADB followed this good practice in 2019 by including a CSO observer in the hiring process for the CRP Chair. Other IAMs have adopted similar practices. For example, the independent Examiners for the Guidelines of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) are chosen through a process that includes a selection committee that has members from academia and NGOs, among others.[2] Additionally, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) creates a nomination committee composed of members internal and external to the EBRD to select the head of the Independent Project Accountability Mechanism (IPAM).[3] This committee is composed of external stakeholders who have expertise in the accountability and social or environmental fields, demonstrated integrity and independence, the ability to interact effectively with parties and civil society, and experience with the operations of the EBRD or similar institutions. Similarly for the selection process for the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Compliance Advisor Ombudsman Director General, the external stakeholders on the selection committee are tasked with reviewing applications, determining a shortlist, and conducting interviews with shortlisted candidates.[4] We request that ADB continue following the good example it set during the 2019 hiring process for the CRP chair by including external stakeholders, especially civil society, in the decision making process for the next SPF. Specifically, we are calling for: Transparency on the selection process; The inclusion of at least one civil society stakeholder on the selection committee; and The ability for the external stakeholders on the selection committee to review applications, determine a shortlist of candidates, and conduct interviews with shortlisted candidates. This is critical for ensuring the OSPF’s legitimacy and independence. As this process is in the early stages, we look forward to hearing your response about the hiring process for the next SPF and hope to further engage with you and the Board on this process. Sincerely, Rayyan Hassan Executive Director NGO Forum on ADB Signatories: Accountability Counsel Asian Peoples' Movement on Debt and Development (APMDD), Regional Bangladesh Working Group on External Debt (BWGED), Bangladesh Building and Wood Worker's International (BWI), Global Buliisa Initiative for Rural Development Organisation (BIRUDO), Uganda CLEAN (Coastal Livelihood and Environmental Action Network), Bangladesh Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt (CADTM), India Community Empowerment and Social Justice Network (CEMSOJ), Nepal COMPPART Foundation for Justice and Peacebuilding, Nigeria Environics Trust, India Environmental Public Society, Armenia Freedom from Debt Coalition, Philippines Food first Information Action Network (FIAN), Sri Lanka Green Advocates International, Liberia Growthwatch, India Indian Social Action Forum (INSAF), India Indigenous Women Legal Awareness Group (INWOLAG), Nepal Initiative for Right View(IRV), Bangladesh International Accountability Project, USA Oil Workers' Rights Protection Organization Public Union, Azerbaijan Oyu Tolgoi Watch, Mongolia Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum, Pakistan Public Interest Law Center (PILC), Chad Sri Lanka Nature Group, Sri Lanka Vision Building Future, Pakistan Witness Radio, Uganda WomanHealth, Philippines [1] See Accountability Counsel, Bank Information Center, Center for International Environmental Law, et al., Good Policy Paper: Guiding Practice from the Policies of Independent Accountability Mechanisms, pgs. 19, 21-22 (Dec. 2021), available at https://www.accountabilitycounsel.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/good-policy-paper-final.pdf. [2] Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Objection Procedures, para. 4 (2010), http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/social_environmental/guideline/pdf/objection100326.pdf; Japan Bank for International Cooperation, Major Rules for Establishment of Examiner for Environmental Guidelines (2010), https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/business-areas/environment/disagree/images/procedure_03_en.pdf; see also C. Daniel, K. Genovese, M. van Huijjstee & S. Singh, Glass Half Full? The State of Accountability in Development Finance (SOMO, Jan. 2016), at Annex 13. Available at https://www.somo.nl/glass-half-full-2/. [3] European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, para. 3.3.a(3) (2019), http://www.ebrd.com/documents/occo/ipam-policy.pdf. [4] International Finance Corporation, IFC/MIGA Independent Accountability Mechanism (CAO) Policy para. 15 (2021), https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/d3e7f1c4-fd6b-40fd-ae76-fb028916611d/IFC-MIGA-Independent-Accountability-Mechanism-CAO-Policy.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=nFDGwP2. Download PDF version here.

To: Mr. Jin Liqun, President, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) Mr. Ludger Schuknecht, V.P. and Corporate Secretary, AIIB Sir Danny Alexander, V.P., Policy and Strategy, AIIB Mr. Bob Pickard, D.G., Communications Department, AIIB AIIB Board of Directors – Via Email – Over the course of last week’s virtual consultations hosted by the AIIB on the Energy Sector Strategy Update, we hoped to join and engage in discussions in good faith. However, while we appreciate this gesture from the Bank towards expanding the process for public input on the Strategy Update, several key concerns – despite being raised consistently in writing and during online discussions – have yet to be addressed. As a result, following a collective deliberation, we are writing once again to highlight key issues of contention. With all due respect, we firmly reiterate our shared perspective that the consultation sessions as scheduled do not provide an opportunity for meaningful and inclusive dialogue between diverse sectors of civil society across the institution’s membership and the responsible Bank representatives – necessary not least because of the major implications on the future possibilities for just transition and the livelihood prospects of populations across borrowing nations of the Bank’s membership as well as meeting global climate ambitions. Key concerns we would like to bring to your attention include those which were highlighted in previous correspondence along with new issues that have come to the fore based on our participation in the virtual consultation sessions last week: The highly constrained participation of civil society organizations due to the extremely short notice provided for the online consultations, the compressed nature of the sessions, the lack of any clear commitment to simultaneous translation into regional languages, and absence of any identified structure or agenda for the sessions; The impossibility for interested local, national or regional groups to effectively gather and provide perspectives from their respective constituencies on thematic consultation issues due to the lack of adequate prior notification and time between online sessions; An evident lack of willingness among Bank management to engage with civil society calls for online sessions to be scheduled over a more extended period of time in order to enable options for greater participation; A perceived lack of serious engagement on the part of representatives of the AIIB joining the consultations when questions and concerns were raised by civil society members during the initial online sessions last week (with participants observing that Bank representatives typically moved from one comment to another, neither providing consistently clear or detailed responses nor clarity on how these issues could be addressed, while leaving few possibilities open to engage in follow-up clarifications); The absence of any gender specialist staff joining the online sessions to respond to specific questions in relation to either (i) the gendered implications of energy sector financing and future/planned projects in the pipeline, or (ii) the critical lack of gender considerations evident in the energy sector portfolio to date, meaning several key points raised remained unaddressed and/or unresolved (with no proactive commitment to correct this gap in forthcoming sessions even when asked by participants to do so), and The absence of specific focal point staff joining the initial sessions to address questions related to regional nuances in the Bank’s energy sector portfolio or to portfolios associated with energy infrastructure financing (including support for energy projects via on-lending facilities or in the urban sector). It is in this context that we urge the AIIB to proactively address the above concerns and commit to: Publishing a summary of comments received – during online interactions and in writing – alongside responses from the AIIB management; Publicly disclosing information on the expected timeline of the Energy Sector Strategy Update revision and approval process, and Publishing a revised draft of the Energy Sector Strategy Update open for a period of public comment prior to Board approval. Ultimately, this situation leaves us, as members of civil society from Asia, the Americas, the Levant and Europe, with no clear understanding of how – or even whether – the substantive points we raise are actually being taken into account or incorporated into the revised text. Significantly, it also appears that the necessary outreach to civil society constituencies about the online sessions was not undertaken by the responsible AIIB personnel, witnessed by the fact that participation in each of the initial sessions was highly limited to a small number civil society groups. At this time, therefore, we cannot consider these upcoming online sessions as legitimate spaces for meaningful discussions and dialogue between civil society and the Bank (which we consider critically necessary before an updated Energy Sector Strategy is approved), and as such, we will be demonstrating this collective conviction through our absence from these consultations. Going forward, we sincerely hope that future consultations on AIIB policies and strategies will reflect a more thoughtful, meaningful, inclusive process with full consideration of the diversity of civil society groups across sectors and regions. Looking ahead, we would also urge the AIIB to shift forthcoming public consultations from the virtual sphere to in-person discussions as soon as possible, enabling a much greater level of participation and engagement of groups informed by on-the-ground realities in communities across borrowing member countries. We look forward to hearing from you. Respectfully, BRICS Feminist Watch (Global) Gender Action (Global) Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives (Global) International Accountability Project (Global) International Rivers (Global) Programme on Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Global) Aksi! for Gender, Social and Ecological Justice (Indonesia) Bangladesh Working Group on External Debt (Bangladesh) Both ENDS (Netherlands) Center for Energy, Ecology and Development (Philippines) Centre for Financial Accountability (India) Civic Advisory Hub (Uganda) Coastal Livelihood and Environmental Action Network (Bangladesh) Defenders Protection Initiative (Uganda) Environics Trust (India) Equitable Cambodia (Cambodia) Freedom from Debt Coalition (Philippines) Friends of the Earth US (USA) Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (Argentina) Green Alternative (Georgia) GrowthWatch (India) Indian Social Action Forum (India) Initiative for Right View (Bangladesh) Just Finance International (Netherlands and Denmark) KRuHA - People's Coalition for the Right to Water (Indonesia) Manushya Foundation (Laos, Thailand) Nash Vek PF (Kyrgyzstan) NGO “Youth Group on Protection of Environment” (Tajikistan) Oil Workers' Rights Protection Organization Public Union (Azerbaijan) Oyu Tolgoi Watch (Mongolia) Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (Pakistan) Recourse (Netherlands) Rivers without Boundaries (Mongolia) Sustentarse (Chile) Urgewald e.V. (Germany) VedvarendeEnergi (Denmark) Arab Watch Coalition (MENA Region) Asian Peoples’ Movement on Debt and Development (Regional) Building and Wood Workers International - Asia Pacific (Regional) CEE Bankwatch Network (Regional) EarthRights International (Regional) Latinoamérica Sustentable (Regional) NGO Forum on ADB (Regional) Rivers without Boundaries International Coalition (Regional) Download PDF version here.

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank's (AIIB) response to 'AIIB’s Extended Deadline for Public Input on the Energy Sector Strategy Update' letter. Download PDF version here.

21st June 2022 To: Mr. Jin Liqun, President, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) Mr. Ludger Schuknecht, V.P. and Corporate Secretary, AIIB Sir Danny Alexander, V.P., Policy and Strategy, AIIB Mr. Bob Pickard, D.G., Communications Department, AIIB – Via Email – Dear AIIB President Jin Liqun, Mr. Ludger Schuknecht, Sir Danny Alexander, and Mr. Bob Pickard: We appreciate the announcement that the AIIB will open up virtual consultation sessions during different time zones in relation to the proposed updates to the Energy Sector Strategy. However, with all due respect, the limited set-up of regionally focused 1.5-hour sessions and subsequent 1-hour thematic sessions scheduled over the coming two weeks fails to reflect minimal standards for an inclusive, meaningful and accountable process as already called for repeatedly by civil society organizations representing local, national, regional and international constituencies.[1] Notably, the format as outlined on the AIIB website falls far short of the standard practices for public consultation on policy matters already followed by peer MDBs (such as the Asian Development Bank). Instead, this highly compressed set of online discussions has been announced with little prior notice, without any appended guiding concept note or background documents, no proposed structure and no suggested agenda for any of the sessions. There is also no indication of who from the Bank will join in order to receive and accordingly respond to questions raised during each session. In addition, the grouping of different regions in the first set of four general consultations does not appear to have any practical rationale. This is most especially concerning in light of the heavily concentrated investments in the energy sector, and the need to allocate time for civil society groups to engage in a dialogue with AIIB management based on lived experiences and realities grounded in specific country contexts. Finally, we also understand that there will not be simultaneous translation into major regional languages, meaning that participants who do wish to raise questions other than in English will have no guarantee of when or how they can receive a response. In order to engage in a more inclusive, meaningful and accountable process for public consultation that would encourage open discussion and dialogue, we urge the AIIB management to at a minimum: Extend the timeline for the consultations, rescheduling the sessions to allow more time between each thematic discussion, and accordingly extend the period for public comment during this time; Publish a clear online timeline of the Energy Sector Strategy approval process (e.g. inclusive of the public consultation period, expected timing to go to the Board for discussion, any re-drafting and final approval); Extend the timing of the sessions with built in flexibility up to 2 hours; Provide an outline of proposed agendas for each session; Identify who will attend from the AIIB to receive comments; Provide clear information on the structure of the proposed sessions and the web platform to be used; Provide background documents to inform each session in advance of the sessions, including – but not limited to – summaries of the Complaints-resolution, Evaluation and Integrity Unit (CEIU) learning assessments as referenced in the proposed text of the update to the Energy Sector Strategy; Commit to simultaneous translation in major applicable languages, and Commit to publishing an online a summary of comments received during each session along with specific responses from the Bank’s management Going forward, we sincerely hope the AIIB management will take further steps towards opening more inclusive, accountable and meaningful consultation periods with full consideration for civil society perspectives from across its membership at the outset of future policy revision processes. We continue to engage in good faith and look forward to a timely response. Thank you. Respectfully, Bangladesh Working Group on External Debt (Bangladesh) Both ENDS (Netherlands) Center for Energy, Ecology and Development (Philippines) Centre for Financial Accountability (India) Coastal Livelihood and Environmental Action Network (Bangladesh) Equitable Cambodia (Cambodia) Environics Trust (India) GrowthWatch (India) Indian Social Action Forum (India) Initiative for Right View (Bangladesh) Manushya Foundation (Laos, Thailand) Nash Vek (Kyrgyz Republic) Oil Workers' Rights Protection Organization Public Union (Azerbaijan) Recourse (Netherlands) urgewald e.V. (Germany) Youth Group for the Protection of the Environment (Tajikistan) BRICS Feminist Watch (Global) International Accountability Project (Global) Just Finance International (Global) Programme on Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Global) Rivers without Boundaries International Coalition (Global) EarthRights International (Global) Gender Action (Global) Arab Watch Coalition (Regional) Asian Peoples' Movement on Debt and Development (Regional) CEE Bankwatch Network (Regional) Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives — Asia Pacific (Regional) Latinoamérica Sustentable (Regional) NGO Forum on ADB (Regional) [1] See for example, the communications to the AIIB endorsed by local, national, regional and international CSOs posted online since January 2022. Download PDF Version here.

Manila – Civil society groups from across Asia are condemning the Asian Development Bank’s Asia Clean Energy Forum 2022, hosted from June 14-17th, as failing to provide a platform for discussion about real climate and energy solutions grounded in science and the lived realities of the region’s diverse communities. To highlight critical concerns about the ADB’s proposed and current energy investments, a range of events are being organized online and in person by community groups and their allies. Today, the NGO Forum on ADB is hosting an online press conference featuring representatives from groups based in Southeast and Central Asia and the Caucasus to speak about the need for the ADB to support decentralized, appropriately scaled, distributed variable renewable energy, and to pull back from sinking limited funds into risky resource intensive energy ventures that are neither clean nor just. In Manila, an in-person convergence will be coordinated by the Power 4 People (P4P) Coalition on the morning of June 17th, bringing together local and regional organizations united in the call issued to the ADB to stop financing false solutions. Details of the event location and timing will be disclosed separately. “We recognize this year at ACEF, though the ADB has made an effort to focus on support for ‘green’ energy technologies, it has been dominated by private sector proponents and by discussions about technologies that are neither ‘clean’ nor economically, socially or environmentally sound. As civil society organizations mobilizing and organizing for a rights based, lasting, inclusive, just transition, we are adamant that power must be wrested in the public domain, ensuring meeting people’s’ rights to water, land, territory and other resources are not only prioritized, but set as non-negotiable,” explained Tanya Lee Roberts-Davis, Energy Campaigns and Policy Strategist with the NGO Forum on ADB. “Net-zero should not be misconceived as real-zero. Short-sighted technocratic fixes such as carbon capture schemes are not a substitute for simply making the rapid and needed shift to invest in forward looking clean energy sources. Meanwhile, we are concerned the highly touted Energy Transition Mechanism risks creating a situation whereby the public may be forced to accept a heavy toll on their health, the environment and climate, while coal companies will have the greenlight to continue to turn a profit over the course of several years during which the ADB and other donors sponsor the project’s retirement,” she continued. As asserted by Yobel Putra, of the Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives-Asia Pacific: “ACEF 2022 is not getting better as it adds more false solutions to the list. For years, ADB has insisted that waste-to-energy incineration is a renewable energy source and a low-carbon solution. However, the world knows that plastic is on track to become a bigger climate problem than coal. Burning municipal solid waste — especially when it contains plastics — is dirtier than coal-fired power plant in every aspects. In addition to the highly toxic emission and ash, WTE incineration is amongst the dirtiest energy sources on the grid both in the U.S. and the E.U.. Substituting one form of dirty fossil fuel with another and claiming it as renewable is greenwashing. Worse, ADB’s suggestion to couple its climate harming projects with carbon capture technology is a huge distraction. Our time is running out, ADB should stop becoming a climate criminal before it is too late.” Andrey Ralev from CEE Bankwatch added: “The biodiversity and climate crisis can and must be addressed together. We fully support the upscaling of investments in renewable energy, but this should not be at the cost of biodiversity loss. The lack of strategic planning and cumulative impact assessment means that many hydro, wind and solar projects in the ADB pipeline are wrongly placed. The Zarafshan wind power project, for example, could lead to the extinction of the globally endangered saker falcon and Egyptian vulture.” In the Philippines and Southeast Asia, the recent Financing a Fossil Future report from the Manila based think-tank Center for Energy, Ecology, and Development (CEED) found that ADB is among notable public financiers helping bankroll the fossil gas industry in the region since the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015. Alarmingly, 84% of total financing for midstream gas projects mapped in the report were found to have been linked to public financial institutions. As Avril de Torres from CEED asserted: “It took 12 years for ADB to recognize that financing coal goes against the development it claims it wants to achieve for the Asia-Pacific region. By keeping the door open for fossil gas, however, ADB is sustaining its dirty energy legacy, merely switching from one fuel to another in dooming the region to climate catastrophe.” “ADB is also forcing grave economic burdens on our people - spiking gas prices as exacerbated by the Russia-Ukraine war are a warning sign against massive fossil gas expansion, if we wish to veer away from vulnerability to volatile fuel costs. If it hopes to become a genuine climate and development bank, we see no other path for ADB to take than working with Asia-Pacific peoples to advance renewables," she concluded