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ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB) Pagsubaybay sa Proyekto Gitnang Asya | Mekong | Timog Silangang Asya | Timog asya Pag-unlad ng Southern Transport PAMAGAT NG PROYEKTO Pag-unlad ng Southern Transport ​ PROJECT NUMBER 26522-013 ​ HALAGA NG LOAN Asian Development Fund $ 90.00 milyon Japan Bank for International Cooperation (ODA) $ 180.00 milyon ​ BANSA Sri Lanka Southern Transport Development Project (STDP) The Southern Transport Development Project (STDP) is an ADB co-financed project, which includes the construction of a 128-km controlled-access expressway from Colombo to the southern city of Galle, which will link up with an existing coastal road in Matara. ADB is providing a US$ 90 million loan approved in November 1999 for 55 km of this expressway, with Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) providing funds for the rest of the stretch. The construction of the road aims to help catalyze economic growth in the southern region of Sri Lanka in general and reduce traffic and accidents on the coastal road. The number of houses to be destroyed under the Road Development Authority (RDA) plans has now reached 1300 before counting those in Akmeemana and Bandaragama. The estimate is for a further 600 at least from these two places which, when added, will be a total of 1700 houses to be destroyed, from the original consultants’ estimate of a maximum of 622 houses. The RDA has also put the road through highly productive paddy and home gardens rather than unused lands. Residents say that the RDA Officers do this so that they can sell or use the timber and the materials from the destroyed houses. Villagers say that the Government is being totally misled by the RDA. The Government position seems to be that the people are unaware of the ‘wonderful’ compensation package and that if they knew, they would give up their lands and homes. The villagers have been cheated and harassed by the RDA and are in no mood to co-operate with them. The ADB and JBIC are giving long term loans to cover the cost. Although the Bank insists that their guidelines for minimum house destruction be included in their contract with the government, so far it has not insisted that the RDA follow these same guidelines. The people feel that it is a duty of the Bank to protect them from Government Officers’ misdeeds. The public consultation that the EIA process has entirely broken down. In at least two places the Road is being run in areas where no Environmental Impact Assessment has been done. These are the biggest villages on the route. The saga of the Southern Transport Development Project starts in 1969 with the proposal of the RDA to link Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka, with Matara, a major city in the southern province. However, the recent story starts with the RDA’s initiative in 1992 to fill the paddy fields from the southern end without any Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). However, this was abandoned due to pressure from environmental groups to comply with the law. This issue popped up again in 1994 with the newly elected regime laying six Foundation Stones along the trace identified by the RDA through aerial photographs. This process is known as an RDA trace. This was again abandoned due to pressure to produce an EIA under the local regulations. The main reason for this radical approach was because it was discovered that the lack of development in the Southern Province was one of the reasons for the youth uprising in the southern part of Sri Lanka in 1972 and 1988. Since 1996, the RDA studied the road trace together with the ADB consultants, and an EIA report was published in 1999. During these assessments, ADB consultants identified a separate trace which is called the ADB Trace. As a compromise, the two traces were merged into the so-called Combined Trace. The Central Environmental Authority (CEA), however, imposed certain conditions after having two public hearings and one condition was to change the trace in Bandaragama (in the western part of the road) and in the Koggala area (in the southern part of the road) in order to protect the two big wetlands known as Bolgoda and Koggala. An EIA was completed for a three-kilometer corridor, but when the trace was changed it jumped beyond the corridor. The RDA started its implementation without studying the changed traces, violating the ADB policies and Sri Lankan environmental laws. They also denied newly affected people from participating in the EIA process. According to the affected people, more than 40 kilometers of the road was not in the studies. Also, the CRP initially found 72% of the new trace is out of the scope of the documents presented to the ADB for approval. Since 1999, affected people have been appealing to the Human Rights Commission, the Sri Lanka Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka. At the beginning of 2004, the Sri Lankan Supreme Court decided that these communities’ human rights have been violated and ordered the RDA to pay Rs. 75,000 as compensation for each person. However, the Supreme Court did not intervene to change the Appeals Court’s decision not to change the road trace. These affected persons finally went to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in 2004 and the decision is still pending up to now. ADB INSPECTION CLAIMS In 2001 eleven complaints were made to the ADB’s Inspection Panel. However, they were rejected by the Inspection panel on different technical grounds. ADB REJECTS INSPECTION REQUEST! ADB Management responded to the Gama Surakeema Sanvidhanaya (GSS) complaint on February 11, 2002, dismissing the allegations as unfounded and not attributable to the Bank. The Bank claimed that the allegations against the ADB were not supported by sufficient evidence and that the GSS failed to demonstrate “direct and material adverse effect caused by ADB.” On April 15, the villagers of Gelanigama received word that their Inspection Request had been rejected by the ADB. GSS maintains that the grounds for the Bank’s response are incorrect, and have promptly conveyed this to the Bank. GSS also feels that the Bank management’s response was extremely legalistic and showed little sense of duty or regard for the Requesters. Affected communities from Kahatuduwa, Gelenigama, and Akmeemana have filed separate requests from Inspection at the ADB. The first of four Requesters — Gama Surakeema Sanvidhanaya (GSS) – filed a formal complaint in August 2001, addressed to ADB President Tadao Chino. In order to send the actual Inspection Request, the community of Gelanigama had to ask for the ADB to send them the policies relevant to the project. These policies were not available in the community’s local language and due to the lack of resources. DEMONSTRATIONS On 14 March 2002, villagers from all along the planned route of the Southern Expressway Matara came to Colombo to protest against the building of the road. They came to show the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), who are the main financiers of the road, how much they are suffering because of the road project. Hundreds of people from 12 villages — Akmeemana in the South, Kurundugaha-hatekma, Bandaragama, Polgasovita, Galanigama, Palpola, Gamagoda, Dodangoda, Pantota, Elpitiya, Etkadura, Kokmadoowa, Sultanagoda — are angry with the way the Road Development Authority (RDA) had thrown aside the original project plans as a result of alleged influenced by the past Government to make the road avoid the land of Government ministers and friends. This campaign was organized by the Sri Lankan Working Group on ADB. ADB ACCOUNTABILITY COMPLAINTS Affected People lead by the Joint Committee of the Affected people, with the assistance of the Sri Lankan Working Group on ADB, NGO Forum on ADB, Bank Information Center, Environmental Defense, Friends of the Earth Japan, Oxfam Australia, etc., made the complaint to the ADB’s Special Project Facilitator in 2004. Although it was accepted the consultation process was failed during the mediation stage. As a result of the complaints made to the Compliance Review Panel, the review was conducted and the Board of Directors of the Asian Development Bank approved the Compliance Review Panel (CRP) report and its recommendations on 12 July 2005. The ADB’s Compliance Review Panel, which was established under its new accountability mechanism in 2004, conducted a series of visits and consultations and found that there were many violations of the ADB policies during the design and implementation of the project. The CRP initially found that 72% of the road is out of the scope of the initial project design. Southern Transport Development Project Documents THE WRATH OF THE GODS: DREAM ROAD TURNED INTO A DISASTER! 22 June 2007, Sri Lanka – Centre for Environmental Justice (CEJ) Sri Lanka claims that the ADB, Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) , and/or the Sri Lankan Government were unable to implement the STDP in an environmentally and socially sound manner. It says in its monitoring report that the supposed-to-be “Dream Road” for the Sri Lankans has only caused many sufferings to them. ADB MANAGEMENT DID NOT COMPLY WITH CRP REPORT 12 July 2006, Manila – After having the monitoring investigation on the Southern Transport Development Project (STDP) in Sri Lanka on June 2006, the ADB Compliance Review Panel reports that the ADB management has not complied with most of the proposed remedial action in the CRP report prepared in July 2005 to solve the problems of the STDP. The CRP finds that ADB’s implementation of the general and project-specific remedial actions have resulted in some progress in complying with the Board’s remedial actions and bringing the project into compliance. ​ The report issued by the CRP on the 11th of July 2006 stated that “Management has complied with 3 recommendations and partially complied with 6 specific recommendations. However, Management has not complied with three General Recommendations and seven Specific Recommendations.” The Panel reports that “some of the affected people remain dissatisfied with specific impacts of the project. There are many potential reasons for these objections, ranging from highly specific issues such as construction-related cracks in buildings to broad anxieties related to the disruption of cultural norms such as the integrity of extended families in landholdings of historical significance.” ​ The Panel states that they are “concerned about allegations of discrimination to affected people for having filed claims with the ADB Accountability Mechanism. The Panel cannot confirm these allegations, but the Panel hopes that all stakeholders in the project are equally committed to transparency and participation, with full redress of valid complaints.” INDEPENDENT REPORT ON STDP A report on the ADB-funded Southern Transport Development Project (STDP) prepared by Bank Information Center (BIC), NGO Forum on ADB, and Center for Environmental Justice-Sri Lanka is now available on Forum website. GREEN MOVEMENT SRI LANKA PROVIDED HELPFUL FACILITATION DURING THE SITE VISITS. STDP is the first case that was fully processed in 2005 by ADB’s new Accountability Mechanism. This report documents the status of the Project’s Resettlement Implementation Plan (RIP) and the Course of Action (CoA). It was developed after a three-day site visit (May 18-20, 2006) conducted by Avilash Roul of Bank Information Center, Hemantha Withanage of NGO Forum on ADB, and Dilena Pathragoda of Center for Environmental Justice and the staff of the Green Movement Sri Lanka. The Team found that several resettlements and rehabilitation related provisions are outstanding and implementation of the Board-approved Course of Action is delayed. The report served as an input for the first Monitoring Visit of the ADB’s Compliance Review Panel (May 31-June 8) and is being shared with ADB Board and Management. ◄ 1 / 1 ► Please reload

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB) Pagsubaybay sa Proyekto Gitnang Asya | Mekong | Timog Silangang Asya | Timog asya Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project PAMAGAT NG PROYEKTO Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project ​ PROJECT NUMBER 19119 ​ HALAGA NG LOAN Espesyal na Pondo ng Japan $ 575.00 milyon ​ BANSA Pakistan Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project (CBRIP) The Chasma Right Bank Irrigation Project (CBRIP) was approved by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in December 1991. It involves the construction of a 274-kilometer canal along the Indus River that will run through two districts in Punjab and Northwest Frontier provinces. According to the Bank, it will irrigate 606,000 acres of land in D.I. Khan and D.G. Khan Districts in central Pakistan. The project primarily aims to provide a dependable perennial irrigation supply, ensure efficient distribution water, and provide necessary drainage and flood relief. Aside from the main canal, 72 distribution canals, 68 cross-drainage structures, and 91 bridges will be constructed. However, the local community held massive protests citing the following complaints: (1) lack of comprehensive and participatory socio-economic, cultural and environmental project assessments; (2) project-induced flooding and resettlement; (3) forced and illegal land acquisition and compensation; (4) lifestyle disruption, in-migration and disintegration of community networks and support systems; (5) termination of traditional irrigation system; (6) project management, irregularities and corruption; and (7) adverse social impacts. The implementation of the project has been problematic. Due to numerous delays, the project incurred cost overruns. The project cost has ballooned to Rs17,000 million from the original Rs1,570 million. With only 15 percent of the project completed in 1999, there were already extensive delays and cost overruns. (Chasma Struggles, 2003) The project was due for completion in December 2002, but until now the project is not yet completed. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS According to villagers, the construction of CRBIP has interrupted the natural flow of the floodwater that resulted in massive flooding in the west side of the main canal and in the riverine belt of the Indus River. They attribute the increased ferocity of the flooding to the disruption of kohi nullah (hill torrent streams). The 274-kilometer main canal cuts through the flow of more than 150 natural hill torrents which come from the mountain range. In addition, some of the flood carrier channels (FCCs), which were built to redirect water flows from these torrents to the main canal or channel the water to the eastern side of the canal (which includes the riverine belt), were also blocking certain hill torrents. Some hill torrents end abruptly before reaching the river, while other torrents were combined into a single channel, increasing the amount and force of water that resulted in massive erosion and silt deposition. (Shanon Lawrence & Mishka Zaman, 2004) On the eastern side of the Chasma canal, the destructive project-induced flooding broke through the mud banks and dumped water into fields that were still planted with the cotton crop. Many huts and mud settlements collapsed or were damaged by the flood. (Lawrence & Zaman, 2004) This resulted in a loss of income and food insecurity. On the west, farmlands remained under floodwater for months. Villagers attribute this to the faulty design of the project. The canal and the embankments have blocked the floodwater from running towards the river on the eastern side. The villagers submitted petitions about the flood damages. However, local officials, elected council members nor the Grievance Redress and Settlement Committee (GRSC) conducted a comprehensive survey of flood-related damages caused by the project. The strong flood also eroded the surrounding hills that serve as a protective barrier between the hill torrent and villages. It also eroded and degraded acres of arable land. Grazing land was also inundated that resulted in the selling of livestock. Drinking water schemes and tube wells were also washed away by the destructive flood. Villagers fear the coming rainy season from March to April that could lead to more flooding disasters. Farmers were reluctant to plant the next seasonal crop for fear of suffering additional crop losses and accruing more debt. This led to the loss of income. Farmers also have to hire tractors and other equipment to level and plow the soil in the fields that cracked and hardened under floodwater. (Lawrence & Zaman, 2004) During floods, the mobility of the villagers was restricted. Some villages were not able to access essential social facilities such as hospitals. The floods also forced men to migrate to cities as day laborers to earn enough income to feed their families. Floods increased women’s labor. Now, women have additional burdens due to loss of livelihoods and income caused by floods. Destruction of drinking water schemes has also forced women to walk a longer distance to fetch water, dramatically increasing their workloads. Due to the destruction of potable water supply, women have to work double-time to care for their young children afflicted with a stomach illness, causing more pressure to their time and meager finances. SAFEGUARD POLICY VIOLATION ENVIRONMENT POLICY The project was erroneously classified as Category B despite it being large-scale irrigation and water management. According to the Panel, no initial environmental examination (IEE) was produced prior to the conduct of a feasibility study. Further, the environmental impact assessment (EIA) was not completed before the approval of the loan. (ADB Compliance Panel Report, 2004) By not making a full appraisal of the probable impact of the project, the ADB failed to identify the project’s environmental impacts and neglected to incorporate provisions in the loan agreement warranting the implementation of mitigating measures against adverse environmental impact. Further, the Bank failed to secure the required funding for identified mitigating measures. (CRP, 2004) For more than 10 years, the Environmental Management Plan (EMP) for CRBIP has not been implemented, nor has a Hill Torrents Management Plan (HTMP) been produced. HTMP serves as a guide flood management based on the traditional “rowed-kohi” system. (Lawrence & Zaman, 2004) The Panel said that “there are still no satisfactory plans or financial arrangements in place for securing the implementation of the plan. Moreover, there has been no adequate process that has enabled the informed and meaningful participation of affected communities of the project area in the implementation of the EMP.” (CRP, 2004) According to the Panel, the ADB failed to sufficiently understand and address problems relating to flooding; the use of agricultural chemicals; forests and grazing lands; water-logging and salinity; and possible pollution and waste management issues. INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT POLICY No Resettlement Action Plan has been prepared for those who were moved even though land acquisition began more than seven years ago. (Lawrence & Zaman, 2004) The resettlement of villagers affected by flooding was not anticipated during the project approval in 1991. The need for resettlement was only identified in 1994; actual resettlement was only conducted in 2001. (Panel Report, 2004) The Panel Report concluded that no resettlement plan was ever prepared which is a clear violation of ADB policy. The Bank also failed to include the necessary provisions in the loan agreement and budget for a resettlement program. The Panel also said that affected groups were not consulted in the valuation of their assets, nor the ADB provided compensation to protect the interests of the poorest affected persons by the CRBIP. The Panel further stated that the ADB did not take action to assess accurately the need for resettlement plan after flood risk was identified in 1994; no resettlement plan was prepared. The Panel said that a resettlement program did not become part of the 1999 Loan Agreement on supplementary financing for CRBIP. Further, it said that the ADB did not conduct proper consultation with the affected people in the decision-making and valuation of their assets. The Panel said that the Bank violated the rights of the affected people to be informed. Many villagers still face the threat of flooding. No new houses were built for the displaced families. Nor proper compensation and rehabilitation of the community were conducted by the ADB to ensure that the resettled families’ living conditions would be restored. (CRP, 2004) INDIGENOUS PEOPLES POLICY According to the Panel, the feasibility study and appraisal document do not address the issues on the rights of tribal/ethnic minorities, cultural integrity, and traditional land use control. (CRP, 2004) This can be seen in the disruption of the kohi system by the project. Also, the Panel stated that the ADB has never made an attempt to apply its Indigenous Peoples Policy and Instructions to the project. It said that the Bank did not come up with any analysis regarding indigenous peoples for this project based on Pakistani Law and the Bank’s policy. Nor a consultative process was done in this regard. The Panel said that it did not find any evidence that specific measures were taken by the Bank to address problems or issues that concern ethnic or cultural identity. (CRP, 2004) --- Asian Development Bank. “Executive Summary of Panel’s Report.” Report and Recommendation of the Board Inspection Committee to the Board of Directors on the Request for Inspection on Chasma Right Bank Irrigation Project (Stage III) in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. July 2004. Chasma Struggles. Chasma Irrigation Project. 2003. (www.chasma-strugles.net/project/index#concerns) Lawrence, Shanon and Zaman, Mishka. NGO Visit to the Asian Development Bank’s Chasma Right Bank Irrigation Project (CRBIP) in Pakistan: Trip Report. December 2003. Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project Documents NGOs report faulty project design (December 2002) Mushtaq Gadi of SUNGI Development Foundation and CRBIP Affectee Javid Iqbal visited CRBIP site 10-14 in December 2002 and reported mistakes in project design and preparation that have significant and destructive impacts on communities: “Lack of comprehensive and participatory social, cultural and environmental impact assessment in the case of Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project (CRBIP) plays a key role in suppressing and displacing the requisite knowledge of adverse impacts of the project. However, this situation politically benefits the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and provides them the opportunity to avoid taking the responsibility for the havoc, which they have created in the name of development. Some mistakes committed in the project design preparation and implementation are stupidly unjustified, though they have significant destructive consequences for the security of life, livelihoods, and ecology in the area.” AFFECTED COMMUNITIES FILE FULL INSPECTION CLAIM (NOVEMBER 2002) Affected persons of the Chashma Right Bank Irrigation Project (CRBIP) Stage III, filed an inspection claim to the ADB’s Board Inspection Committee (BIC) on November 19, 2002. Following are the major concerns of the project affectees: Lack of comprehensive and participatory socio-economic, cultural and environmental project assessment; Flooding and resettlement; Changes in project design, supplementary financing, and full project reappraisal; Forced and illegal land acquisition and compensation; Lifestyle disruptions, in-migration and disintegration of community networks and support systems; and Adverse environmental impacts. Complainants claim that the ADB did not comply with its own policies and procedures viz: Incorporation of Social Dimensions in Bank’s Operations Guidelines for Social Analysis for Development Projects Environmental Considerations in Bank’s Operation Policy on Involuntary Resettlement Policy on Indigenous Peoples Operational Procedures on Supplementary Financing of Cost overruns of Bank-Financed Projects (OM 32 BP/OP and OM 13/OP) Policy on Benefit Monitoring and Evaluation. Inspection claimants are Mr. Zafar Iqbal Lund (Hirak Development Center, D.G. Khan; Mr. Ahsan Wagha, Damaan Development Organization, D.G. Khan; Mr. Khadim Hussain, Action Aid-Pakistan, Islamabad; Mr. M. Nauman, Creed Alliance, Karachi; Mr. Shafi Qaisrani, Chashma Affectees Committee, D. G.Khan; and Mr. Mushtaq Gadi, SUNGI, Islamabad. CHASMA AFFECTEES STAGE PROTEST RALLY (OCTOBER 2002) Chasma affectees staged a protest rally against the highhandedness of local district administration and Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and violation by ADB of its own policies and procedures in Dera Ghazi Khan on October 4, 2002. The affectees warned that a mass movement will be launched against them if they failed to ensure immediate redress of their grievances. They demanded the following: allotment of land against the land acquired from them by WAPDA land valuation according to market rates; resettlement and rehabilitation of the affectees accountability of the ADB and WAPDA staff elimination of corruption and commission mafia in the project. More than 500 project affectees, peasant councilors and the representatives of political parties and NGOs joined the rally organized by Chashma Mutasereen Committee (CMC) and Chashma Right Bank Canal (CRBC) Area Organization. ​ ADB POSTPONES DIALOGUE TO MARCH 2002 (SEPTEMBER 2001) Due to the September 11 attacks in the US, ADB reset its CRBIP mission and multi-stakeholder dialogue –originally scheduled for September 2001 — to March 2002. Affectees had been unhappy with this latest development as many of the problems brought about by the project have yet to be resolved, even as the project nears completion. ADB releases draft consultants’ report (September 2001) ADB consultants from Consensus-Building Institute released a discussion paper prepared for the multi-stakeholder dialogue on CRBIP III slated for September. Chasma affectees and civil society groups were unhappy with the report, however, citing that many of their concerns have not been addressed. These include negative environmental impacts, overestimation of economic returns, flaws in project design, and decision-making processes. ADB consultants to assess CRBIP social impacts (July 2001) ADB contracted the services of the US-based Consensus-Building Institute (CBI) in July 2001 to undertake an “independent and neutral process” of social assessment for CRBIP III and initiate a multi-stakeholder dialogue. The Social Assessment Team consists of Dr. Adil Najam (senior consultant, CBI) and Syed Ayub Qutub (President, Pakistan Institute of Environment-Development Action Research). An initial fact-finding mission will be undertaken in August and a draft report prepared for discussion at a multi-stakeholder workshop in September. Consultants will visit Islamabad, Lahore, Peshawar, and the project area in DI Khan. Aside from project affectees, the consultants’ team will meet with government officials and other stakeholders, including ADB staff and SUNGI/DAMAAN. Chasma affectees earlier demanded that WAPDA arranges a CRBIP workshop with various stakeholders to develop and mutually agreed on the work plan for regular engagement between the affectees and WAPDA and a code of conduct for the latter. (see consultants’ TOR and schedule of ADB mission) FORUM NETWORK ENDORSES DEMANDS OF CHASMA AFFECTEES (APRIL 2001) Some twenty-two (22) NGO participants at the FORUM-organized Regional Strategy Meeting of Asian NGOs on ADB Advocacy in April 2001 in Subic, Philippines endorsed an “Initial Charter of Demands” presented by Wasim Wagha, a representative of the local NGO DAMAAN. The participants also signed a letter in support of the Chasma affectees, which Wagha also presented at subsequent meetings with various ADB officials at the Bank’s Headquarters in Manila. AFFECTEES DISSATISFIED WITH ADB-WAPDA MEETING (FEBRUARY 2001) In a February 2001 meeting organized by WAPDA on the occasion of the site visit of ADB’s Akira Seki, Director of the Agriculture and Social Sector Development (West), Chasma affectees realized that WAPDA and ADB officials were unwilling to listen to their concerns. From a report prepared by SUNGI’s Khadim Hussain: “… it seems that both WAPDA and ADB like to deal with the issue by dilly-dallying and wasting time, they want to quickly finish the project and leave the mess they have made for the local administration to deal with… (ADB) tries to shift the blame to the implementing agency (WAPDA). It always shows readiness to bring more funds (loans) to remove the complaints of the communities. On the other hand, WAPDA wants to deal with people in the typical bureaucratic way; that is, first to ignore them (PD told DAMAAN that he didn’t read the survey report), then to split the people by threats, co-optation, bribery in the form of favors, etc.” NGO survey reveals adverse social, environmental impacts (November 2000) DAMAAN (a local NGO) and Sungi Development Foundation conducted a survey of CRBIP III in November 2000. The survey identified several adverse social, environmental, and economic impacts of the project. Social impacts include the mobility of people, land ownership patterns, land prices, labor movements, the influx of outsiders, social organization, movement of capital, cropping pattern. ​ For more information please visit the Chashma Struggle Websit e. CRBIP-III Stakeholder Dialogue on Social Impacts : Summary of Action Recommendations Download the document here. ◄ 1 / 1 ► Please reload

Pagsubaybay sa Proyekto ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB) Gitnang Asya | Mekong | Timog Silangang Asya | Timog asya Phulbari Coal Project PAMAGAT NG PROYEKTO Phulbari Coal Project ​ HALAGA NG LOAN $100 milyon na Pribadong Sektor na Pautang $200 milyon ADB ​ BANSA Bangladesh Ang Phulbari Coal Project ay kinabibilangan ng pagkuha ng karbon gamit ang open-pit mining method. ​ Kabilang dito ang pagtatayo ng 500-MW power plant. Ayon sa ADB, sa buong produksyon, humigit-kumulang walong milyong tonelada ng karbon ang idadala sa pamamagitan ng tren at mga barge patungo sa isang offshore reloading facility na matatagpuan sa Akram Point. Mga apat na milyong tonelada ang iluluwas sa India sa pamamagitan ng riles. Ang natitirang tatlong milyong tonelada ay para sa domestic use. ​ Gayunpaman, kasing dami ng mga benepisyong pang-ekonomiya na nilalayon nitong dalhin sa Bangladesh, ang proyekto ay hindi lamang magdulot ng panganib sa kalusugan ngunit lumilipat sa humigit-kumulang 50,000 katao. Gayundin, ang Akram Point, kung saan matatagpuan ang reloading facility, ay nasa Sundarbans Mangrove Forest - isang UNESCO-declared world heritage site. Ang transportasyon ng milyun-milyong toneladang karbon sa pamamagitan ng Sundarbans at Akram Point ay magkakaroon din ng malubhang epekto sa kapaligiran MGA ISYU PAGLABAG SA PATAKARAN SA ENERHIYA NG ADB Ayon sa Patakaran sa Enerhiya, dapat lamang na aprubahan ng ADB ang pagpopondo ng isang mine-mouth project kung ito ay magpapahusay sa kahusayan ng proyekto dahil sa agarang kalapitan ng planta ng kuryente na gagamit ng nakuhang fossil fuel. Gayunpaman, ang mas malaking bulk ng mga aktibidad ng extractive ay nakatuon para sa pag-export. Ang karamihan ng uling na kukunin ay gagamitin ng mga komunidad sa labas ng Phulbari, higit pa, sa labas ng Bangladesh. Dapat ay naging matibay na dahilan ito para tanggihan ng mga opisyal at kawani ng Bangko ang panukala. ​ MASSIVE DISPLACEMENT Ang Phulbari Coal Project ay humigit-kumulang makakaapekto sa 50,000 katao, na kinabibilangan ng 12,000 kabahayan at 2,200 katutubo sa lugar ng proyekto lamang. Humigit-kumulang 43,000 katao ang mawawalan ng tirahan sa pagpapatupad ng proyekto. ​ Ayon sa Resettlement Plan para sa Coal Mine Area ng Phulbari Coal Project, ang kabayaran ay ibibigay sa mga legal na may-ari ng lupa at bahay. Ang mga taong maaaring maapektuhan ang kabuhayan ay bibigyan din ng mga gawad para sa pagpapanumbalik ng kabuhayan sa loob ng dalawang taon. Gayunpaman, sa kasalukuyang deklarasyon ng emerhensiya sa bansa, pagsususpinde ng mga pangunahing karapatan, pagbabawas ng kalayaan sa pagpapahayag ng media, at regular na marahas na panunupil ng mga lokal na awtoridad, ang pagpapatupad ng naturang mga plano sa resettlement ay lubhang kaduda-dudang. PAGLABAG SA KARAPATANG PANTAO Ang mga malubhang paglabag sa karapatang pantao ay ginawa sa mga tao ng Phulbari dahil sa proyekto. Noong Agosto 2006, pinaputukan ng Bangladesh Rifles, isang puwersang paramilitar, ang 50,000 lokal na tao na nagsasagawa ng mapayapang protesta. Limang tao ang namatay, kabilang ang isang 14 na taong gulang na batang lalaki, at 100 katao ang nasugatan. ​ Noong Pebrero 2007, si G. SM Nuruzzaman ay pinahirapan sa publiko at inihagis sa kulungan dahil sa umano'y pagsali sa protesta laban sa proyekto. ​ KULANG SA IMPORMASYON AT KONSULTASYON Sinabi ng mga lokal na matatanda na ang Asia Energy Corporation, isang kumpanyang nakabase sa UK na magpapatupad ng proyekto, ay nagsabi lamang ng mga benepisyo ng proyekto. Sa kabila ng mga kahilingan na ginawa ng chairman ng Phulbari Pourasaua at mga inihalal na komisyoner ng Phulbari, hindi nito isiniwalat ang mga negatibong epekto na maaaring idulot nito sa kapaligiran at mga lokal na komunidad, at kung paano mapapawi ang mga naturang problema. MGA MALING PAHAYAG AT HINDI KATANGGAP SA SOSYAL Ayon sa ADB, karamihan sa mga nagprotesta noong Agosto 2006 ay hindi residente ng Phulbari. Ito ay ganap na salungat sa mga pahayag na ginawa ng mga lokal na tao na ang karamihan sa mga demonstrador, kabilang ang lahat ng mga biktima na napatay at nasugatan, ay mga residente ng Phulbari. ​ Gayundin, ayon sa Mines and Communities, isang British NGO, karamihan sa mga taong pumirma sa logbook ng bisita, na sumusuporta sa proyekto, sa Information Center ay mga hindi residente ng Phulbari at ang mga pirma ay hindi ma-verify. Taliwas ito sa sinabi ng Asia Energy sa isinumiteng ulat ng Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) na 80 porsiyento ng mga bisita ay tumatanggap ng proyekto. ​ MGA UPDATE: Inaalis ng ADB ang Kontrobersyal na Proyekto ng Coal Phulbari Coal Project: Ang Development Bank ay umatras ​ ​

Pagsubaybay sa Proyekto ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB) Gitnang Asya | Mekong | Timog Silangang Asya | Timog asya Wind Power Generation Project PAMAGAT NG PROYEKTO Wind Power Generation Project ​ PROJECT NUMBER 49345-002 ​ HALAGA NG LOAN Karaniwang mapagkukunan ng kapital $ 200.00 milyon ​ BANSA Sri Lanka Ang Wind Power Generation Ang proyekto sa Sri Lanka ay isang US$ 200 milyon na proyektong pinondohan ng ADB naaayon ay naglalayong magbigay ng mas mataas na access sa isang malinis at maaasahang supply ng kuryente sa 2025. Ang proyekto, na nasa ilalim ng sektor ng enerhiya, ay sinasabing tumutugon sa napapanatiling paglago ng kapaligiran at napapabilang na paglago ng ekonomiya. May kabuuang 39 na wind turbine ang itatayo sa lugar ng Mannar District, na matatagpuan sa Northern Province ng Sri Lanka. Ang mga output ng proyektong pamumuhunan na ito ay: Ang kapasidad ng pagbuo ng lakas ng hangin ay tumaas Napabuti ang pamamahala ng kapangyarihan ng reaktibo ng system at Ang kapasidad ng CEB sa pagsusuri at pangangasiwa ng disenyo ng engineering ng proyekto ay pinalakas. Alinsunod dito, isasaalang-alang ng proyekto ang mga aspetong pangkalikasan, involuntary resettlement, at mga katutubong apektado. Ang iminungkahing proyekto ay nakategorya A para sa Kapaligiran at B para sa hindi boluntaryong resettlement. Miyembro ng forum, Center for Environmental Justice (CEJ) at ang Ang NGO Forum on ADB ay naghain ng mga sumusunod na alalahanin sa ADB Board of Directors tungkol sa iminungkahing proyekto: ​ 1. Sa isyu ng pinagsama-samang epekto at paglipat ng ibon: Isinulat ng ADB na ang Collision Risk Assessment ay isinagawa mula Hunyo – Marso 2016. Gayunpaman, iminumungkahi ng mga lokal na eksperto sa biodiversity na ang mga ibon ay bumalik sa paglipad ng mass migration ay karaniwang sa pagitan ng Marso – Abril. Ang panahong ito ay hindi sakop sa pagtatasa na ito. Ang mga lokal na eksperto sa ibon kabilang ang Ceylon Bird Club ay nababahala sa katumpakan ng mga natuklasan sa kasalukuyang ulat sa isyu ng mass migration ng ibon. ​ Rekomendasyon: Iminumungkahi namin na magsagawa ng independiyenteng pagsusuri sa mga pinagsama-samang epekto at partikular sa mga negatibong epekto sa paglipat ng ibon sa mga ambisyon sa hinaharap na pag-unlad sa 300 MW (kasalukuyang 100MW na proyekto + hinaharap na 200 MW na karagdagan) sa mataas na ito sensitibong lokasyon. ​ 2. Sa isyu ng pagsara ng turbine: Bilang isang hakbang sa paglipat, iminungkahi na magkaroon ng emergency shut down sa panahon ng paglipat ng ibon. gayunpaman, ito ay maaaring magresulta sa pagkawala ng henerasyon sa panahon ng pagsasara, na maaaring magdulot ng pagdududa sa pang-ekonomiyang posibilidad ng proyekto. ​ Rekomendasyon: Iminumungkahi namin na ang ADB ay dapat magsagawa ng karagdagang pag-aaral sa pagiging epektibo sa gastos ng opsyon sa pagsasara ng turbine (kabilang ang gastos sa pagkawala ng biodiversity), na maaaring ang tanging opsyon kung ang proyekto ay magpapatuloy sa kung ano ito. Basahin ang CEJ's komento sa Mannar Wind Farm EIA Basahin ang Tugon ng ADB sa mga komento ng CEJ Basahin ang CEJ at NGO Forum sa ADB's Demand para sa Karagdagang Pagtatasa ng Epekto Basahin ang Liham ng Tugon ng ADB Basahin Liham ng Ceylon Bird Club sa ADB

Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project Home PROJECT TITLE | Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project ​ PROJECT NUMBER | 26227 ​ LOAN AMOUNT | Ordinary Capital Resources | US$ 150.00 million ​ COUNTRY | Thailand ​ Erroneous was how a 2004 Far Eastern Economic Review article1 described Thailand's scandal-tainted Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project. Quoting from the joint report of the Bank Information Center and Terra-Thailand, two, the article detailed how corruption problems have transformed this Asian Development Bank-financed public initiative into a significant development debacle. Even the Thai Prime Minister3 publicly conceded that the project was riddled with corruption. And after years of resistance from affected communities and pressure from an international monitoring campaign, the ADB withdrew from the project in 2003. ​ The ADB and the Government of Thailand conceived the US$230-million wastewater management project in the early 1990s to improve the environmental quality and public health and welfare in Samut Prakarn Province through modern, reliable, cost-effective wastewater collection and treatment facilities. It was designed as the hub of all waste (generated by about 1.2 million residents and over 4,000 factories) flowing into the Chao Phraya River. The Bank's US$230-million stake in the project was the sum of two separate loans: the initial loan of US$150 million in 1995 and the supplementary loan of US$80 million in 1998. ​ Initially, the ADB recommended two treatment plants built on both sides of the Chao Phraya River. Controversy erupted when construction of a single wastewater treatment plant instead began in the village of Klong Dan. These were apparent deviations from the original project design and location. The Samut Prakarn project caught the Klong Dan locals, numbering around 60,000, by surprise. This was due to the failure of the Bank and the executing agency, the Pollution Control Department (PCD), to inform and consult them about the project. In 2000, the mayor and citizens of Klong Dan filed the first-ever complaint with the ADB over the impacts of the Samut Prakarn project. Thus, the group became the first to test the Bank’s accountability to those impacted by its tasks since the Inspection Function4 was established in 1995. The villagers asked the Inspection Committee to launch a full-scale reassessment of the project design and the flawed decision-making process in their formal request. They contended that the project had violated the ADB’s environmental, social disclosure, good governance, and anti-corruption policies, as well as the project’s goal of sustainable development. ​ The Inspection Panel reported in 2001 that the Bank did not comply with some of its policies and procedures in the project processing and implementation. These were: (1) additional financing of cost overruns, (2) bank operational missions, (3) environmental considerations in Bank operations, (4) involuntary resettlement, (5) incorporation of social dimensions in Bank operations and (6) governance. Furthermore, the Panel concluded that the Bank committed a crucial omission when it did not reappraise the 1998 supplementary loan proposal, thereby resulting in other consequences.5 Notwithstanding these severe findings, the subsequent recommendations of the Inspection Committee to the ADB Board were perceived to be weak by the affected communities, as well as independent CSO observers. Moreover, the ADB failed to take adequate action towards implementing even these recommendations. ​ In 2003, the Bank and the Thai Ministry of Finance agreed to close the original and supplementary loans for this project. The undisbursed balance remaining in the original loan for US$18.3 million has been canceled. The Bank said the project remains incomplete and suspended and that no progress has occurred on the remedial measures. ​ In early 2004, the Natural Resources and Environment Ministry was given the signal to sue the owner of the Klong Dan Wastewater Treatment project for Bt20 billion for alleged contract fraud and duping the state to buy public land. In 2005, the ADB reported that the court rejected the civil suit filed by PCD against the turnkey contractor, and no progress has been made on this matter. Moreover, no progress has been made on fraud charges versus individuals associated with the controversial land acquisition, resettlement plans, monitoring systems, community involvement initiatives, and odor and effluent management. The Bank would not act on the said issues until the contractual dispute between PCD and the contractor is resolved. ​ Project Impacts When Klong Dan residents finally became aware of the nature of the wastewater management project, they strenuously objected. They raised several concerns about the negative impacts the facility would have on their environmental quality and economic wellbeing. They expressed concern about the ill effects of toxic wastes and heavy metals released from the treatment plant. The project would threaten their way of life, the local economy, and community strength. The daily release of 525,000 cubic meters of treated wastewater to the sea would change the ecosystem of the coast, which is one of Thailand’s principal economic bases. The 2001 findings of the Bank’s Inspection Panel confirmed their fears. The report revealed that the Samut Prakarn project threatens the livelihoods of people dependent on the coastal ecosystem due to the dilution of salinity and release of toxins or heavy metals. Further, people living in the vicinities of the treatment plant could be adversely affected by the lowering of their property value and the odor and potential problems caused by the existence of toxins and heavy metals in sludge management. Moreover, community members became convinced that the decision to move the project was driven more by the desire to enrich a handful of politically well-connected landholders than by any considered assessment of the public interest. They pointed to several irregularities in the relocation of the project and acquisition of the Klong Dan site. ​ ADB Policy Violations ​ Information Disclosure Citizens never received detailed information about the project from the ADB. Nor were they ever consulted by the PCD that manages the project. For years, the Bank and the Thai government have known about the Samut Prakarn project, but they have excluded the participation of the Klong Dan people. Since the onset of the project’s construction, the public has yet to see the Environmental and Social Impact Analyses. ​ Environment Policy In their Inspection request, the Klong Dan villagers contended that no environmental impact assessment was conducted before the plant’s construction. Given this, the facility could have released toxic heavy metals into and diluted the salinity of local waterways, in the process jeopardizing the fisheries that primarily support the community. Likewise, documents obtained from project co-financier, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, showed the plant’s inability to fully treat wastewater with metals remaining in their original state after treatment. Social and Involuntary Resettlement The Bank failed to undertake an initial social assessment of the project area, leading to poor planning and design. This, in effect, deprived affected villagers of their right to participate and have their concerns addressed by the project proponents. No resettlement plan was established to compensate and support any villagers displaced by the facility. Neither was there any socio-economic survey done among the affected families. The total cost of resettlement was not identified or included in the project cost. Resettlement and compensation were only mentioned when protests against the project began mounting. ​ Corruption The land purchased for the facility was acquired under highly dubious circumstances, with the price twice its official rate. This was a clear violation of the ADB’s anti-corruption policy. In particular, the purchased land area was not the one specified in the project design. Likewise, the Bank accepted changes in the bidding documents to allow alternative bids for one facility instead of two facilities as stipulated in the loan agreement. It took the change in location of the treatment plant to Klong Dan minus the requisite project impact assessments. It failed to adequately scrutinize project changes that led to an 87 percent increase in costs before loan signing. ADB also did not object when the contract was granted to the only bidder in direct violation of Thai procurement/bidding regulations. ​ Lessons to Learn The botched Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project demonstrates the devastating impacts of ADB’s failure to exercise its complete monitoring, oversight, and investigative responsibilities relative to corrupt-ridden development projects. Its response to the allegations of corruption raised by the Klong Dan community has been grossly inadequate and unsatisfactory. The ADB failed to consider corruption issues during the project and appraisal stages. Despite the apparent high country and project risks, the Bank neglected to mention in its Review and Reports of the President (RRP) for neither the original loan nor the December 1998 supplementary loan (which was already covered by the Anti-Corruption Policy) that the Samut Prakarn project was susceptible to procurement fraud, bribery and other types of corruption. Similarly, its project monitoring and supervision during implementation were unsatisfactory. It failed to question several substantial design changes that contravened ADB policy, loan agreements, or Thai law, thereby providing significant opportunities for corruption. From the onset, the Bank had the opportunity to curb the corrupt practices related to the Samut Prakarn project. However, it failed to address these issues as illustrated by the following: The Bank’s three offices that reviewed aspects of the project did not thoroughly investigate or report the corruption issues related to the land transaction; Management review of the project failed to find any evidence of corruption, and both the Inspection Panel and the Anticorruption Unit declined to consider the issue at all; The Bank never publicly commented on the fact that the Thai government has filed criminal charges against many senior officials of the projects; and The Bank did not launch a more comprehensive investigation of the corruption issues given the said charges. ​ -------- Gay, Christopher. “Thai Project Yields Graft and New Policies.” Far Eastern Economic Review, 2004. Herz, Steve.“Zero Tolerance? Assessing the Asian Development Bank’s Efforts to Limit Corruption in its Lending Operations,” 2004. “Making a case for Graft at Klong Dan,” The Nation, July 2003. This policy became the Accountability Mechanism Policy in May 2003. ADB. “Final Report of Inspection Panel on Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project,” 2001. ADB. “Samut Prakarn Waste Water Management Project Fourth Semiannual Report to the Board Directors on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the Board Inspection Committee as Adopted on 25 March 2002,” 2004. ​ ​

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB) Pagsubaybay sa Proyekto Gitnang Asya | Mekong | Timog Silangang Asya | Timog asya Proyekto ng Tanahu Hydropower Ang 140 MW Tanahu Seti Hydroelectric Project (THP) ay matatagpuan sa Tanahu District ng Western Development Region ng Nepal. Ito ay isang storage type hydropower project na may kapasidad na 140 MW. Bilang bahagi ng proyekto, isang dam na may taas na 140 metro ang gagawin sa Vyas Municipality ng Tanahun district. Isang 1,203-meter long tunnel ang dadaan sa kanang pampang ng Seti River para sa pagbuo ng kuryente sa isang underground powerhouse sa Kunaute. Ang powerhouse ay magkakaroon ng dalawang turbine na may kapasidad na 70 megawatts bawat isa. Inaasahan na ang mga kontratista para sa konstruksiyon ay pipiliin sa kalagitnaan ng Oktubre, 2017 at ang nakatakdang petsa ng pagkumpleto ay sa loob ng Disyembre 2022. Upang mailipat ang kuryente sa Pambansang Grid, ang mga gawaing pagtatayo ng isang 37-km na transmission line mula sa site ng powerhouse sa Bharatpur sub-station ay pinaplano. Ang Proyekto ay matatagpuan sa ilog ng Seti ng munisipalidad ng Vyas malapit sa Damauli, ang punong-tanggapan ng distrito ng Tanahun (150 km kanluran mula sa kabisera ng lungsod ng Kathmandu). Walong Village Development Committee (VDCs) at ang munisipalidad ng Vyas ng distrito ng Tanahun ang direktang apektado ng proyekto. ​ Ayon sa Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Addendum, 2012, kabuuang 758 na kabahayan ang maaapektuhan. Kabilang sa mga ito, 86 na kabahayan ang ganap na lilisanin sa kanilang lupaing ninuno. Ang proyekto ay mag-aambag sa pagkawala ng 660 metrikong tonelada ng isang pananim na magtataas ng isyu ng seguridad sa pagkain. ​ Ang kabuuang halaga ng THP ay tinatayang nasa humigit-kumulang 505 milyon US$ (ADB, 2013). Kasama ang Asian Development Bank (ADB), may iba pang mga kasosyo na may mga pamumuhunan sa pananalapi sa proyektong ito. Ang isa sa mga pangunahing kasosyo sa pagpopondo ay ang Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) at ang natitirang mga kasosyo ay ang European Investment Bank (EIB) at ang Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD). Ipinapakita ng sumusunod na talahanayan ang mga pamumuhunan ng iba't ibang financier ng proyektong ito. ​ Ang mga nagpapatupad na ahensya ay ang Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) at ang Tanahu Hydropower Limited (THL). Gaya ng inilarawan sa manwal ng proyekto ng ADB, ipapatupad ng THL ang hydropower plant at lahat ng kaugnay na gawain, samantalang ang NEA ay gagawa ng mga transmission lines at ang rural electrification program. Ayon sa ulat at rekomendasyon ng presidente ng ADB sa board of directors ng Bangko, gagawin umano ng Bangko ang lahat ng proseso sa pagkuha kabilang ang bid evaluation, contract negotiations, at contract payment. Bilang karagdagan sa ADFD, ang EIB ay magpopondo sa mga gawaing sibil samantalang ang JICA ay magpopondo sa lahat ng mga pasilidad ng powerhouse. Higit pa rito, ang parehong ulat ay nagsasabi na ang ADB ay magpopondo nang mag-isa o kasabay ng gobyerno, ang mga linya ng transmission, ang pagpapaunlad ng komunidad, mga programa sa elektripikasyon sa kanayunan at bahagi ng mga gastos sa pagkuha at pag-aayos ng lupa. ​ Ang ADB ay aktibong manlalaro sa proyektong ito at aasikasuhin ang pangangasiwa, pagkuha, at pagtatalaga ng mga eksperto. Sinasabi ng ADB na ang mga benepisyo ay kasama ang pinalawak na pag-access sa napapanatiling enerhiya sa Nepal sa pamamagitan ng pagtaas ng kahusayan at supply ng maaasahang hydropower na enerhiya. Ang mga output ng proyekto na binanggit sa ulat ay ang mga sumusunod: Isang 140 MW hydropower plant at kaugnay na transmission system 37 km, 220 Kv Rural electrification na sumasaklaw sa 17,636 na kabahayan Programa sa pagpapaunlad ng komunidad sa lugar ng proyekto muling pagsasaayos ng NEA Iba pang mga reporma sa sektor Equity pamamaraan ng pagbebenta para sa pagpapaunlad ng hydropower Tulong teknikal para sa pagkamit ng mga output ng proyekto Ang espesyal na tampok na binanggit para sa THP ay ang lahat ng mga patakaran ng ADB kasama ang iba pang mga kasosyo sa pagpopondo ay ilalapat sa pagsasagawa ng proyektong ito. Epekto ng proyekto Ang Tanahu Seti ay isang proyekto ng storage dam at ang reservoir ay magpapalubog sa lupa, kagubatan ng komunidad, mga komunidad, pampublikong istruktura, at mga lugar ng cremation, atbp. Ang dam ay magkokontrol din sa daloy ng ilog sa ibaba ng agos. Kaya, ang proyekto ay magkakaroon ng mga sumusunod na epekto sa kapaligiran at panlipunan. Pagkuha ng Lupa Ayon sa EIA addendum 2012 na inihanda ng NEA at ng THL, ang kabuuang lupang kailangan ng proyekto ay 828 ha. Mula rito, ang pagpapatupad ng proyekto ay kailangang kumuha ng 112 ha at pagpapaupa ng 19 ha ng pribadong lupa (THL at NEA, 2012). Walang binanggit na mga taong walang lupa na naninirahan doon sa maraming henerasyon na walang mga sertipiko ng lupa. Napag-alaman na ang mga lupain sa Vyas Municipality at Kahun Shivapur ay nakuha na sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay ng cash compensation bago ang 2014. Mayroon na, 156.8 million Nepalese rupees ang naibigay sa mga may-ari ng lupain ng apektadong lugar kaagad pagkatapos ng pamamahagi ng kompensasyon sa lupa ay sinimulan noong kalagitnaan- Pebrero 2017. Ang gobyerno ay naglaan ng kabuuang 420 milyong Nepalese rupees para sa mga layunin ng kompensasyon sa lupa ng proyekto sa loob ng 2017 fiscal year. ​ Mayroong mga tao at mga paaralang pangkomunidad (ang Dipak Community Secondary School ay sumakop sa 216 ropani mga lupaing walang anumang sertipiko ng lupa) na naninirahan doon mula sa maraming henerasyon gayunpaman, wala silang mga sertipiko ng lupa. Ayon sa Land Acquisition Act, 1977 ng Nepal, wala silang karapatan sa kabayaran. Gaya ng sinabi ng isa sa mga lokal sa Damauli, ang kanilang lupain (Darai: marginalized community) ay kinuha para sa pagtatatag ng punong-tanggapan ng Distrito at binayaran ng cash ngunit, ang Darai Ang komunidad ay walang ideya sa pamamahala ng likidong cash at walang karunungan na mamuhunan sa mga alternatibong lupain para mabuhay. Sa wakas, ginastos nila ang lahat ng pera at ngayon ay mga walang lupang dukha sa paligid ng Damauli. Pampublikong Yaman at Imprastraktura Ayon sa EIA addendum, 2012 na inihanda ng NEA at ng THL, napag-alaman na ang proyekto ay ganap na sisirain ang mga suspension bridges, pinagmumulan ng inuming tubig, mga daanan, mga foot trail, mga templo, at mga lugar ng cremation. Bukod dito, napag-alaman mula sa EIA 2012 na ang proyektong ito ay maglalagay ng presyon sa mga pampublikong mapagkukunan dahil sa paglipat ng mga apektadong kabahayan. Nakikita na dahil sa tunneling work, natigil ang supply ng tubig. Naistorbo na ng tunneling ang daloy ng tubig sa lupa na nagpapababa ng suplay ng tubig sa ilang oras sa isang araw sa halip na ang dating 24 x 7 na supply. Itinuro na sa EIA 2012 na ang proyekto ay magkakaroon ng malaking epekto sa kapaligiran at kabuhayan sa mga lugar ng proyekto. Di-boluntaryong Resettlement Ayon sa resettlement framework na inihanda ng NEA at ng THL, humigit-kumulang 758 kabahayan ang maaapektuhan ng proyektong ito. Sinasabi pa ng balangkas na mula sa 758 na mga kabahayan na ito, 86 na mga kabahayan ang pisikal na lilisanin at lilipat sa kanilang kasalukuyang nayon. Sinasabi pa ng ulat na ang mga apektadong sambahayan ay na-rate bilang katutubo at mahina. Bilang karagdagan, kinumpirma din ng ulat ng EIB na ang karamihan sa mga apektadong tao ay kabilang sa mga katutubong grupo na ang panlipunan at kultural na paraan ay malalagay sa alanganin. Sa isang field visit, napag-alaman na 19 na pamilya sa Wantang Khola ng Rishing Ranpokhari VDC, 7 pamilya sa Chhang VDC gayundin sa Beltar ng Kahun Shivapur, Bhimad at Jamune VDC ay nasa listahang ito na nanganganib. Kabuhayan Ang proyektong ito ay lubhang makakaapekto sa kabuhayan ng mga apektadong populasyon. Ang mga paraan ng kabuhayan na apektado ng proyekto ay ang agrikultura, pangingisda, panggatong, at pagkolekta ng kumpay. Majhi, Bote, Danuwar, at Darai ay mga katutubo at marginalized na mangingisda na kilala bilang mga bulnerableng grupo sa Nepal na ganap na umaasa sa mga ilog para sa kanilang kabuhayan. Hindi sila mabubuhay kung walang mga ilog at karamihan sa kanila ay walang lupa. Pangingisda ang kanilang propesyon ng ninuno. Ang kumpay, pag-aalaga ng baka, paggawa ng dumi, at agrikultura ay magkakaugnay. Kung ang isa ay apektado ang buong cycle ay sira. kapaligiran Ayon sa EIA addendum 2012, ang proyekto ay magkakaroon ng mga epekto sa aquatic ecosystem, terrestrial ecosystem, at tirahan ng fauna at flora. Sinabi pa nito na 400.3 ha ng kagubatan ang mawawala na naglalaman ng 162,000 puno, 18.7 ha ng palumpong, at 94.3 ha ng damuhan. Magkakaroon ng mga seryosong hadlang sa paglipat ng isda na isang bagay na seryosong alalahanin. May kabuuang 36 na species ng isda, kung saan anim na species ang lumilipat mula sa malayo, anim mula sa isang maikling distansya, at ang iba ay matatagpuan sa ilog ng Seti. Ang proyekto ay makakahadlang sa libreng migrasyon ng mga isda at magreresulta din sa pagkawala ng populasyon. Ayon sa IUCN, mayroong mga endangered at almost threatened species. Kultura at relihiyon Karamihan sa mga tao ay Hindu ayon sa relihiyon gayunpaman, mayroon ding mga Budista at Muslim. Ang mga lugar ng cremation at ang mga templo ay masisira na nagdudulot ng pagkabalisa sa mga tao. Ang interbensyon ng proyekto ay magdadala ng bagong kultura sa mga site ng proyekto at mga apektadong lugar na posibleng makasira sa orihinal na kulturang ginagawa doon. Konklusyon Hindi maikakaila na mayroong matinding krisis sa kuryente sa Nepal at ang karamihan sa mga taga-bukid ay walang access sa kuryente. Kung kaya't hindi maaaring tumanggi ang Nepal sa mga dam; gayunpaman, maiiwasan nito ang mga mapaminsalang dam. Ang mga lokal na tao ay humihingi ng sapat na impormasyon, napapanahong abiso, inklusibo at makabuluhang konsultasyon at pakikipag-ugnayan tungkol sa proyektong ito. Nahihirapan pa rin silang makuha ang buong mga dokumento ng proyekto kabilang ang buong volume ng EIA, IPPF, Resettlement Plan gayundin ang mga alituntunin at pananggalang ng ADB, EIB, at JICA sa lokal na wika. Nais ng mga lokal na garantiya ng kanilang kabuhayan at pinakamahusay na mga presyo para sa kanilang mga lupain at mga plano upang mabuhay muli ang kanilang mga paraan ng kabuhayan. Hinihingi nila ang kuryente, trabaho sa proyekto, at regular na pinagmumulan ng kita para magkaroon ng disenteng buhay. ​ Ang ADB, JICA, at EIB ay may mga patakaran at pananggalang na umaakma sa isa't isa na nagtataguyod ng pagbabawas ng kahirapan at pagliligtas sa kapaligiran. Pag-proyekto ng mga dakilang pangitain para sa mga tao, kapaligiran, at lipunan na sinasabi nitong may pananagutan ito at/o gagawin nitong mananagot ang nanghihiram/kliyente sa lahat ng pangunahing patakaran nito sa pag-iingat. Gayunpaman, ang mga pangakong ito ay malinaw na nilabag sa kaso ng proyekto ng Tanahu Seti. Bagama't ang proyekto ay nasa yugto ng pagpapatupad, napansin na sa yugto ng pagpaplano at paghahanda, marami sa mga patakaran ng ADB ang nilabag tungkol sa komunikasyon, konsultasyon, pakikilahok, at paunang abiso. Ang proyektong ito ay kailangang suriin ng mga grupo ng mamamayan at mga panlabas na katawan upang matiyak na makukuha ng mga apektadong tao, kapaligiran, at lipunan ang nararapat sa kanila ayon sa batas. ​ Mga kaugnay na dokumento - Hydro project: Tutol ang mga katutubo ng Nepal sa ADB, pagpopondo ng bangko sa Europa ADB at mga proyekto ng hydropower sa Nepal Nilabag ng ADB ang sarili nitong mga patakaran sa pag-iingat sa Nepal Hydropower Project ​ PAMAGAT NG PROYEKTO Proyekto ng Tanahu Hydropower ​ PROJECT NUMBER 43281-013 ​ HALAGA NG LOAN Asian Development Fund $ 120.00 milyon $ 30.00 milyon European Investment Bank $ 70.00 milyon Japan International Cooperation Agency $ 184.00 milyon Abu Dhabi Fund $ 30.00 milyon Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction $ 1.50 milyon European Investment Bank $ 15.00 milyon ​ BANSA Nepal

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB) Pagsubaybay sa Proyekto Gitnang Asya | Mekong | Timog Silangang Asya | Timog asya GMS Rehabilitation ng Riles sa Cambodia PAMAGAT NG PROYEKTO GMS Rehabilitation ng Riles sa Cambodia ​ PROJECT NUMBER 37269-013 ​ HALAGA NG LOAN Asian Development Fund $ 42.00 milyon Pondo ng OPEC para sa International Development $ 13.00 milyon Pamahalaan ng Malaysia $ 2.80 milyon ​ BANSA Cambodia Ang Royal Cambodian Railway ay nagpapatakbo na nag-aalok ng ilang mga serbisyo kabilang ang pampasaherong tirahan papunta sa iba't ibang destinasyon ng Cambodia. Sa katunayan, ang malaking bilang ng mga taong sumasakay sa tren ay mga turistang pupunta sa Sihanoukville, 221.7 km ang layo mula sa Phnom Penh. Ang lugar ay kilala bilang Krong Preah Sihanouk at sikat sa mga beach, tropikal na isla, at mangrove jungles ng Ream National Park. Gayunpaman, mahigit 4000 pamilya pa rin ang nasa malalang kalagayan dahil sa kawalan ng kompensasyon na ibinigay sa kanila ng Asian Development Bank (ADB) at ng gobyerno. Malaking bilang ng mga pamilya ang nabaon ngayon sa sobrang utang na nagresulta sa pagkakasangla ng kanilang mga relokasyon na tahanan kahit na wala ang titulo ng lupa. Isang hindi kumikibo na residente mula sa Poipet, isang relocation site 411.3 km mula sa Phnom Penh, malapit sa mga hangganan ng Cambodia at Thailand, malungkot na isinalaysay kung paano siya humihingi/naghihintay ng mga scrap ng pagkain mula sa kanyang mga kapitbahay dahil hindi na niya kayang suportahan ang kanyang sarili. Invalid from the waist down, alone and without any support from her family he compared her situation before she went to the relocation site, according to her “at least nung nasa old place ako, nakakapagtanim ako ng gulay, mais, root crops at sapat na iyon para mabuhay ako. Sa susunod na araw ay ganoon din ang gagawin ko dahil nakakalusot ako…”. Ito ay hindi isang bagong kuwento para sa karamihan ng mga tao sa relocation site, bukod sa mga problema na nauugnay sa teritoryo ng paglilipat tulad ng access sa transportasyon, pagkakaroon ng trabaho o iba pang mapagkukunan ng kita at kabuhayan, kuryente at malinis na inuming tubig, kung bakit ang Cambodian Ang mga apektadong pamilya ay "natatangi" ay ang pagkakautang nila sa iba't ibang ahensya ng pagpapautang at maging sa mga tao. Ang ilang mga pamilya ay kumuha pa nga ng pangalawang sangla upang bayaran ang unang sangla, hanggang sa ito ay naging isang mabisyo na ikot. Gayundin, ang pagkakaroon ng mga impormal na nagpapahiram, na hinahayaan ang mga apektadong pamilya na humiram ng pera gamit ang resettlement plot bilang collateral ay ginagawang mas kumplikado ang sitwasyon. Nagresulta ito sa panawagan ng mga tao hinggil sa pangako ng gobyerno na ibibigay ang 'titulo ng lupa' pagkatapos ng 5 taong paninirahan sa resettlement site. Isang community leader mula sa isa sa mga resettlement site ang nagsabi na ito ay dapat na noong 2013 dahil sila ay naninirahan doon mula pa noong 2007, ngunit apat na taon na ang lumipas ay wala pa ring balita sa titulo ng lupa. Sinabi pa niya na sa kanilang bahagi ay masigasig silang nag-follow up sa Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning, and Construction. (MLMUPC) hinggil sa usapin pero hindi sila natugunan ng maayos, worst pakiramdam nila ay binabalewala ang kanilang hinaing. Isang ama ng tatlo sino ang nag-iisa Ang pinagmumulan ng kita ay ang pagmamaneho ng taksi sa paligid ng lungsod na halos hindi kumikita ng 100,823 KHR (humigit-kumulang 25$) sa isang araw, at kailangan niyang magbayad ng 100,823 KHR (250$) bawat buwan para sa kanyang 24,197,500 KHR (humigit-kumulang 6000$), kapareho ng kuwento. ang babaeng may humigit-kumulang 4000$ at kailangang magbayad ng 200$ sa isang buwan, ang pinagkukunan niya ng kita ay gumagawa ng basahan, na nagbebenta ng 2,016.45 KHR (50¢) bawat isa. Sa isang araw ay makakagawa sila ng 50 hanggang 60 piraso na kung sila ay walang tigil sa trabaho sa loob ng 12 oras. Ang sitwasyon ng pautang ay nakakaalarma na VisionFund Cambodia – suportado ng Gobyerno ng Australia – ay nagpatupad ng isang programa upang makatulong na mapagaan ang mga problema sa pautang ng mga pamilya sa 5-resettlement site. Ngunit winakasan ng VisionFund ang programa nito at tatapusin ito ngayong taon (2016). ​ Nalaman ng VisionFund Cambodia na ang mga pinaka-apektadong sambahayan ay hindi nakakatugon sa mga kinakailangan o pamantayan sa pagiging karapat-dapat na lumahok sa programa. Kasama sa pamantayan sa pagiging karapat-dapat ang- Sapat na kita para mabayaran ang buwanang installment Patuloy na paninirahan sa resettlement site Ang antas ng pagkakautang na hindi dapat masyadong mataas upang ang pag-eehersisyo sa utang ay makakamit sa loob ng sobreng pinansyal at ang Ang pagpayag ng mga impormal na nagpapahiram na pumirma sa kasunduan. Nang tanungin ang mga apektadong pamilya kung paano tutugunan o lutasin ang kanilang kakila-kilabot na sitwasyon, mapagpakumbaba nilang hiniling sa gobyerno ng Cambodia at Asian Development Bank (ADB) na tulungan sila sa anumang paraan na magagawa nila. Idinagdag ng isang pinuno ng komunidad at isang ina ng 4 na sila ay "sumusunod sa rekomendasyon ng gobyerno, ng ADB, at ng Australian Aid na lumipat dahil ipinangako sa kanila na ang kanilang buhay ay magiging mas mahusay" at ito ay mga ahensya na kanilang pinagkakatiwalaan sa simula, ngunit after years of struggle and making ends meet masyado na silang pagod sa paulit-ulit na ginagawa. At mas natatakot sila na ang kanilang mga anak, apo ay makatagpo ng parehong. Sa katunayan, karamihan sa mga kabataan sa mga relocation site mayroon itinigil ang kanilang pag-aaral sa pagkuha ng mga responsibilidad sa paglalagay ng pagkain sa mesa.

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB) Pagsubaybay sa Proyekto Gitnang Asya | Mekong | Timog Silangang Asya | Timog asya Proyekto sa Sektor ng Serbisyong Infrastruktura na Nakabatay sa Komunidad PAMAGAT NG PROYEKTO Proyekto sa Sektor ng Serbisyong Infrastruktura na Nakabatay sa Komunidad ​ PROJECT NUMBER 31197-032 ​ HALAGA NG LOAN Asian Development Fund $ 30.00 milyon ​ BANSA Republikang Kyrgyz Maraming nayon sa Kyrgyz Republic ang walang malinis na tubig. Kaya naman humingi ang gobyerno ng Kyrgyz sa ADB ng pautang na nagkakahalaga ng US$36 milyon noong 2001. Matatapos sana ang proyekto noong 2007 ngunit hindi. Ang unang proyekto na pinasimulan ay kinabibilangan ng pagbibigay ng mga serbisyo sa imprastraktura sa isang settlement area na nagkakahalaga ng US$45 milyon. Magbibigay ang ADB ng pautang na nagkakahalaga ng US$36 milyon; sasagutin ng gobyerno ng Kyrgyz Republic sa pamamagitan ng co-financing ang natitirang US$9 milyon. Ang pangalawang proyekto na nagkakahalaga ng US$24.5 milyon ay ang Suplay ng Tubig at Kalinisan sa Rural. Kabilang dito ang isang US$15-milyong pautang mula sa World Bank, isang grant mula sa Kagawaran ng Internasyonal na Pag-unlad sa ang halagang $US6.25 milyon, at co-financing ng gobyerno ng Kyrgyz Republic sa halagang US$3.25 milyon. Ang mga problema na lumitaw sa panahon ng pagsubaybay ay naging pareho tungkol sa buong bansa. Ang misyon ng aming organisasyon ay isulong ang pagpapabuti ng pang-ekonomiya, panlipunan, at ekolohikal na estado ng mga mahihinang grupo ng populasyon sa pamamagitan ng pagprotekta sa kanilang mga karapatan at pagtataguyod ng kanilang mga interes. Dahil ang misyon na ito ay kasabay ng mga layunin ng mga proyekto, ang CO “Taza-Tabigat” (Ivanovka village, Chui Oblast) ay nagsagawa ng mga paunang konsultasyon sa mga stakeholder. Tinukoy ng organisasyon ang pangangailangang subaybayan ang mga aktibidad sa ilalim ng "Taza-Suu Project". HEALTH AND SANITATION Sa simula ng proyekto, hindi naunawaan ng mga taganayon kung ano ang ibig sabihin ng co-financing. Kinailangan nilang magbayad ng limang porsyento ng halaga ng mga serbisyo sa tubig. Ang koleksyon ng pera ay lumabag sa civil code na nagsasabing, "na ang lahat ng ibinigay na serbisyo ay dapat kumpirmahin sa pamamagitan ng pagsulat at ang mga resibo ay dapat ibigay sa pagbabayad ng mga naturang serbisyo". Ang pera ay nakolekta mula sa mga taganayon nang walang anumang paliwanag kung paano ito gagastusin. Ang paggamit ng kanilang pera ng mga lokal na awtoridad ay nagdulot ng galit. Ang masama pa, ilan sa mga tagabaryo na nag-ambag ang nagbayad ng halaga ng mga serbisyo ay hindi naging benepisyaryo ng proyekto. Sabihin pa, hindi natuwa ang mga tao sa proyekto dahil sa hindi kasiya-siyang pagpapatupad ng proyekto. Sinabi ng KA ng nayon ng Uch-Emchek, "bago ang pagpapatupad ng proyekto, ang mga tao ay umiinom ng tubig mula sa irigasyon (magtanong)". Ngunit sa halip na mapabuti ang kalidad ng tubig na lumala, ito ay hindi chlorinated. ​ Sa taglamig at tag-ulan, may loam at dumi sa tubig, sa unang dalawang taon ng operasyon ng proyekto, 20 bata ang nagkasakit ng jaundice hepatitis (Botkin's disease), kasama ang anak ni K.A. Ang lahat ng ito ay nangyari dahil sa masamang kalidad ng tubig. Mayroong lahat ng kinakailangang dokumento na nagpapatunay sa mga kaso ng Botkin's disease sa kanilang nayon. Noong Hunyo 19, 2007, nagpasya ang mga tao sa nayon ng Uch-Achmed na kumilos sa masamang kalidad ng tubig. Ang chairman ng Association of Water Users, na responsable para sa supply ng tubig, ay nag-organisa ng paglilinis ng mga pipeline. Nagulat sila nang makakita sila ng mga parasito, na tinatawag na hairworm, sa tubig. Nagtabi sila ng ilang sample. Pagkatapos ng rebolusyon noong 2005, nagpasya ang bagong gobyerno na simulan ang mga kasong kriminal laban sa mga kontratista ng proyekto. Ayon sa opisina ng General Prosecutor, mayroong 18 bilang ng mga kasong kriminal para sa panahon ng 2004-2006 na umaabot sa 47 milyon ang ilan. Ang kabayaran para sa pinsala sa panahon ng imbestigasyon ay 4 na milyong soms lamang. Gayunpaman, wala sa mga matataas na opisyal ng gobyerno ang naparusahan. Ang mga lokal na tanggapan ng World Bank at ng ADB ay hindi nasiyahan sa mga natuklasan ng tanggapan ng tagausig. ANG PROSESO NG BIDDING Ang isa pang problema ay ang proseso ng pag-bid. Ang mga proyekto ay madalas na napanalunan ng mga kontratista na walang propesyonal na karanasan at mga manggagawa na dapat magkaroon ng mga kinakailangang kasanayan para sa pagpapatupad ng proyekto. Bukod dito, ang pagpapatupad ng proyekto ay hindi ginawa alinsunod sa mga batas at regulasyon ng Kyrgyz, ngunit alinsunod sa kasama ang mga patakaran ng ADB. Ang tanggapan ng tagausig ay nagsumite ng pinagsama-samang ulat nito sa parlyamento noong 28 Hunyo 2007. Ang Parliament ay lumikha ng isang espesyal na grupo para sa pagpapatupad ng proyektong ito noong Nobyembre 2006. Gayunpaman, ang publiko ay hindi nasiyahan sa pagpapatupad ng proyekto. Ang ulat ng opisina ng tagausig ay ginawang available sa publiko dahil sa pampulitikang pagkiling ng Parliament. May katibayan na ang mga naturang aksyon ay ginawa upang matanggap ang ikalawang bahagi ng ADB loan sa kabila ng pagkabigo ng proyekto. Sa kasalukuyan, patuloy na sinusubaybayan ng CO “Taza-Tabigat” ang proyekto. ​ Mag-click dito para sa mga update.

Maikling Proyekto RESOURCES Bankwatch | Taunang Ulat | Mga Espesyal na Lathalain | Mga Gabay na Aklat Asian Development Bank (ADB) funded Mahaweli Water Security Investment Program Download Asian Development Bank (ADB) funded Rupsha 800-Megawatt Combined Cycle Power Plant Project See more Fast facts on ADB’s dubious energy investments Read More Supplemental notes to the CHM submission Read More Concerns and suggestions on AIIB’s Accountability Mechanism Read More Critique of AIIB Energy Strategy: Sustainable Energy for Asia Issues Note for discussion Read More The Assam Integrated Flood and Riverbank Erosion Management Project (India) Read More The Sipat Super Thermal Power Project (India) Read More The Visayas Base-Load Power Development Project (Philippines) Read More The Southwest Area Integrated Water Resources Planning Management Project (Bangladesh) Read More The Masalli-Astara Highway Project (Azerbaijan) Read More Pakistan: Lessons from Korangi ‘Inspection’ Case Read More ADB’s Inspection Function under Review Read More ◄ 1 / 1 ► Please reload

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB) Pagsubaybay sa Proyekto Gitnang Asya | Mekong | Timog Silangang Asya | Timog asya Proyekto ng Sektor ng Supply at Kalinisan ng Tubig PAMAGAT NG PROYEKTO Proyekto ng Sektor ng Supply at Kalinisan ng Tubig ​ PROJECT NUMBER 40296-013 ​ HALAGA NG LOAN Asian Development Fund $ 36.00 milyon ​ BANSA Armenia Ang Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Project ay naglalayon na pahusayin ang sistema ng supply ng tubig, sewerage, at mga pasilidad sa sanitasyon sa 16 na bayan o humigit-kumulang 125 na nayon sa Armenia. Inaasahan ng ADB na magdadala ito ng pagpapabuti sa kalusugan ng publiko at sa kapaligiran para sa 576,000 katao (humigit-kumulang). Ipinatupad ng Komisyon ng Estado sa Sistema ng Tubig, ang $36-milyong proyekto ng pautang ay kinabibilangan ng rehabilitasyon at pagpapalit ng nasirang imprastraktura ng suplay ng tubig sa pamamagitan ng pagbabawas ng pagtagas; pagpapabuti ng presyon ng suplay ng tubig; at pagtatayo ng mga bagong pangunahing tubo para sa mga bagong mamimili, partikular na ang mga komunidad na mababa ang kita. Tinutugunan din nito ang mga kinakailangan sa kalinisan sa mga bayan at nayon ng subproject, nililinis ang mga kasalukuyang imburnal, at pinapalitan ang mga nasira. MAHALAGANG ISYU Ang hindi magandang disenyo ng proyekto ay nagresulta sa pagkasira ng mga tubo at hindi magandang kalidad ng suplay ng tubig. Ang pagbubukod ng mga napiling natuklasan mula sa ulat ng pagsubaybay sa proyekto ay humantong din sa pagbubukod ng isang bilang ng mga residente ng Landjazat mula sa proyekto at iniwan silang walang koneksyon sa pangunahing tubo ng tubig. Ang Armenian Women for Health and Healthy Environment (AWHHE) ay sinusubaybayan ang proyekto sa ilang mga nayon. Sa pamamagitan ng interbensyon at tungkulin nito bilang tagapamagitan (facilitator), tumulong ang grupo na subaybayan ang kalidad ng suplay ng tubig at matukoy ang mga pagtagas ng tubig. Sa matagumpay na interbensyon ng AWHHE sa yugto ng pagpapatupad ng proyekto, pinahusay ng ADB ang disenyo ng proyekto.​